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INTRODUCTION
When the owner of a development files for bankruptcy and be-
comes a debtor-in-possession, ' a battle erupts over the revenues the
1. The primary objective of most developers in filing bankruptcy is to avoid pend-
ing or threatened state law remedies sought by the mortgagee, such as foreclosure or
receivership. By filing for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11, the owner of a
development becomes a "debtor-in-possession" under 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1988), and is
thus entitled to possession of the development and control over its day-to-day opera-
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development generates after the bankruptcy filing ("postpetition
revenues"). The debtor-in-possession-typically a partnership or
corporate entity that has no assets other than the development-
often wants to use these revenues to fund its reorganization efforts
and pay professional fees and expenses.2 In contrast, the mortga-
gee, to whom the developer granted a lien on the revenues, wants to
prevent the debtor's use of those revenues, which the mortgagee
claims as its "cash collateral" under section 363 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 3
To resolve this dispute, a bankruptcy court must categorize
those revenues as a particular type of collateral. If the development
is an apartment complex, for example, the bankruptcy courts usu-
ally characterize the revenues as "rents." The bankruptcy court
then must ask (a) whether the mortgagee obtained a perfected
prepetition security interest in that type of collateral and (b)
whether that perfected security interest attaches to the postpetition
revenues. Generally, section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides that property received by a debtor postpetition is not subject
to any prebankruptcy security agreement. 4 If section 552(a) applied
to the development, a mortgagee with a lien upon the rents would
lose its lien upon postpetition rents. Section 552(b) provides protec-
tion for the commercial mortgagee, however, by allowing the mort-
gagee to maintain its lien against the postpetition "proceeds,"
"rents," or "profits" of the development to the extent provided by
the mortgage and applicable law.5 Thus, if the mortgagee has a
valid and properly perfected prepetition lien upon the development
and its rents, section 552(b) permits the mortgagee to retain its lien
against the postpetition rents.
Enterprising developers and their creative attorneys, however,
have used the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and uncertainties
tions. Id. § 541 (development constitutes property of the estate); § 1107(a) (debtor-in-
possession entitled to general powers of trustee, including possession of property of es-
tate); § 1108 (debtor-in-possession entitled to operate business).
2. See, e.g., Robert A. Silverman & Bruce Grohsgal, Critical Issues in Single-Asset
Real Estate Bankruptcies, REAL EST. REV., Summer 1992, at 30, 31.
3. Section 363(a) defines "cash collateral" to include "cash . . . or other cash
equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity other than the estate
have an interest and includes the proceeds .... rents, or profits of property subject to a
security interest .... " 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988). The debtor-in-possession may not
use a creditor's cash collateral unless that creditor consents or unless the court autho-
rizes that use following notice and a hearing. Id. § 363(c)(2).
4. Id. § 552(a).
5. Id. § 552(b).
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in state real property laws to avoid the effect of section 552(b). 6 The
focus on this article is one such uncertainty-the treatment of a
hotel mortgagee's lien upon hotel room revenues. In many com-
mercial land developments-such as shopping centers, office build-
ings, or apartment complexes-the developer and the occupier
stand in a relationship of landlord and tenant in which the tenant
clearly pays "rent." Bankruptcy courts administering distressed
projects of this type uniformly have held that if a mortgagee pos-
sesses a validly perfected prepetition lien against the "rents" of such
a development, then the mortgagee's lien falls within the protec-
tions of section 552(b). 7
In many other developments, however, the developer and the
occupier do not stand in the relationship of landlord and tenant. In
some commercial land developments, the occupier might be only a
licensee. Examples of this type of project include nursing homes s
parking garages, 9 golf courses, 10 and student dormitories,"1 but by
6. One such uncertainty, which is not the primary focus of this Article but is
discussed briefly infra note 265, concerns what action is necessary for a mortgagee to
have a perfected security interest in rents. Under the Supreme Court's landmark deci-
sion in Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979), state law determines the extent to
which a secured creditor's lien upon rents is enforceable in bankruptcy. The primacy of
state real estate laws, which may vary significantly from state to state, has generated
conflict in the bankruptcy courts as to when a mortgagee's security interest in rents is
"perfected." Some courts have concluded that certain states' laws permit a mortgagee
to perfect its lien upon rents by duly recording its assignment of rents on the real estate
records. See, e.g., In re Raleigh/Spring Forest Apartments Assocs., 118 B.R. 42, 44-45
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990) (security interest in rents perfected upon recording of assign-
ment of rents); In re Metro Square, 106 B.R. 584, 587 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) (same).
Other courts have concluded that the relevant state law requires a mortgagee to take
actual or constructive possession of the realty following default in order to perfect its
lien upon rents. See, e.g., In re Village Properties, Ltd., 723 F.2d 441, 443-47 (5th Cir.
1984) (security interest in rents unperfected where mortgagee had not obtained posses-
sion of property, impounded rents, or secured appointment of receiver); In re Prichard
Plaza Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 84 B.R. 289, 293-97 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (same);
see also Craig H. Averch, The Heartbreak Hotel for Secured Lenders: When Postpeti-
tion Revenue from a Hotel Is Not Subject to a Prepetition Security Interest, 107 BANK-
ING L.J. 484, 485 n.3 (1990) (collecting cases). As discussed infra Part III, this
nonuniformity in the treatment of identical transactions is not justifiable in terms of
sound commercial policy.
7. See, e.g., In re Metro Square, 106 B.R. 584, 587 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989).
8. See In re Hillside Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 121 B.R. 23 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990)
(nursing home residents are licensees); In re Woodstock Assocs. I, Inc., 120 B.R. 436
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (same).
9. See, e.g., In re Ashford Apartments Ltd. Partnership, 132 B.R. 217 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1991) (parking garage users called licensees).
10. See, e.g., In re GGVXX, Ltd., 130 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (golfers
characterized as licensees).
11. See, e.g., Cook v. University Plaza, 427 N.E.2d 405 (I11. App. Ct. 1981) (resi-
dents of privately-owned student dorm not "tenants" but "licensees").
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far the most common is the hotel. Most bankruptcy courts ad-
ministering distressed hotels have held that a mortgagee's lien upon
room revenues does not survive the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
According to these courts, because there is no landlord-tenant rela-
tionship between the developer and the guests, the sums paid by the
guests cannot constitute "rents" of the hotel. 12 When the developer
files its bankruptcy petition, therefore, section 552(b) does not pro-
tect the mortgagee's lien upon room revenues, even if that lien was
validly perfected under state law prior to bankruptcy. As a result,
the mortgagee's lien becomes inoperative against postpetition room
revenues under section 552(a).
Regrettably, these hotel bankruptcy decisions do not thought-
fully address the nature of the income generated by a commercial
real estate development. Is there any relevant difference between
the income produced by a hotel and that generated by an apartment
complex? In today's modem commercial environment, should the
sanctity of the mortgagee's lien upon that income depend upon
whether it is paid by a tenant as opposed to a licensee? Fortunately,
the American Law Institute, in the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Property-Security (Mortgages), has now focused some thoughtful
attention upon these questions. In Tentative Draft No. 2 of the pro-
posed Restatement, the drafters define "rents" as "the proceeds pay-
able by a lessee, licensee, or other person for the right to possess,
use, or occupy the real property of another."1 3 Pursuant to this
suggested reform, hotel room revenues, parking fees and all other
sums paid in exchange for the temporary right to use, occupy, or
possess the land of another would be treated as "rents" in the na-
ture of realty. 14
This Article is intended to continue the dialogue begun by the
proposed Restatement and has two distinct goals in this effort.
Parts I through III argue that the position of the Restatement draft-
ers is both legally and functionally sound and that bankruptcy
courts should embrace and apply the proposed Restatement in ad-
ministering distressed real estate developments. Part I reviews the
reasoning articulated in the hotel bankruptcy cases, demonstrating
how courts have applied the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and
state law in a formalistic manner to extinguish the hotel mortga-
12. See infra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY-SECURITY (MORTGAGES) § 4.2(a)
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1992) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
14. Id. illus. 7 (hotel room revenues); id. illus. 9 (parking lot revenues).
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gee's lien upon postpetition room revenues.15 Part II rejects the
analysis of the hotel bankruptcy cases on legal grounds. Although
the drafters of the proposed Restatement appear to base their rec-
ommendations purely upon the functional similarity of rents and
hotel room revenues, 16 bankruptcy courts properly may character-
ize hotel room revenues as "rent" in the nature of real property.
The notion that a licensee may pay "rent" in exchange for its con-
stituent rights respecting the land is consistent with the original
common law scope of the term "rent," as well as the nature and
scope of the term within the civil law tradition.17 Part III then crit-
icizes the hotel bankruptcy cases on policy grounds, demonstrating
that financial and economic realities do not justify distinguishing
between real estate projects based solely upon the status of the occu-
pier as a tenant rather than a licensee. To the developer and the
mortgagee, the occupancy revenues generated by the apartment and
the hotel are economically identical. Accordingly, sound commer-
cial policy dictates that security law should treat hotel mortgagees
with liens upon hotel room revenues no differently than apartment
mortgagees holding liens upon rents.18
In Part IV, this Article shifts away from the hotel bankruptcy
cases to focus on broader questions that the proposed Restatement
and bankruptcy court jurisprudence have not addressed. What is
the true nature of the income paid in exchange for the right to oc-
cupy real estate? What consequences follow for the manner in
which parties document commercial real estate transactions and
bankruptcy courts administer distressed developments? Part IV be-
gins by questioning whether the term "rent" (with its attendant
common law baggage) continues to be a useful concept for describ-
ing the revenue produced by the modem commercial land develop-
ment. Bankruptcy courts and orthodox real estate finance law
characterize real estate income as either "rent" (in the nature of
realty) or "nonrent" (in the nature of personalty) depending upon
whether the income was paid for the use of land or for the provision
of services.1 9 This historical distinction has diminished meaning
and validity when applied to the occupier of the modem commer-
cial land development, who contracts not for the bare use of land,
15. See infra notes 23-57 and accompanying text.
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 4.2 reporter's note.
17. See infra notes 58-148 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 149-186 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
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but for an inseparable mix of space and services that together con-
stitute a developer's "product." 20
Part IV suggests that property security law should not con-
tinue to treat sums paid by commercial occupants as "rent" in the
nature of realty, but should instead employ different conceptual
paradigms. In reality, the modem commercial real estate develop-
ment is a depreciating capital asset with a finite productive capacity
and a limited useful economic life. Its value is a function of the
revenues that it can generate over its economic life. Sums paid by
occupiers during that useful life constitute the proceeds of the de-
velopment's economic value, as that value is consumed over time.
Thus, security law should treat these sums as "proceeds" of the de-
velopment, so that a lien upon such sums would be protected in
bankruptcy under section 552(b). 21 Furthermore, the developer's
consumption of the development's economic value over time is not
different in substance from an outright sale of the development. As
Part IV argues, it is inconsistent to treat a mortgagee's interest in
"rent" as real estate collateral while treating an installment land
contract vendor's interest in contract payments as personalty. In-
stead, Part IV suggests that all income generated pursuant to con-
tracts in which one party purchases an interest in land from another
should be treated as personalty when pledged as security, with liens
upon such income being governed by Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code.22
I. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS
AND THE TREATMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN HOTEL
ROOM REVENUES
A. The Nature of the Guest's Interest and Obligation
In introducing their first-year students to the subject of land-
lord and tenant, Professors Edward Rabin and Roberta Kwall pro-
vide the following caveat:
Lease or license? A license, unlike a lease, is not a posses-
sory interest in land. A license merely authorizes the licensee to
use land in the possession of another. The license arises from the
consent of the owner of the possessory interest. Since different
rules govern licenses and leases, it is often necessary to distin-
guish between them .... One should resist the temptation to
20. See infra notes 192-219 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 220-250 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 251-267 and accompanying text.
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approach such questions from too high a level of abstraction.
The practical context in which the question of lease or license is
raised must never be overlooked. A court will be reluctant to
find that a particular arrangement is a "license" if this will create
an injustice or thwart an important public policy. In fact, one
may question whether any controversy should ever be decided
merely by classifying the interest involved as a lease or a license.23
One suspects that the students of Professors Rabin and Kwall, des-
perate to accord a single understanding to each new concept (as
first-year students often are), probably fail to understand the larger
message underlying this caveat-one should never decide how to
allocate property rights between parties to a dispute without consid-
ering the context in which the dispute arises.
Unfortunately, bankruptcy courts faced with resolving the
debtor/mortgagee dispute over postpetition hotel room revenues
also seem to have forgotten this message. In hotel bankruptcy
cases, the courts have chosen to classify hotel room revenues based
on the legal relationship between the hotel owner and its guests. A
hotel, of course, typically does not involve "real estate leases," that
is, conveyances that create a nonfreehold estate. A hotel guest in-
stead receives a mere contractual right to occupy her assigned
room, which courts typically have classified as a license.24 If the
owner or a third party wrongfully interferes with the guest's right to
occupy that room, the guest's remedy is for contract damages; the
guest has no legal remedy that entitles her to recover occupation of
the room, unlike the tenant, who may recover possession of the de-
mised premises. 25
In theory, this distinction between the remedies of the tenant
and the hotel guest merely clarifies their respective positions vis-fi-
vis the owner of the premises. This distinction has no necessary
consequence in characterizing the nature of their respective obliga-
tions. Nevertheless, the vast majority of bankruptcy courts have
relied upon this distinction to conclude that a hotel mortgagee has
23. EDWARD H. RABIN & ROBERTA R. KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN
REAL PROPERTY LAW 26-27 (3d ed. 1992) (emphasis added).
24. See, e.g., NATHAN KALT,.LEGAL ASPECTS OF HOTEL, MOTEL, AND RESTAU-
RANT OPERATION 28-31 (1971); HENDRIK ZWARENSTEYN, FUNDAMENTALS OF Ho-
TEL LAW 50 (1963).
25. See, e.g., In re Greater Atl. & Pac. Inv. Group, 88 B.R. 356, 359 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1988) ("As a general rule . . . 'guests in a hotel . . . are mere licensees and not
tenants, and.., they have only a personal contract and acquire no interest in the realty
... the relation is not that of landlord and tenant, for, notwithstanding the guest's
occupancy, it is the house of the innkeeper.' ") (quoting 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord &
Tenant § 6 (1970)).
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no lien upon room revenues because those revenues are not "rents"
in the nature of real property. 26 The decision of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota in In re Mid-City
Hotel Associates 27 typifies the analysis of these courts. The mortga-
gee in Mid-City, Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Pru-
dential"), obtained and recorded an assignment of rents, issues,
profits and revenues from the debtor Mid-City Hotel Associates,
which owned and operated the Minneapolis Metrodome Hilton.
Following its bankruptcy filing, the debtor sued Prudential, arguing
that the assignment of rents, issues, profits and revenues did not
create an enforceable lien against room revenues. The debtor ar-
gued that room revenues do not constitute "rents," because" 'rents'
must be restricted to income arising out of a landlord-tenant rela-
tionship-that relationship based on a tenancy of real estate for a
fixed term, and those funds paid in consideration for the exclusive
use and occupancy of such real estate."
'28
The Mid-City court began its analysis by contrasting a hotel
guest, who "holds nothing more than a license to enter on the hotel
premises," with a tenant, who "holds a legally-cognizable interest in
26. See, e.g., In re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. 543, 546-48 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991);
In re General Associated Investors Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R. 756, 759-62 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1993); In re Thunderbird Inn, Inc., 151 B.R. 224, 226-27 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993);
In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership, 148 B.R. 456, 459-63 (E.D. La. 1992); Finan-
cial Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Days Cal. Riverside Ltd. Partnership, No. S-92-119GEB,
1992 WL 471706, at *2-4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 1992); In re Tri-Growth Centre City,
Ltd., 133 B.R. 524, 526 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1991); In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners,
133 B.R. 850, 854 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991); In re Nendels-Medford Joint Venture, 127
B.R. 658, 663-68 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991); In re Majestic Motel Assocs., 131 B.R. 523,
526 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991); In re Shore Haven Motor Inn, Inc., 124 B.R. 617, 618
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); In re Airport Inn Assocs., Ltd., 132 B.R. 951, 954 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1990); In re Sacramento Mansion, Ltd., 117 B.R. 592, 606 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990); In re Oceanview/Virginia Beach Real Estate Assocs., 116 B.R. 57, 58-59
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re M. Vickers, Ltd., 111 BR. 332, 335-37 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990); In re Investment Hotel Properties, 109 B.R. 990, 993 -94 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990);
In re Kearney Hotel Partners, 92 B.R. 95, 98-102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re
Greater Atl. & Pac. Inv. Group, 88 B.R. 356, 359 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988); In re
Ashkenazy Enters., 94 B.R. 645, 646-47 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986); United States v. PS
Hotel Corp., 404 F. Supp. 1188, 1191-92 (E.D. Mo. 1975). But see In re S.F. Drake
Hotel Assocs., 131 B.R. 156, 158-61 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991) (hotel room revenues are
rents), aff'd, 147 B.R. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see also In re Mid-City Hotel Assocs., 114
B.R. 634, 638-42 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (hotel room revenues are not rents but are
profits in nature of realty).
27. 114 B.R. 634 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
28. Id. at 638.
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the real estate itself."'29 The court then noted that "a tenant pays
'rents' in consideration for his use and occupancy of real estate."' 30
From these premises, the court concluded:
By negative inference if nothing else, then, a hotel guest does not
pay "rent." Rather, the guest pays a room rate to the host in
consideration for a license to enter and make temporary use of a
portion of the host's real estate for a limited time, and for a lim-
ited purpose.
Room rates, thus, cannot be legally categorized as
",rents.",3 1
According to other courts that have adhered to this reasoning,
hotel room revenues are not "rents," but instead constitute personal
property in the nature of "accounts," 32 such that a mortgagee's lien
upon room revenues is governed not by real estate law but by Arti-
cle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). 3 3 By classifying
hotel room revenues in this fashion, bankruptcy courts have effec-
tively extinguished the hotel mortgagee's bargained-for lien upon
room revenues through one of two statutory traps--either UCC
section 9-104(j) or Bankruptcy Code section 552(a).
B. The UCC Section 9-1040) Trap
Article 9 of the UCC governs only those transactions intended
to create security interests in personalty. 34 Consistent with this pur-
pose, section 9-104(j) excludes from Article 9's scope any transac-
tion intended to create a security interest in real estate, such as a
real property lease or rents. 35 For example, in the typical commer-
cial mortgage transaction for an apartment complex, the owner
pledges both the complex and its leases and rents as security for the
29. Id. at 640-41 (citations omitted). Of course, one can also characterize a hotel
guest's license as a legally cognizable interest in land. See infra notes 130-147 and
accompanying text.
30. 114 B.R. at 641.
31. Id.
32. The UCC defines "account" as "any right to payment for goods sold or leased
or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper,
whether or not it has been earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1987). As dis-
cussed in Part IV of this Article, many bankruptcy courts have concluded that "hotel
revenues constitute service income, rather than income generated by the real property
collateral; therefore, the 'services' and not the realty create the accounts .... Averch,
supra note 6, at 490 (discussing rationale of hotel bankruptcy decisions).
33. As discussed in Part III.C infra, the Mid-City Hotel court held that even
though hotel revenues were not "rents," they did constitute "profits" of the hotel and
were thus interests in land subject to Prudential's lien. Mid-City Hotel, 114 B.R. at
641-42.
34. See U.C.C. § 9-102(1) (1987).
35. Id. § 9-104(j).
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mortgage debt. Since section 9-104(j) excludes these security inter-
ests from Article 9, the mortgagee's lien against the rents is gov-
erned by real estate law.
In the typical hotel mortgage transaction, the developer also
pledges both the hotel and its revenues as security. 36 In many "old"
hotel mortgage transactions (those documented seven to ten years
ago or longer), many developers and mortgagees apparently as-
sumed that because room revenues were generated by the tempo-
rary occupation of real estate, they were "rent" in the nature of
realty.37 Based upon this assumption, many such hotels were fi-
nanced with documents entitled "Assignments of Rents," which ef-
fectively granted security interests in "rents," "issues," and
"profits," but not an Article 9 security interest in accounts.
Bankruptcy courts analyzing such hotel financing transactions
have concluded with near unanimity that since room revenues are
not "rents," the mortgagee has no security interest in the room rev-
enues. 38 The decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma in In re Greater Atlantic and
36. See Averch, supra note 6, at 484 ("The loan amount funded by a lender secured
by income-producing real properties... is generally calculated on the projected revenue
generated from the property. Therefore a lien on the revenue generated from an in-
come-producing property is vital to properly collateralize a loan on such real prop-
erty.") (footnotes omitted); see also In re S.F. Drake Hotel Assocs., 131 B.R. 156, 160
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991) ("Hotel room revenues are, or resemble, rents in that they are
a primary component used by appraisers in valuing a hotel. The value of the income
stream, rents, is a major factor in determining the value of the real property. The in-
come is what the debtor and the secured lender look to for payment of the loan.").
37. See, e.g., Ricardo R. Calderon, The Significance and Implications of the Rents
Versus Accounts Receivable Debate in Hotel Bankruptcies, 21 REAL EsT. L.J. 136, 138
(1992) ("Until recently, the ability of a lender to insure its right to the stream of income
(generated by a hotel] during the pendency of a bankruptcy had been thought achieva-
ble by virtue of the execution and proper recordation of an assignment of leases and
rents and a mortgage.").
38. See, e.g., In re General Associated Investors Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R. 756,
759-62 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993); In re Tri-Growth Centre City, Ltd., 133 B.R. 524, 526
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1991); In re Majestic Motel Assocs., 131 B.R. 523, 526 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1991); In re Shore Haven Motor Inn, Inc., 124 B.R. 617, 618 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1991); In re Oceanview/Virginia Beach Real Estate Assocs., 116 B.R. 57, 58-59
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re M. Vickers, Ltd., 111 B.R. 332, 335-37 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1990); In re Greater Atl. & Pac. Inv. Group, 88 B.R. 356, 359 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
1988); In re Ashkenazy Enters., 94 B.R. 645, 646-47 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986); see also
In re Anderson, 137 B.R. 819, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (revenues generated by feed-
lot operation analogous to hotel revenues, do not constitute "rent").
According to these bankruptcy courts, the hotel mortgagee can provide itself "pro-
tection" versus hotel room revenues by obtaining and perfecting an Article 9 security
interest in accounts receivable. As discussed infra notes 44-57 and accompanying text,
however, these same bankruptcy courts have concluded that this "protection" becomes
meaningless once the hotel owner files for bankruptcy, since at that time Bankruptcy
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Pacific Investment Group, Inc. 39 is typical of these cases. The
debtor in that case owned a Holiday Inn in Branson, Missouri,
upon which it had granted a mortgage and an assignment of all
"rents, issues and profits" of the hotel.40 The mortgagee sued to
prevent the trustee from using room revenues. The court, however,
allowed the trustee to operate the hotel under a stipulated order
that permitted the trustee to use "postpetition rents receivable. '41
The trustee operated under this order for eighteen months, generat-
ing a surplus of net operating revenues upon which the mortgagee
claimed a lien. 42 Despite the terminology of the earlier stipulated
order, however, the court held that the mortgagee never had any
lien upon room revenues, because the room revenues were not
"rents" but "accounts" which were not described in the mortga-
gee's loan documents. 43
C. The Bankruptcy Code Section 552(a) Trap
One might argue that hotel mortgagees who run afoul of UCC
section 9-104(j) suffer the consequences of their own omissions.
Why stretch to protect a hotel mortgagee that could have protected
itself by obtaining and properly perfecting a security interest in ac-
counts under Article 9? The answer is that simple compliance with
Article 9 does not cure the mortgagee's problem. According to the
Code § 552(a) effectively extinguishes the hotel mortgagee's lien against postpetition
room revenues.
39. 88 B.R. 356 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988).
40. Id. at 357-58.
41. Id. at 358. The order further provided that the mortgagee's lien against
"postpetition rents receivable" would be valid to the same extent as its lien against
"prepetition rents receivable." Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 359-60. In other hotel cases, the mortgagees' loan documents did de-
scribe accounts as collateral, but the mortgagees (perhaps assuming room revenues were
rents in the nature of realty) failed to file financing statements in the central UCC
records. One example is the unfortunate purchase-money seller of a Kearney, Nebraska
Holiday Inn in In re Kearney Hotel Partners, 92 B.R. 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). The
seller's deed of trust included as collateral all fixtures, rents, proceeds, and revenue of
any nature derived from the hotel. Id. at 96. While the seller recorded notice of its
liens in the realty records, it did not file UCC financing statements with the Nebraska
Secretary of State. Id. at 97. During bankruptcy, the debtor's operations generated
$2.8 million of postpetition room revenues. The debtor sought to avoid the seller's
claimed lien against this sum, contending that the seller's lien was unperfected and thus
avoidable under Bankruptcy Code § 544(a) (which accords debtors-in-possession the
status of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor, who would prevail over unperfected secur-
ity interests under UCC § 9-301(l)(b)). The court agreed, concluding that the $2.8
million was not "rent" but "accounts" in which the seller had an unperfected security
interest avoidable in bankruptcy. Id. at 98-103; see also In re Punta Gorda Assocs., 137
B.R. 535, 537 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
1472
HeinOnline  -- 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1472 1992-1993
1993] COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCE
majority of bankruptcy courts that have considered the question,
Bankruptcy Code section 552(a) will effectively extinguish a hotel
mortgagee's validly perfected prepetition security interest in
accounts.
Section 552(a) provides that a prepetition security agreement
does not affect property that a debtor's estate acquires postpeti-
tion." This section prevents a secured creditor's prepetition float-
ing lien from attaching to property acquired postpetition. A
secured party holds a floating lien when it holds a security interest
in all of a particular type of collateral owned by a debtor, whether
owned now or acquired in the future. For example, if First Bank
holds a floating lien upon XYZ Co.'s "equipment," it has a security
interest in all equipment currently owned by XYZ Co. and any
equipment that XYZ Co. acquires in the future. Outside of bank-
ruptcy, there is no question that First Bank's floating lien is valid
and enforceable.45 Once XYZ Co. files for bankruptcy, however,
section 552(a) terminates the prospective impact of First Bank's
floating lien. If XYZ Co. acquires ten new machines after bank-
ruptcy, First Bank's security interest will not attach to those
machines.
Despite its harsh consequences for secured creditors like First
Bank, section 552(a) is necessary and appropriate to implement the
Code's broad policy goal of assisting debtors to rehabilitate them-
selves.46 Section 552(a)'s impact upon the creditor's lien, however,
is only prospective. Section 552(a) does not affect the validity of the
creditor's lien against prepetition collateral. If First Bank had a
valid and properly perfected prepetition lien upon XYZ Co.'s equip-
ment, then First Bank continues to retain its lien upon all equip-
ment owned by XYZ Co. prepetition.
But suppose that XYZ Co. sells or leases two pieces of prepeti-
tion collateral after the petition date. Does the creditor's lien attach
to the proceeds of the sales or the rental income collected by XYZ
Co.? To clarify that section 552(a) is not intended to affect the
creditor's lien against such funds, Congress added section 552(b):
44. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988).
45. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1987) ("[A] security agreement may provide that any or all
obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired
collateral.").
46. If postpetition property is not subject to a prepetition security agreement, then
the debtor can use property acquired postpetition to secure the financing necessary to
assist in an orderly rehabilitation. See, e.g., In re Photo Promotion Assocs., 53 B.R.
759, 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Lawrence, 41 B.R. 36, 37 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1984).
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[I]f the debtor and [the secured party] entered into a security
agreement before the commencement of the case and if the secur-
ity interest created by such security agreement extends to prop-
erty of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the case
and to proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of such prop-
erty, then such security interest extends to such proceeds, prod-
uct, offspring, rents, or profits acquired by the estate after the
commencement of the case to the extent provided by such secur-
ity agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law .... 47
Under section 552(b), if the debtor sells or leases prepetition collat-
eral, and the security agreement gives the secured party a lien upon
the proceeds, rents, or profits of the collateral, the secured party's
lien attaches to any proceeds, rents, or profits that the debtor re-
ceives postpetition. 48 This provision affords critical protection for
the mortgagee of a typical apartment complex; under section
552(b), a mortgagee with a valid and enforceable prepetition lien
upon the complex and its rents also has a lien against postpetition
rents if the owner files for bankruptcy. Because those postpetition
rents will constitute the mortgagee's cash collateral, the debtor will
be unable to use them unless the debtor can adequately protect the
mortgagee's interest. 49
According to the majority of bankruptcy courts considering
the issue, however, a hotel mortgagee does not deserve similar treat-
ment. These courts have concluded that "rents" and "profits" as
used in section 552(b) mean "rents and profits" in the nature of
realty; since hotel guests are not tenants and thus cannot pay
"rent," room revenues are not rents or profits within the meaning of
section 552(b). 50 Instead, these courts have characterized room rev-
47. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988) (emphasis added). Section 552(b) was enacted in its
present form in 1978, well before the current debate over the characterization of hotel
room revenues.
48. See 124 CONG. REC. H 11,097 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (floor statement of Rep.
Edwards upon compromise version of § 552(b)) ("Proceeds coverage, but not after ac-
quired property clauses, are valid under title 11."); 124 CONG. REc. S17,414 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1978) (floor statement of Sen. DeConcini) (same).
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988).
50. See, e.g., In re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. 543, 548 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991); In
re The Green Corp., No. 92-10903, 1993 WL 180921, at *4-7 (Bankr. D. Me. May 18,
1993); In re General Associated Investors Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R. 756, 759-62
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993); In re Thunderbird Inn, Inc., 151 B.R. 224, 226-27 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1993); Financial Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Days Cal. Riverside Ltd. Partnership,
No. S-92-119GEB, 1992 WL 471706, at *24 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 1992); In re Corpus
Christi Hotel Partners, 133 B.R. 850, 854-55 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991); In re Airport
Inn Assocs., 132 B.R. 951, 960 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991); In re Sacramento Mansion,
Ltd., 117 B.R. 592, 602-07 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re Investment Hotel Properties,
109 B.R. 990, 994-97 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).
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enues as accounts and have applied section 552(a) to defeat the
mortgagee's lien upon postpetition room revenues.
The decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in In re Northview
Corp. 51 typifies these cases. Calmark Properties, Inc. ("Calmark"),
a subsidiary of the debtor Northview Corp. ("Northview"), leased
two California hotels, each encumbered by a leasehold deed of trust
in favor of Greyhound Real Estate Finance Company ("Grey-
hound"). The deeds of trust granted Greyhound a lien upon "all
income, rents, royalties, revenues, issues, profits, fees, and other
proceeds" of the hotels.52 Greyhound properly recorded the deeds
of trust and filed accurate UCC- 1 financing statements in all re-
quired offices. 53 Immediately after Northview fied a Chapter 11
petition,54 Greyhound moved to condition Northview's use of the
hotels' room revenues. The court noted that Greyhound's filings
gave it a perfected security interest in prepetition room revenues,
but still denied Greyhound's motion, concluding that Greyhound
possessed no security interest in postpetition room revenues under
section 552(a).55 The court rejected Greyhound's position that the
room revenues were "rents," "profits," or "proceeds" under section
552(b):
The revenues are not "proceeds," which refers to secured pre-
petition personal property which is converted into some other
property. Nor are the revenues "profits," which refers to sale of
real property to which a security interest was attached and per-
fected before the bankruptcy filing. Finally, the revenues are
closest in kind to "rents," since they are generated by the hotels'
provision of room rentals and related services and do not arise
from the mere conversion of pre-petition collateral. However, as
discussed revenues must be deemed "accounts" and not "rents"
in light of the case authority on this question.5 6
51. 130 B.R. 543 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991).
52. Id. at 544. The deeds of trust also contained a specific assignment of rents
provision, under which Calmark assigned "all income, rents, royalties, revenues, issues,
profits, fees, and other proceeds (including, without limitation, room sales)" from the
hotels. Id. at 545.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 543, 545. Immediately before the filing, Calmark had assigned its inter-
est in the leases back to Northview, apparently out of concern that the original transfer
of the leases to Calmark would have been an avoidable transfer under 11 U.S.C. § 548.
Id. at 545.
55. Id. at 545-46.
56. Id. at 548 (citations omitted). The Northview court's definition of "profits"
seems clearly at odds with a plethora of court decisions indicating that the meaning of
"profits" as used in the term "rents and profits" is either synonymous with rents, see
Grusmark v. Echelman, 162 F. Supp. 49, 51 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), or is a broader term
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With its reasoning sagging under the weight of bankruptcy court
authority, the court permitted Northview to use fifteen months'
worth of net postpetition room revenues free and clear of Grey-
hound's prepetition lien. 57
II. CONCEPTUAL FORMALISM AND THE HOTEL BANKRUPTCY
CASES-CAN HOTEL ROOM REVENUES BE "RENTS"?
The hotel bankruptcy cases discussed above are monuments to
the danger of conceptual formalism in legal analysis. John Dewar
has characterized conceptual formalism
as the view that either judges do, or ought to, decide cases ac-
cording to a limited range of pre-ordained conceptual categories;
that the categories have distinguishable features and conse-
quences, and that it is the task of the judge to determine whether
the differing conceptual requirements are satisfied, and to allow
the result to be dictated accordingly. Put another way, "concep-
tual formalism" is characterised by a refusal to regard anything
other than conceptual arguments (and some strictly limited "pol-
icy" arguments) as reasons or justifications for decisions, or as
the basis for criticism. At the same time, there is a compara-
that includes rents, see Fairchild v. Gray, 242 N.Y.S. 192, 196 (Cayuga County Ct.
1930); see also KENELM E. DIGBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY 231 (1875) (treating "rents" as subset of "profits"); 1 HERBERT T.
TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 165, at 1009
(1910) (rent issues directly out of land, "as part of its actual or possible profits").
As Part IV argues, the Northview court's definition of the term "proceeds" can be
criticized on policy grounds, since as an economic matter room revenues can be charac-
terized as proceeds of the hotel's economic value. See infra notes 220-250 and accom-
panying text.
57. To add insult to injury, § 552(a) will continue to deny the hotel mortgagee any
lien upon room revenues generated throughout the bankruptcy, which provides the
debtor with extra revenue for a hostile plan confirmation battle with the mortgagee. See
Silverman & Grohsgal, supra note 2, at 31. Giving the debtor unfettered control of
project cash flows thus provides. the debtor with a substantial disincentive to seek
prompt confirmation of a reorganization plan.
One commentator has argued that a mortgagee's secured claim against the debtor
should be valued at zero if the debtor avoids the mortgagee's lien against postpetition
revenues:
The value would have to be the value of sticks and bricks comprising the
hotel without the income produced therefrom. A common basis for valu-
ing income-producing properties is the "income approach." Using the
"income approach" to value a creditor's lien on a hotel, postpetition,
would necessarily result in a zero value. Imagine the secured creditor's
dismay when confronted with the debtor's argument that the debtor only
has to pay the present value of the creditor's secured claim and the value
of the security (the lien on the postpetition revenue) is equal to zero.
Averch, supra note 6, at 504 (footnotes omitted). Averch's position is certainly correct
as an economic matter. See infra Part III. Fortunately, it has not yet been embraced by
any bankruptcy courts.
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tively narrow intellectual concern with defining the limits of, and
differences between, conceptual categories. 58
The influence of conceptual formalism in the hotel bankruptcy cases
is obvious. No one can question the premise that tenants pay rent,
but it is quite another thing to say that only a tenant pays rent. Yet
the hotel bankruptcy cases are based upon the assumption that the
latter conclusion conceptually follows from the former-because
tenants pay rent, the term "rent" is limited to payments made to a
landlord by a tenant who possesses a nonfreehold estate. 59
This conception of "rent" is both illogical and historically
wrong. Part II traces the historical parameters of the common
law's conception of rent and demonstrates that the conceptual for-
malism of the hotel bankruptcy cases narrows the meaning of
"rent" beyond its original scope. The common law did not limit the
term "rent" solely to the landlord-tenant relationship;6° instead,
the term reflected the payment obligation incurred by an occupier
of land in exchange for the right of occupation bestowed under his
agreement with the landowner. Based upon the historical parame-
ters of the term "rent," as well as other theoretical and judicial con-
ceptions of the term,61 Part II argues that security law could
characterize hotel room revenues (and other license fees paid by oc-
cupiers of iand) as rents and profits in the nature of realty.
58. John Dewar, Licenses and Land Law: An Alternative View, 49 MOD. L. REV.
741, 742 (1986); see also Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE
L.J. 1017, 1026 (1981) (characterizing tendency toward formalism as "Cartesianism,"
or "the intellectual strategy of constructing highly simplified models of social reality for
the sake of analytic rigor and elegance," and noting that such an approach is often
typified by selective use of history). As discussed infra notes 62-148 and accompanying
text, the analysis of the hotel bankruptcy cases likewise suffers from blind adherence to
an inaccurate historical conception of rent as being inextricably bound to the landlord-
tenant relationship.
59. See, e.g., In re Majestic Motel Assocs., 131 B.R. 523, 525-26 (Bankr. D. Me.
1991) (" '[R]ent' is associated with payments on behalf of a tenant for his interest in real
property .... A hotel guest does not obtain an interest in the underlying real property
but is a mere licensee with a personal right to use the premises."); In re Nendels-Med-
ford Joint Venture, 127 B.R. 658, 663 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991) ("IT]he term rents... is
limited to payment for the right to possession, use and control of a legally cognizable
interest in the referenced real estate."); In re Mid-City Hotel Assocs., 114 B.R. 634, 641
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) ("A tenant pays 'rents' in consideration for his use and occu-
pancy of real estate for the term of his lease-i.e., for his legal interest in that real estate.
By negative inference if nothing else, then, a hotel guest does not pay 'rent.' ").
60. See infra notes 62-89 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 100-148 and accompanying text.
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A. The Early Common Law Conception of "Rent"
1. The Early Common Law Real Property Lease
Following the Norman Conquest, tenure became the basis for
the ownership of land in England. Ultimate ownership of land was
vested in the King; the King's transferees (his "tenants") held the
land of the King in exchange for performing feudal services for the
King. In turn, the King's immediate tenants became lords in their
own right, transferring to a new tenant the right to possess and oc-
cupy their land in exchange for feudal services. This process of
"subinfeudation" led to a lengthening feudal chain of landholding,
in which D (the occupier of certain land) might hold of C, who held
of B, who held of A, who held of the King.62
The sanctity of the occupier's right to occupy the land, how-
ever, depended upon whether the occupier was considered to be
"seised" of a free tenement. An occupier who was so seised was a
"freeholder," and had the benefit of the assize of novel disseisin, the
great possessory remedy by which one who was seised of land and
who had been dispossessed wrongfully could recover possession of
the land.63 Yet not all land in England was occupied by persons
who were seised of free tenements. Two significant occupiers of
land, villein tenants and lessees, were not seised of the land at all.
The first such occupier, the villein, stood in a relationship of lord
and tenant with the landowner, holding the land in exchange for
feudal services. 64 But the villein's occupation of the land was preca-
rious; if the villein was ejected from the land, he had no recourse to
62. THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND
AND FUTURE INTERESTS 1-6 (2d ed. 1984).
63. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 116-19
(1969); THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
358-60 (5th ed. 1956); ALFRED W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAW 28-33,
40-44 (2d ed. 1986).
64. Unlike the freeholder, whose services were fixed by his grant, the vilein's ser-
vices were prescribed by his lord periodically, even day to day. R.E. MEGARRY &
H.W.R. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 22 (5th ed. 1984) ("When villeins 'go to
bed on Sunday night they do not know what Monday's work will be'; it might be ditch-
ing, it might be threshing, it might be driving a cart.") (quoting 1 SIR FREDERICK
POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 371 (1968)).
The typical villein fulfilled three sets of obligations:
[T]he first, imposed by the custom of the manor and enforced by the
manorial court, consisted both of the rendering of services and the pay-
ment of rents to the lord of the manor; the second, political in origin, but
influenced during the feudal period by manorial custom, consisted chiefly
of the payment of rents to the king through his local officers, or to the
lord of the manor, who, under the peculiar conditions of feudal society,
was usually the holder of regalia obtained by franchise or usurpation; and
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the assize of novel disseisin. 65 Villeinage was a status, -the "tenure
of common laborers." 66
The second "non-seised" occupier was the lessee, who held
land either for a term or at the will of the lessor. Prior to the thir-
teenth century, terms of years were rare67 and apparently were used
primarily to avoid the church's prohibition upon usury.68 Whether
for this reason or because the lessee was not seised of a free tene-
ment, 69 the common law afforded the lessee scant protection of his
rights of occupancy. If dispossessed, the lessee for a term had no
the third, in origin non-manorial like the second, consisted of the pay-
ment of tithes and rents to the church.
NELLIE NEILSON, CUSTOMARY RENTS, reprinted in 2 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIAL
AND LEGAL HISTORY B5 (1910).
65. MEGARRY & WADE, supra note 64, at 23-24; 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK &
FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 360 (1968); John F. Hicks,
The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 447 (1972).
66. Hiram H. Lesar, The Landlord-Tenant Relation in Perspective: From Status to
Contract and Back in 900 Years?, 9 KAN. L. REV. 369, 369 (1961). Despite his precari-
ous status, the villein was not without some protection:
For customs arose that the tenants did not lose their lands unless they did
some act recognized as meriting forfeiture, and the "custom of the
manor" became recognized as "law" in the manor court. The lord could
not be sued in his own court, but he usually obeyed the custom. Eventu-
ally, by the end of the fifteenth century, the common-law courts were
ready to come to the assistance of any tenant ejected by his lord other
than in accordance with the custom of the manor ....
Id. at 369-70 (footnotes omitted).
67. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 65, at 111. Both Henry Bracton and
Glanvill, however, wrote of the "letting and hiring" of things, including land. See 2
BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 183 (George E. Woodbine ed.
& Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968) ("By a letting and hiring a thing is usually given
either for use or occupation, as where one lets his movable or immovable property to
another for a specified time in return for a certain payment; he who lets is bound to give
up the thing let for use and the hirer obliged to pay the hire."); THE TREATISE ON THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL
X, at 18 (G.D.G. Hall ed., 1965) ("A thing is sometimes owed on a letting and on a
hiring, as when anyone lets out some thing of his to another for a certain time and at a
certain rent. Here the letter is bound to give the use of the thing let, and the hirer on his
part is bound to pay the rent.").
68. The church prohibited moneylending at interest, but a lessee could circumvent
this prohibition by "lending" money to the owner of land in exchange for a term of
years, from which the lessee could collect rents and profits. Since the lessee's entitle-
ment to rents and profits was not limited to the amount "loaned," any excess rents and
profits were a substitute for interest on the money "loaned." PLUCKNETr, supra note
63, at 572-73; Hicks, supra note 65, at 448; Lesar, supra note 66, at 370. These origins
may explain why the early lessee was considered "in very bad company among usurers
and other scoundrels who prey upon society." PLUCKNETT, supra note 63, at 573.
69. Hicks, supra note 65, at 449.
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possessory remedy, only' an action of covenant against his lessor.70
The occupancy of a lessee at will was more precarious yet, for he
could be "put out at the pleasure of the lessor."7 1 Unlike the villein,
however, the lessee's interest was based not upon status but upon
contract. As Milsom noted:
[T]he creation of a lease for years was not at first the grant of a
property right but the making of a contract; and the only tenure
to survive in England today did not begin as a tenure at all.
There was no relationship of lord and man between the parties
and no homage was done .... Indeed, in comparison with an
ideal feudal grant, the parties are reversed. There, the grantor
was at first the buyer, the services the thing bought, and the land
the price paid. But in the case of a term of years, the grantor was
clearly in the position of seller, and the termor was an investor
and sometimes in effect a money-lender. 72
Between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, the lessee for
years began to replace the villein tenant, due to a combination of
legal,73 financial, 74 and socioeconomic factors 75 that brought the
70. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 65, at 106-07 ("At the end of the
twelfth century the law was apparently endeavouring to regard the termor as one who
has no 'real' right, no right in the land; he enjoys the benefit of a covenant (conventio);
he has a right in personam against the lessor and his heirs. His action is an action of
covenant (quod teneat ei conventionemfactam) .... But as against the world at large he
is unprotected."); see also Hicks, supra note 65, at 449; Lesar, supra note 66, at 370.
71. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND Bk. 1, Ch. 10, § 84, at 63a (Francis Hargrave & Charles Butler eds., 15th ed.
1794).
72. MILSOM, supra note 63, at 127-28; see also BRACTON, supra note 67, at 232("letters" did not do homage); COKE, supra note 71, Bk. 2, Ch. 1, § 90, at 66b ("[N]one
shal do homage but such, as have an estate in fee simple, or fee taile, in his owne right,
or in the right of another."); id. Bk. 1, Ch. 10, § 84, at 63a ("For tenant at will, that
may be put out at pleasure, shall not doe fealty."); ALBERT M. KALES, ESTATES, Fu-
TURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN ILLINOIS § 21(1920) ("In the feudal scheme of society the term for years seems to have had no place.
No feudal dues or services were exacted from tenants for years. The possession did not
count for anything from the feudal point of view. The relation between the landlord
and tenant was only that produced by a personal contract.").
73. Milsom argued that the husbandry lease developed to fill a gap left by the Stat-
ute Quia Emptores, which forbade subinfeudation in fee simple. MILSoM, supra note
63, at 100 ("[A]fter Quia Emptores, the lease was the simplest secure way of parting
with the land in return for a fixed annual income .... ").
74. As the mortgage became an acceptable manner of using land to secure indebt-
edness, "the term of years became disassociated with the unsavory aspects of
moneylending." Hicks, supra note 65, at 449; see also PLUCKNETr, supra note 63, at
574.
75. The Black Death reduced the agricultural labor force, opening opportunities
for villeins to secure opportunity outside the manor, and many became agricultural
lessees for years. PLUCKNETT, supra note 63, at 573-74; Hicks, supra note 65, at 449;
Lesar, supra note 66, at 370.
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lease into more common use. But without the benefit of the assize
of novel disseisin, the lessee's right of occupancy was essentially
contractual in nature.76 The early lessee's right to occupy land thus
provides an interesting comparison to the holder of a modem li-
cense to occupy land, such as a hotel guest--each with a "contrac-
tual" right to occupy land, but neither with a possessory remedy if
that right of occupation is disturbed.
2. Early Common Law Conceptions of "Rent"
Early common law characterized an occupier's obligation to
pay for his rights (and the landowner's correlative right to payment)
as "rent." In summarizing ancient common law authorities, Black-
stone described rent as
a compensation, or return; it being in the nature of an acknowl-
egement given for possession of some corporeal inheritance. It is
defined to be a certain profit issuing yearly out of lands and tene-
ments corporeal. It must be a profit; yet there is no occasion for
it to be, as it usually is, a sum of money .... It may also consist
in services or manual operations; as, to plough so many acres of
ground, to attend the king or the lord to the wars, and the like;
which services in the eye of the law are profits .... It must,
lastly, issue out of lands and tenements corporeal . . . 7
The landowner's right to collect payment from occupiers of land
was an intangible right, of course, yet landowners and the common
law conceptualized this right as one that attached to and sprang
from the land to which it related. The common law "reified" the
right to collect payment from occupiers into a form of property, a
"rent." The common law further characterized that "rent" as an
incorporeal hereditament governed by the same rules as the land
from which it had sprung, a "piece[ ] of property like land itself."
78
Early common law recognized four types of rent: "rent ser-
vice," "rent distrainable of common right," "rent seck," and "rent
76. MEGARRY & WADE, supra note 64, at 24; see also MILSOM, supra note 63, at
127; Hicks, supra note 65, at 449; Lesar, supra note 66, at 370.
77. 2 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
*41. Other authorities provide similar definitions. See, e.g., W.H. BURTON, AN ELE-
MENTARY COMPENDIUM ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 328 (1839) ("A RENT,
such as a subject may have according to the Common Law, consists in a right to the
periodical receipt of money or money's worth, in respect of lands which are held in
possession... by him from whom the payment is due.").
78. SIMPSON, supra note 63, at 104. Blackstone listed ten incorporeal heredita-
ments recognized by the common law-advowsons, tithes, commons, ways, offices, dig-
nities, franchises, corodies, annuities, and rents. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at
*20-43.
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charge."' 79 The first type, "rent service," was a rent reserved upon a
grant that created a tenurial relationship between the lord and the
occupier.80 The lessee of land, however, did not stand in a tenurial
relationship with his grantor,8' so the lessee's obligation was not
rent service, but "rent distrainable of common right."8 12 Both "rent
service" and "rent distrainable of common right," however, were
notable for the lord's right of distress. If the occupier failed to sat-
isfy the rent at the time and place required, the owner could seize
the occupier's chattels located on the land as security for the unpaid
rent.83
Prior to 1290, the transfer of an inheritable interest in land
created a relationship of tenure between transferor and transferee.
Following the Statute Quia Emptores 84 in 1290, however, the gran-
tor of a generally inheritable interest in land could no longer create
79. Most common law authorities speak of only three types: rent service, rent
charge, and rent seck. See, e.g., 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at *41-43; 1 TIFFANY,
supra note 56, § 167, at 1011. Lord Coke identified a fourth type, "rent distreinable of
common right," or the rent collected from a lessee who had not done fealty. COKE,
supra note 71, Bk. 1, Ch. 8, § 72, at 57b (lessor upon lease at will "may distreine for the
rent, and yet it is no rent service, for no fealty belongeth thereunto, but a rent distrein-
able of common right"). As noted infra note 82 and accompanying text, rents payable
by those who had not done fealty did not satisfy the common law definition of rent
service, rent charge or rent seck.
By the time of Blackstone and Tiffany, the common law had engrafted principles of
tenure upon the leasing of land. See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text. Hom-
age and fealty had become "meaningless formalities never observed in practice." COR-
NELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 20 (2d ed.
1988). Thus, modern authorities may have concluded that no further basis existed for
characterizing any rent as "rent distreinable of common right."
80. Rent-service is so called because it hath some corporeal service incident
to it, as at the least fealty, or the feodal oath of fidelity. For, if a tenant
holds his land by fealty, and ten shillings rent; or by the service of
ploughing the lord's land, and five shillings rent; these pecuniary rents,
being connected with personal services, are therefore called rent-service.
2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at *41-42; see also MEGARRY & WADE, supra note 64,
at 818; 1 TIFFANY, supra note 56, § 167, at 1011. Consistent with this characterization,
rent paid by a lessee who had not done fealty was not rent service. See infra note 82.
81. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
82. COKE, supra note 71, Bk. 1, Ch. 8, § 72, at 57b (lessor upon lease at will "may
distreine for the rent, and yet it is no rent service, for no fealty belongeth thereunto").
83. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at *42; see also DIGBY, supra note 56, at 166
n.l; 1 TIFFANY, supra note 56, § 167, at 1011-12; 2 TIFFANY, supra note 56, § 325, at
1985-86. If the occupier was a tenant holding the land in fee simple, the right of dis-
tress was incident to the lordship. If the occupier held a lesser interest, the right of
distress was incident to the owner's reversion. 1 TIFFANY, supra note 56, § 167, at
1012.
84. Stat. Westminster III (18 Edw. 1, c.1) (1290).
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a relationship of tenure with his grantee.8 5 ,Although the transferor
of such an interest still could reserve a rent, since the transferee was
not a "tenant" of the grantor that rent was not rent service. In-
stead, the common law treated that obligation as "rent seck,"86 un-
less the grantee agreed that the grantor should have the right of
distress for unpaid rent, in which case the rent was "rent charge."
87
This synopsis illustrates that the common law has not always
limited the concept of "rent" to the landlord-tenant relationship, as
the hotel bankruptcy cases appear to suggest. The early lessee of
land was not a tenant,8 8 yet certainly paid rent; likewise, the grantee
of a fee simple after Quia Emptores, while not a tenant of his gran-
tor, still might have paid rent to his grantor.89 "Rent" was never
simply the obligation incurred by a tenant; instead, it was the obli-
85. See, e.g., JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF PROPERTY 36-37 (3d ed. 1989); ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., THE LAW
OF PROPERTY § 1.6, at 21-22 (1984); MOYNIHAN, supra note 79, at 19-20.
86. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at *42 (rent seck is "nothing more than a
rent reserved by deed, but without any clause of distress"); 1 TIFFANY, supra note 56,
§ 167, at 1012. Rent seck might also arise if a landowner "severed" a rent from the
land-Le., if a landowner transferred his interest in the land while retaining the right to
rents, or transferred his right to rents while retaining his interest in the land. If a rent
was severed from the land, the holder of the rent could no longer enforce it via distress.
Id. This "severed" rent was also called rent seck, or "dry rent."
87. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at *42 ("A rent-charge, is where the owner
of the rent hath no future interest, or reversion expectant in the land; as where a man by
deed maketh over to others his whole estate in fee simple, with a certain rent payable
thereout, and adds to the deed a covenant or clause of distress ....").
88. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text; see also MEGARRY & WADE,
supra note 64, at 43 ("By a paradox of history the relationship of landlord and tenant,
originally no tenure at all, is now the only tenure which has any practical
importance.").
89. While such a rent was not "rent service," it was still a rent. Perhaps the only
meaningful difference was that a covenant to pay such a rent would not run with the
land to bind personally any successors or assigns of the grantee.
But when the statute of quia emptores abolished subinfedation...
privity no longer existed in cases where a fee was transferred and no re-
version left in the donor, and it became a rule that covenants which im-
posed any charge, burden or obligation upon the land were held not to be
incident to it, and therefore incapable of passing with it to an assignee;
thus, if the owner of land granted it in fee, reserving to himself a rent
which the grantee covenanted to pay, here, though the covenant was to
be performed out of the land, yet the assignee of the covenantor would
hold the land discharged from its liability.
WILLIAM H. RAWLE, THE LAW OF COVENANTS FOR TITLE 294 n.2 (5th ed. 1887); see
also Ingersoll v. Sergeant, 1 Whart. 336, 350 (Pa. 1836) ("[A] covenant to pay a rent-
charge is merely personal and collateral to the land, and therefore will not render the
assignee liable to an action of covenant for the non-performance of it.") (citing Brewster
v. Kidgill, 1 Ld. Raym. 317, 12 Mod. 166 (1698)); ANSON BINGHAM & A. COLVIN, A
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gation incurred by an occupier of land in exchange for the right to
possession of the land.
3. Development of the Lessee's "Possessory" Interest
If "rent" is the obligation an occupier incurs in exchange for
"possession" of land, then what level of "possession" is sufficient to
generate an obligation for rent? To most bankruptcy courts, "pos-
session" means the level of possession of a holder of an estate in
land: actual possession secured by a possessory remedy, or specifi-
cally enforceable proprietary control of the land. If X is a hotel
guest who occupies a room but has no possessory remedy, property
law might say that X does not have legal possession of the room.
For the bankruptcy courts, this reasoning leads inexorably to the
conclusion that X is not a tenant and thus does not pay "rent."
History indicates, however, that the term "possession" did not
have such a fixed and narrow meaning as that term related to an
occupier's rent obligation. Although origins are not "an infallible
key to modem classification," 90 the original meaning of "posses-
TREATISE ON RENTS, REAL AND PERSONAL COVENANTS AND CONDITIONS 47 (1857)
(citing earlier edition of Rawle's treatise).
As a practical matter, such a rent would have operated either as an annuity upon
the land, see MEGARRY & WADE, supra note 64, at 815, or as a reservation of purchase
money. While some authorities have characterized sums reserved upon the sale of land
as not "rent," see, e.g., 1 TIFFANY, supra note 56, § 169, at 1024, this seems plainly
wrong. As Bingham and Colvin noted in their treatise on rents, a perpetual rent-charge
upon land effectively represents the purchase price of that land. Bingham and Colvin
demonstrated this point by comparing two hypothetical conveyances of a farm in fee
simple, one for an annual perpetual rent and the other for fourteen annual payments:
In each.., the grantor sold and conveyed his estate to the grantee,
his heirs and assigns, forever. Stop there, and they are precisely alike. If
any dissimilitudes of principle exist they must be beyond that point, and
in some manner arise out of the provisions in relation to the payment of
the purchase money. . . . In the one case, the purchase money is payable
in fourteen annual installments; and, in the other, in a certain amount
annually forever. Can this affect the character of the covenant so that in
the one case it will run with the land and in the other not? Would there
not equally be a sale of the premises in the one case as in the other?...
That the sum or amount to be paid, may, :by the covenants, be de-
nominated rent, cannot have any controlling effect. We are dealing with
things, not names. Covenants of payment, in a limited number of instal-
ments, may be as appropriately called rent as similar covenants in an
indefinite number; and in either case they would be none the less the
purchase price.
BINGHAM & COLVIN, supra, at 70-72.
90. John A. Humbach, The Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation, Hab-
itability and Dependence of Covenants, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 1213, 1220 n.30 (1983) (quot-
ing S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 120, 127-29
(1969)).
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sion" is important to an accurate understanding of the true scope of
the term "rent." Writing in the thirteenth century, Bracton spoke
of "possession" in clearly relative terms, describing both the free-
holder and the lessee (even the lessee at will) as having "possession"
of the land.91 In a purely conceptual sense, of course, the common
law had to characterize the lessee as having some right to "posses-
sion" in order to classify the lessee's obligation as "rent."
Yet the early lessee was not seised of a free tenement; his rights
were ones that modem law would characterize as purely contrac-
tual ones, unprotected by possessory remedies. 92 Only beginning in
the thirteenth century did the common law begin to provide the
lessee with remedies that modem law characterizes as "possessory"
rights. First, the lessee obtained limited possessory remedies
against persons claiming through the lessor:
The first extension from covenant appears to have been a
definite event about 1235 .... the introduction of a writ for use
against the lessor's grantee. The lessee ejected by him would
have a remedy in covenant against his lessor, but could not get
the land back because the lessor no longer had it; and against the
grantee there would be no action at all. The writ quare ejecit
infra terminum allowed direct recovery of the land from the
grantee; and the lease, like the equity of redemption and the re-
strictive covenant in later centuries, had taken the first seductive
step on the path from contract to property.
93
After 1235, however, two centuries passed during which the lessee
had no rights in rem against other third party ejectors. 94 Not until
1499 and the development of the action of ejectment did the courts
91. Bracton described even the lessee at will as having "possession" of land:
Some possessions are precarious, as where one grants to another at will
the right to use his house as a dwelling or a usufruct in his property,
which is properly called bare since it may be revoked in season and out
.... There is possession granted for a price, and it is then important
whether the price established is certain or uncertain. If certain and for a
definite time, or in perpetuity, he cannot be ejected at the will of the gran-
tor; if uncertain, then let him proceed as in the case of precarium ....
2 BRACTON, supra note 67, 123-24; see also SIMPSON, supra note 63, at 40 (noting that
both lessee for years and freeholder were "equally in defacto possession").
92. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
93. MILSOM, supra note 63, at 129; see also MEGARRY & WADE, supra note 64, at
1156; PLUCKNETr, supra note 63, at 571; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 65, at
107-08; SIMPSON, supra note 63, at 74-75.
94. The ejected lessee could bring a special writ in trespass, de ejectionefirmae, in
order to recover damages (but not possession) against such third parties. MILSOM,
supra note 63, at 129-31; PLUCKNETT, supra note 63, at 571; 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 65, at 109; Hicks, supra note 65, at 450.
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permit the wrongfully ejected lessee to recover the land from any
person disturbing his occupancy. 95
Why did the common law finally grant the lessee a possessory
remedy? As Dean Hiram Lesar noted:
That [the lessee] did secure it was due to social and economic
causes. The lessee for years had replaced the villein, but the
landlords, without a labor-service system, tended to convert ara-
ble land to pasture, a practice the government desired to end.
Providing the tenant with a possessory remedy to protect his in-
terest served this purpose.96
Some conceptual framework was necessary to accomplish this re-
sult, and the readiest framework for the task was the feudal rela-
tionship of tenure.97 As Professor John Humbach has noted,
applying principles of tenure to the lessor-lessee relationship "sup-
plied an analytical basis for protecting most of the then usual expec-
tations of parties to leasing transactions. ' 98 Girded with a
possessory remedy, the lessee came to be regarded as someone who
possessed a "real" or "possessory" right.99 Nevertheless, having
such a remedy was never a necessary condition for characterizing
the lessee's obligation as rent.
B. Extricating the True Nature and Scope of Rent
In summarizing the law of landlord and tenant, nineteenth and
twentieth century scholars defined rent in a manner that laid the
framework for the conceptual formalism displayed by the hotel
95. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at *200-01; 7 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 4 (1956); MEGARRY & WADE, supra note 64, at 1156-57;
PLUCKNETr, supra note 63, at 574; SIMPSON, supra note 63, at 144.
96. Lesar, supra note 66, at 370 (footnotes omitted); see also Humbach, supra note
90, at 1221-22.
97. After Quia Emptores, the feudal hierarachy of fee simple ownership had crum-
bled. Still, Quia Emptores applied only to grants in fee simple, and a landowner could
create a relationship of tenure upon a grant of lesser conveyances. MOYNIHAN, supra
note 79, at 19-20; Humbach, supra note 90, at 1222-23 & n.39.
98. Humbach, supra note 90, at 1222-23. The objective of protecting ejected les-
sees required some framework upon which to regard the lessee's rights as rights in rem,
specifically enforceable against third parties. As Professor Humbach argued, "modem
contract theory, which provides a basis only for in personam rights, probably would not
have served the intended purpose even if it had existed." Id. at 1221 n.36.
99. Hicks, supra note 65, at 450; Lesar, supra note 66, at 371. Despite the lessee's
new status as an estate holder, the common law continued to treat the lessee's interest as
personalty for other purposes, such as descent and distribution. By 1499, leases "had
become too firmly established as personalty for this change [the action of ejectment] to
make any difference to their status." DAVID J. HAYTON, MEGARRY'S MANUAL OF
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 18 (6th ed. 1982); see also MOYNIHAN, supra note 79, at
57.
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bankruptcy cases. For example, Tiffany's treatise defined rent as "a
tribute or return of a certain amount ... payable by one having an
estate in land, as compensation for his use, possession and enjoy-
ment of the land." 10° By defining rent as an obligation payable by
one possessing an estate, Tiffany blended together rights and reme-
dies, with no distinction between the existence of a right to occupy
land and the existence of a remedy for protecting that right. Based
upon this conception of common law "rent," modern courts have
concluded that "rent" can arise only in exchange for legal posses-
sion of land, that is, possession secured by a possessory remedy.
This limitation upon the scope of the term "rent" seems plainly
contrary to its original historical scope. The earliest villein tenant
or lessee of land had the right to occupy land, subject to the obliga-
tion to pay rent. While that right was not "possessory" in the mod-
ern sense of the term, that does not mean that both the villein
tenant and the lessee were without any "possession," for the term
"possession" never had but one talismanic meaning.101 In its origi-
nal scope, the "possession" necessary to trigger one's obligation to
pay rent was de facto possession-actual possession referable to the
occupier's rights respecting the land, not to the occupier's remedies.
Viewed in that historical context, "rent" could include any sum
paid for the occupier's right to use and occupy land.
Consistent with this historical meaning, one can use the term
"rent" to characterize the obligation of the holder of a license to
occupy land, such as a modern hotel guest. As discussed below,
this broader conception of rent is consistent with the conception of
rent under the civil law tradition. 102 In addition, this broader con-
ception finds support within the common law tradition, particularly
in judicial opinions involving oil and gas leasing and lodgers. 103
100. 1 TIFFANY, supra note 56, § 165, at 1009 (emphasis added).
101. Scholars have often suggested that the term "possession" necessarily must be
defined in relative terms to have any utility as a concept of property law. See Thomas
L. Shaffer, The "New" Property Law: "Reports of Litigation Are Wreckage from Failed
Attempts at Harmony," PREVENTIVE L. REI., June 1992, at 8 (first-year property stu-
dents are "supposed to learn that the legal notion of possession of property is as evanes-
cent as probable cause in torts or promissory estoppel in contracts"); Burke Shartel,
Meanings of Possession, 16 MINN. L. REV. 611, 612 (1932) (arguing "that there are
many meanings" of "possession," which can be defined only with reference to context).
102. See infra notes 104-118 and accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 119-147 and accompanying text.
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1. The Civil Law Conception of Rent
The civil law conception of rent provides a stark contrast to the
narrower conception articulated in the hotel bankruptcy cases. In
the civil law tradition, "ownership of a thing includes also the ob-
jects which it is capable of producing, either by itself, or with
human help, as well as of monetary benefits which can be gained
from it."1°4 The civil law characterizes these "objects produced by
a thing" as profits and further distinguishes between "profits and
gains in general and those which have the character of fruits."105
Fruits are either natural profits, which "come from the thing itself,"
or civil profits, which are "payments due by another and based on
an obligation which rests on the enjoyment of the thing."' 106 Within
the category of civil profits, the civil law includes "rent." 10 7
In classifying an occupier's obligation as "rent," however, the
civil law accords no consequence to the occupier's remedies, that is,
whether the occupier's rights are "real" rights or "personal" rights.
In Louisiana, for example, a grantee who receives outright owner-
ship of land may agree to pay rent to his grantor under the terms of
the conveyance. 108 In addition, one who holds a right of habitation,
the "right of a natural person to dwell in the house of another,"
may agree to pay rent to the owner of the house. 109 These rights are
"real" rights, for which the holder has possessory remedies. 10
104. 2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS, AUBRY & RAu, DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS § 192,
at 186 (Vol. II, 7th ed. 1966) (hereinafter AUBRY & RAU].
105. Id. (emphasis omitted).
106. Id. § 192, at 186 n.34. In the civil law tradition, civil profits "do not come
from the thing itself and obtain the character of profits only by virtue of the law." Id.
107. Id. § 192, at 186 (civil profits include sums paid by lessee to landowner for
"rents of houses, shops, and factories, [and] farm rents") (footnotes omitted).
108. Such a rent is called a "rent of lands." See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2779
(West 1952) (rent of lands is a contract "by which one of the parties conveys and cedes
to the other a track [sic] of land ... and stipulates that the latter shall hold it as owner,
but reserving to the former an annual rent ... which the other party binds himself to
pay him"). The rent of lands is roughly analagous to the common law rent charge. See
supra note 87 and accompanying text.
109. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 630 (West 1980). The right of habitation may be
created gratuitously (at no rental) or onerously (with rental). Id. cmt. (d); see also
Louis v. Garrison, 64 So. 2d 254, 257 (La. Ct. App. 1953) (gratuitous); Chenevert v.
Lemoine, 52 La. Ann. 586 (1900) (same).
110. The real remedies include the petitory action and the possessory action. See,
e.g., LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3651 (West Supp. 1992) ("The petitory action is
one brought by a person who claims the ownership, but who is not in possession, of
immovable property or of a real right therein, against another who is in possession or
who claims the ownership thereof adversely, to obtain judgment recognizing the plain-
tiff's ownership."); id. art. 3655 ("The possessory action is one brought by the possessor
of immovable property or of a real right therein to be maintained in his possession of the
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In contrast, the civil law lessee of land historically received no
"real" right in the leased premises. The civil law treated the lease of
land as purely a contract rather than a conveyance of ownership.III
The lease entitled the lessee to "peaceable possession" of the prem-
ises, 112 but the civil law termed this right of possession "precarious
possession. " 113 The lease did not convey ownership to the lessee; 114
it merely granted the lessee a personal right vis-A-vis the lessor, one
that was not protected by the real remedies. 1 5 The civil law thus
treated the lessee much like her pre-1235 common law counter-
part-as an occupier who merely held "for the account of another"
and who had "only a personal right of enjoyment." 116 Although
the civil law lessee had no possessory remedy, 117 she unquestionably
property or enjoyment of the right where he has been disturbed, or to be restored to the
possession or enjoyment thereof when he has been evicted."). As discussed in the fol-
lowing text, these actions were not available to lessees, whom the civil law treated as
mere "precarious possessors."
111. Ferdinand F. Stone, A Primer on Rent, 13 TUL. L. REV. 329, 342 (1939); see
also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2669 (West 1952) ("Lease or hire is a synallagmatic
contract, to which consent alone is sufficient, and by which one party gives to the other
the enjoyment of a thing, or his labor, at a fixed price."); FRENCH C. civ. art. 1709
(concerning rental of things); ITALIAN C.C. § 1571 ("A contract of lease is one by which
one party binds himself to let the other enjoy a movable or immovable thing for a given
period of time at a fixed compensation.").
112. Cf LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2692 (West 1952) ("The lessor is bound... [t]o
cause the lessee to be in a peaceable possession of the thing during the continuance of
the lease.").
113. Cf id. art. 3437 ("The exercise of possession over a thing with the permission
of or on behalf of the owner or possessor is precarious possession."); id. art. 3438 ("A
precarious possessor, such as a lessee or a depositary, is presumed to possess for another
although he may intend to possess for himself.").
114. See Comment, The Louisiana Law of Lease, 39 TUL. L. REV. 798, 826 (1965)
("A lease conveys the rights of use and enjoyment, which constitute jura ad rem, rights
upon the thing.") (footnote omitted); see also Rials v. Davis, 31 So. 2d 726, 727 (La.
1947) (lease is mere transfer of use/enjoyment of property); Gulf Refining Co. v. Glass-
ell, 171 So. 846, 849 (La. 1937) (same); Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 137 So. 46, 48
(La. 1931) (same); Logan v. State Gravel Co., 103 So. 526, 526 (La. 1925) (same); Goins
v. Goins, 580 So. 2d 477, 478 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (lease contract gives lessee right to
enjoyment/use of object, but does not impart ownership).
115. Cf LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3656 (West 1961) ("A plaintiff in a posses-
sory action shall be one who possesses for himself.... A predial lessee possesses for and
in the name of his lessor, and not for himself."); see also Leightsey v. Welch, 105 So. 51,
51 (La. 1925) (tenant disturbed in possession of land not entitled to bring possessory
action against adverse possessor, nor could tenant evict adverse possessor since no lease
contract existed between them); Den~gre & Viller6 v. Bayhi, 35 La. Ann. 255, 256
(1883) (lessees of land not entitled to bring possessory action against persons who alleg-
edly entered land and harvested stubble cane).
116. AUBRY & RAu, supra note 104, § 187, at 151.
117. In the past two decades, civil law systems have begun to accord the lessee with
a possessory remedy. In 1982, for example, Louisiana changed the traditional civil law
rule and determined that "[w]here there is a disturbance of possession, the possessory
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paid "rent" in exchange for her personal right to occupy the
premises.
Free of feudal theory and its limitations, the civil law thus con-
ceptualized rent in a manner independent of the existence of a
"real" (i.e., exclusively possessory) right. This approach permits
the term "rent" to be used flexibly in a manner that befits its true
nature as a return for the right to use, enjoy, and occupy land.
Under this view, the sums paid by a hotel guest, who occupies the
land of another pursuant to her contract, constitute rent."1 "
action is available to a precarious possessor, such as a lessee or a depositary, against
anyone except the person for whom he possesses." LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 3440
(West Supp. 1992). As the Louisiana legislature noted, Article 3440 permits a lessee to
bring "a possessory action against a trespasser or an adverse possessor .... " Id. Revi-
sion cmt. (d); see also FRENCH C. civ. art. 2282 ("Possession is protected, without
regard for the basis of the right, against a disturbance which affects or threatens it.")
(1975 amendment).
This change in the law demonstrates that the character of the remedy available to
protect the occupier's possession has nothing to do with whether the occupier's obliga-
tion is characterized as rent. Both before and after the possessory action was available
to the civil law lessee, that lessee unquestionably paid rent.
118. One Louisiana statute explicitly denominates hotel room revenues as rent. See
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3259 (West 1991) ("Whenever any lessee of any apartment
building, house, motel, hotel, or other dwellingfails to pay rent that has become due and
delinquent, within twenty days after delivery of written demand therefor... the lessee
shall be liable for reasonable attorney fees .... ") (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, in 1985 the Louisiana Supreme Court held in Pioneer Bank & Trust
Co. v. Oechsner, 468 So. 2d 1164 (La. 1985), that hotel room revenues were not "rent."
The issue in Oechsner was whether the mortgagee of a New Orleans motel could obtain
sequestration of room receipts under LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 327, which per-
mitted the sheriff to collect "rents" and "revenues" of property that had been seized.
The owner argued that hotel room receipts were not "rents" or "revenues" of the hotel
and thus could not be seized. Oechsner, 468 So. 2d at 1166-67. The court held that the
receipts were "revenues" subject to seizure, id. at 1168, but in a manner shockingly
typical of more recent hotel bankruptcy cases, the court held that the receipts were not
rents because hotel guests were not tenants. Id.; see also In re T-H New Orleans Ltd.
Partnership, 148 B.R. 456, 460 (E.D. La. 1992) (citing Oechsner as authority).
This aspect of Oechsner seems plainly wrong. In support of its distinction between
hotel guests and tenants, the court cited only two decisions, Walling v. Peavy-Wilson
Lumber Co., 49 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. La. 1943), and Coggins v. Gregorio, 97 F.2d 948
(10th Cir. 1938). Coggins was a tort action brought by a New Mexico tenant against a
New Mexico landlord for damages caused by falling plaster. Coggins, 97 F.2d at
949-50. Walling was an action by the United States Department of Labor against a
Louisiana-based company to enjoin violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act at its
plant in Holopaw, Florida, where it provided lodging to company employees at exces-
sive "rental" costs. Walling, 49 F. Supp. at 853-58. As New Mexico and Florida are
common law states, these cases are completely inapposite. The court's characterization
of hotel room receipts seems contrary to the Louisiana Civil Code and other civil codes
which either explicitly or implicitly treat hotel room receipts as rent. See, e.g., LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2669 (West 1952) (treating any contract by which one party gives
another "the enjoyment of a thing" as a lease for rent); ITALIAN C.C. § 2760 ("Claims
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2. Common Law Judicial Treatment as "Rent" of Sums Paid
Outside the Context of the Landlord-Tenant Relationship
(Herein of Oil and Gas Lessees and Lodgers)
Even within the common law tradition, courts have character-
ized payments made for the use of land as "rent" even though those
payments are not made by tenants who possess a nonfreehold estate
in land. The following sections highlight two examples of this
broader conception of rent-the consistent judicial treatment of oil
and gas revenues as "rent," and the tendency of courts generally to
classify the payment obligations of lodgers as "rent."
a. Treatment of Revenues from Oil and Gas Leasing as "Rent"
A large number of petroleum-producing states recognize abso-
lute ownership of oil and gas in place beneath the earth's surface.
In these states ("ownership theory" states), an owner of land
"owns" the oil and gas located beneath the land by virtue of her
ownership of the land surface.1 19 Other states, however, do not rec-
ognize absolute ownership of oil and gas in place. In these states
("nonownership theory" states), the surface owner does not own oil
and gas located beneath the surface, but merely owns an exclusive
right to search for oil and gas on that land. The surface owner
cannot acquire ownership of the oil and gas itself until she removes
it from the ground and reduces it to her possession.120
A surface owner may transfer her rights respecting oil and gas
beneath the surface through a conveyance typically called an oil and
gas "lease." In a nonownership theory state, where the surface
owner has no possessory rights in oil and gas in place, the lessee
of innkeepers for rent... have a privilege on the property brought by the guests into the
inn or its appurtenances .... ").
This mistake has significant consequences in the bankruptcy context. Oechsner did
hold that hotel room receipts are "revenues" because they are "like rent, paid for the
use of the property." Oechsner, 468 So. 2d at 1168. Accordingly, for purposes of creat-
ing and perfecting a security interest in hotel. room revenues in Louisiana, hotel room
revenues are treated like rents. But since the Oechsner court transplanted erroneous
common law conceptions into its analysis, Louisiana hotel mortgagees can still fall vic-
tim to the Bankruptcy Code § 552(a) trap. See In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partner-
ship, 148 B.R. 456, 460-63 (E.D. La. 1992) (mortgagee's lien against postpetition
"revenues" extinguished by Bankruptcy Code Section 552(a)).
119. RICHARD W. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 1.3, at 29 & n.131
(3d ed. 1991).
120. Id. § 1.3, at 29 & n.132.
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receives no common law estate in land. 121 As such, this "leasing"
relationship is not one of landlord and tenant. The lessor's convey-
ance merely transfers to the lessee the right to search for and re-
move any oil and gas located under the land, a right which the
common law has classified as a profit A prendre. 122
In exchange for her interest, the lessee agrees to pay certain
sums called "delay rentals," payments made in order to delay com-
mencement of development operations. 123 The lessee also agrees to
pay to the lessor a royalty out of future production under the
lease. 124 In ownership theory states, courts have treated delay rent-
als and royalties as rent in the nature, of realty, or so analogous to
rent as to partake of its character. 125 Such treatment presents no
conceptual problem, as the lessee receives a possessory interest in oil
and gas in place, and the delay rentals and royalties constitute a
return upon that interest. In nonownership theory states, however,
the lessee's mineral interest is incorporeal.126 If Tiffany and other
scholars were correct to suggest that rent cannot issue upon the
121. Id. § 1.3, at 32-33; see also JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUT-
SHELL 32 (1988) ("By definition, no owner of any oil and gas right can have the right to
present possession of the oil and gas in place in a non-ownership theory state.").
122. HEMINGWAY, supra note 119, § 1.3, at 33. Numerous modem cases in non-
ownership theory states are in agreement. See Pasteur v. Niswanger, 290 S.W.2d 852,
853 (Ark. 1956); Davis v. Collins, 245 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Ark. 1952); Atlantic Oil Co. v.
County of L.A., 446 P.2d 1006, 1011 (Cal. 1968); Gerhard v. Stephens, 442 P.2d 692,
704-05 (Cal. 1968); Miller v. Ridgley, 117 N.E.2d 759, 761 (Ill. 1954); Rice Brothers
Mineral Corp. v. Talbott, 717 S.W.2d 515, 516-17 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Voyta v.
Clonts, 328 P.2d 655, 659 (Mont. 1958); Williard v. Federal Sur. Co., 8 P.2d 633, 635(Mont. 1932); Boatman v. Andre, 12 P.2d 370, 373 (Wyo. 1932); see also Heller v.
Dailey, 63 N.E. 490, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 1902) (lessee's interest in the nature of an
incorporeal hereditament); White v. McVey, 31 P.2d 850, 851 (Okla. 1934) (same);
Walla Walla Oil, Gas & Pipeline Co. v. Vallentine, 174 P. 980, 981 (Wash. 1918) (lessee
has license in nature of incorporeal hereditament). Kansas courts have characterized
the lessee's interest both as a license and a profit i prendre within the same case. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Fatzer v. Board of Regents, 269 P.2d 425, 433 (Kan. 1954) ("An oil
and gas lease ... conveys no interest in land, but is merely a license to explore ....
Such a lease is a 'profit d prendre.' ") (citations omitted).
123. HEMINGWAY, supra note 119, § 2.3, at 54; W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL
AND GAS § 571, at 3 (1958).
124. HEMINGWAY, supra note 119, § 2.5, at 57-58.
125. E.g., id. § 2.3, at 55 (delay rentals); id. § 2.5(B), at 59-60 (royalties); see also
Commissioner v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766, 769 (5th Cir. 1935) (delay rentals); Merrill Eng'g
Co. v. Capitol Nat'l Bank, 5 So. 2d 666, 670 (Miss. 1942) (royalty); Texas Co. v. Parks,
247 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) (delay rentals); Caruthers v. Leonard, 254
S.W. 779, 782-83 (Tex. Com. App. 1923) (delay rentals); cf Kentucky Bank & Trust
Co. v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 310 S.W.2d 287, 290 (Ky. 1958) (royalty is incorpo-
real hereditament in nature of realty); Duquesne Natural Gas Co. v. Fefolt, 198 A.2d
608, 610 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964) (same).
126. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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conveyance of an incorporeal interest, 127 then delay rentals or roy-
alties could not constitute "rent" in nonownership theory states.
Yet courts have characterized these obligations as rent in the nature
of realty, consistent with the broader historical scope of the term. 128
As the California Supreme Court has recognized:
"Rent is a compensation paid for the use of land... ." Similarly,
royalty payments are consideration to the lessor for the uses of
land allowed by contract. "Under the usual oil and gas lease the
owner confers on the lessee for the term of the lease an exclusive
right of profit to drill for and produce oil, the lessee usually re-
turning to the lessor for the privilege granted a rent or royalty
measured by a fraction of the oil produced." . . . [W]e recog-
nized that "royalty return... is rent, or so closely analogous to
rent as to partake of the incidents thereof." "The words 'royalty'
and 'rent'... 'are used interchangeably to convey the same mean-
ing;' i.e., 'the compensation which the occupier pays the flessor]for
that species of occupation which the contract between them
allows.' "129
b. Lodgers and Holders of Licenses to Occupy Land
The hotel bankruptcy cases have concluded that the holder of a
license to occupy land does not pay rent because she has no "inter-
est in the realty to which the license obtains." 130 While the hotel
127. See, e.g., 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 77, at *41 (rent "cannot be reserved out of
an advowson, a common, an office, a franchise, or the like") (footnote omitted); 3
JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 657 (Charles M. Barnes ed., 13th
ed. 1884) (rent "cannot issue out of a mere privilege or easement"); 1 TIFFANY, supra
note 56, § 169, at 1019-20 (common law rent was incorporeal interest that issued only
out of corporeal tenements). Many scholars cited Lord Coke in support of this position,
but Coke himself confined the rule only to "common persons," not to the King. COKE,
supra note 71, Bk. 1, Ch. 7, § 58, at 47a. Coke noted that the King could "reserve rent
out of an incorporeal inheritance; the reason of which is, that he by his prerogative can
distrain on all the lands of his lessee." Id. Bk. 1, Ch. 7, § 58, at 47a n.284.
128. See, e.g., Arrington v. United Royalty Co., 65 S.W.2d 36, 37-38 (Ark. 1933);
Atlantic Oil Co. v. County of L.A., 446 P.2d 1006, 1015 (Cal. 1968); Dabney-Johnston
Oil Corp. v. Walden, 52 P.2d 237, 244 (Cal. 1935); Callahan v. Martin, 43 P.2d 788, 795
(Cal. 1935); see also HEMINGWAY, supra note 119, § 2.3, at 55 ("It would seem a better
view, however, to apply a broader concept of rent as including any 'income, return, or
profit' arising out of the land. Under this view delay rentals would constitute rent.").
But see Lathrop v. Eyestone, 227 P.2d 136, 141 (Kan. 1951) (delay rental and royalty
characterized as personalty); Pure Oil Co. v. Kindall, 156 N.E. 119, 122-23 (Ohio 1927)
(though "royalty" and "rentals" are used interchangeably, royalty is personalty).
129. Atlantic Oil Co., 446 P.2d at 1015 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 52 P.2d 237, 243 (Cal. 1935); Nelson v.
Republic Iron & Steel Co., 240 F. 285, 291-93 (8th Cir. 1917); Callahan v. Martin, 43
P.2d 788, 795 (Cal. 1935); Clarke v. Cobb, 59 P. 74, 75 (Cal. 1898)).
130. In re Nendels-Medford Joint Venture, 127 B.R. 658, 663 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991).
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guest does not have a nonfreehold estate in her assigned room,13 1
that is not the same as saying that she has no interest in the room at
all. The blanket conclusion that a license to occupy land does not
constitute an "interest in land" fails to recognize that the term "in-
terest"-like the term "possession"-is a relative term not always
synonymous with "estate."
A license to occupy land is only a contract, and the holder of a
license has a tenuous interest that is generally unprotected by a pos-
sessory remedy.' 32 While this lack of a possessory remedy has
caused many courts to conclude that a license does not constitute an
interest in land,' 33 that conclusion inextricably fuses the occupier's
rights and remedies, rendering the meaning of "interest" static re-
gardless of context. The drafters of the Restatement of Property re-
jected this approach, defining the term "license" as an "interest in
land" ' 34 and thus squarely embracing the notion that the term "in-
terest" has meaning that is not absolute, but relative depending
131. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
132. The licensee's interest, however, is not appreciably more tenuous than that of
the early common law lessee. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. This
raises another question-when was there a conceptual need for the license as a legal
interest respecting land? As Clark noted, early common law recognized no defined legal
interest termed "license." CHARLES E. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER IN-
TERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 18-19 n.17 (2d ed. 1947) (noting that earliest
apparent case distinguishing "license" from gift, grant, or lease was decided in 1461).
Before the common law accorded the lessee with possessory remedies, the common law
and civil law leasing transactions were identical, each involving purely in personan
rights. As in the civil law tradition, the common law had no conceptual need for an
interest analogous to the modem license to occupy the land of another. Id. ("In the
Roman or civil law there seems to be no defined legal interest of this character [the
license], there being no lesser iura in re aliena than servitudes, which like our easements
are indestructible by the owner of the land owing the obligation."). Once the common
law began to accord the lessee with possessory remedies, however, some interest analo-
gous to the modem "license" was needed to create a purely in personam right to occupy
the land of another.
133. See, e.g., Wheeler v. West, 11 P. 871, 873 (Cal. 1886); Eastman v. Piper, 229 P.
1002, 1004 (Cal. Dist Ct. App. 1924); Tucker v. Carter Oil Co., 43 N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1942); Parish v. Caspar, 10 N.E. 109, 110 (Ind. 1887); Kuhlman v. Rivera, 701
P.2d 982, 985 (Mont. 1985); Waterville Estates Ass'n v. Town of Campton, 446 A.2d
1167, 1169 (N.H. 1982); Hill v. Smith, 277 S.E.2d 542, 545 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981). A
number of these cases turn upon the fact that the license was an oral agreement. See,
e.g., Wheeler, 11 P. at 873; Tucker, 43 N.E.2d at 101. As the court noted in Wheeler,
had the license been in writing, it would have created "an incorporeal hereditament,"
clearly an interest in land. Wheeler, 11 P. at 873.
134. Section 512 defines "license" as "an interest in land in the possession of another
which (a) entitles the owner of the interest to a use of the land, and (b) arises from the
consent of the one whose interest in the land used is affected thereby, and (c) is not
incident to an estate in the land, and (d) is not an easement." RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 512 (1944); see also id. cmt. c ("All 'licenses' . .. are 'interests in land' as that
phrase is used in the Restatement of Property.").
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upon context. A license to occupy land is not equivalent to an es-
tate in land, and thus is not an "interest in land" for the purpose of
the statute of frauds.1 35 For other purposes, however, the law
deems the licensee to have a sufficient "interest in land" to sustain
the licensee's continued exercise of the license despite the licensor's
attempted revocation. 136 Furthermore, factual context may justify
a conclusion that a licensee has a relative "possessory" interest-
one that is not possessory as against the licensor, but that is posses-
sory as against third persons. 137 For as long as a license to occupy
135. Id. § 512 cmt. c.
136. In theory, a license is revocable at the will of the licensor, id. §§ 519(1), 521(1),
but when context requires, courts have riddled this principle with caveats. See, e.g.,
Cooke v. Ramponi, 239 P.2d 638, 640-42 (Cal. 1952) (licensee spent sums to build
access road across land of licensor; licensor cannot revoke); Stoner v. Zucker, 83 P. 808,
809-10 (Cal. 1906) (licensee constructed irrigation ditch across land of licensor; licensor
cannot revoke); Verrall v. Great Yarmouth Borough Council, 1981 Q.B. 202, 209, 216
(Eng. C.A.) (owner agreed to allow National Front to use meeting hall for two-day
conference but later revoked consent; National Front granted specific performance of
license agreement); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 519(4) (1944) (licensee who ex-
pends capital or labor in reasonable reliance upon representations as to license's dura-
tion may continue use after revocation to extent reasonably necessary to recover
expenditures). When a license is deemed irrevocable by its nature or by context, it is
functionally equivalent to an easement (or in the case of a license to occupy land, a
lease), and its status as a bona fide interest in land seems beyond dispute.
Furthermore, English courts have held that certain licensees can have "exclusive
possession" even against the licensor. Street v. Mountford, 1985 App. Cas. 809, 818
("There can be no tenancy unless the occupier enjoys exclusive possession; but an occu-
pier who enjoys exclusive possession is not necessarily a tenant. He may be . . . an
object of charity or a service occupier."); see also Heslop v. Burns [1974] 1 W.L.R.
1241, 1252 (Eng.) ("The fact of the exclusive occupation of property for an indefinite
period is no longer inconsistent with the occupier being a licensee and not a tenant at
will.").
137. Conceptually, the revocable nature of a license does not mean that a licensee
must possess no remedies against third party interference. CLARK, supra note 132, at
28. As the drafters of the Restatement argued:
The physical relationship to land and the intent to control it sufficient to
entitle the one having such relationship and such intent to protection as a
possessor of the land vary . . . in different personal relationships....
Specifically, a relationship to land sufficient to entitle the one having it to
protection as a possessor as against third persons may not entitle him to
such protection as against the owner of the land. ... Interests which are
less than possessory as against the owner of the land may be possessory as
against third persons. Interests which do not amount to leases as against
the owner of the land, which are as against him only licenses, may be the
equivalent of leases as against third persons.
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 521(2) cmt. b (1944) (emphasis added). This comment
has been criticized, but it seems a rather straightforward application of the principle of
relativity of title, a principle that by now should be beyond reproach. Consistent with
this approach, courts have acted where appropriate to protect licensees against interfer-
ence. See Water Works & Sewer Bd. v. Anderson, 530 So. 2d 193, 196-98 (Ala. 1988)
(upholding TRO preventing licensor from logging land); Patterson v. Shoffner Sand,
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land continues, the licensee's right of occupation "derogates from
the completeness of the servient owner's ownership and this re-
quires [the license's] recognition as an 'interest in land.' ",138
By acknowledging that the holder of a license to occupy land
possesses an interest in land (albeit not one that is "possessory" for
all purposes or against all persons), one can denominate the license-
holder's payment obligation as "rent," 139 as numerous courts have
done when the licenseholder at issue was a lodger.140 Like all li-
censees, the lodger has only a contractual right to use and occupy
some portion of the land of another, unprotected by a possessory
remedy.141 Yet the lack of a possessory remedy has no necessary
Inc., 530 P.2d 580, 583-84 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) (licensee with right to remove sand
could enjoin licensor's tenant from interfering with sand removal); Moundsville Water
Co. v. Moundsville Sand Co., 19 S.E.2d 217, 218-20 (W. Va. 1942) (holder of license to
pipe water across sand company's land could enjoin sand company's actions that inter-
fered with piping of water); see also Nahas v. Local 905, Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 302
P.2d 829, 830 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) (suggesting in dictum that licensee may enjoin
violation of right to exercise license); Bell Tel. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 38
A.2d 732, 733 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1944) (same).
138. RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
428, at 584 (1968).
139. Two illustrative examples in the Restatement use the term "rent" or "rental" to
describe payments made in exchange for licenses in land. See RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERTY § 519(4) cmt. g, illus. 3 (1944) (demand by owner of land subject to license that
licenseholder pay "rental" for permission to maintain power transmission lines); id.§ 521(4) cmt. e, illus. 2 (oral agreement to mine land of another in exchange for "rent"
of proportion of gross income from mining operations).
140. See infra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
141. While the hotel bankruptcy cases focus on the guest's lack of exclusive "posses-
sion," English courts have designated certain of the lodger's/guest's constituent rights
as "exclusive." See Stephen Tromans, Leases and Licences in the Lords, 44 CAM-
BRIDGE L.J. 351, 353 (1985) ("The lodger, it should be carefully noted, may be entitled
to exclusive occupation. He may under the terms of his contract be entitled to insist on
no-one else occupying with him (even the owner). What he cannot do is exclude the
owner entirely, by an action for trespass if necessary. That is the prerogative of the
tenant."); Allan v. Overseers of Liverpool, [1874] 9 L.R.-Q.B. 180, 191-92 (Eng.)(Blackburn, J.) (lodger has exclusive use of room even though not in exclusive posses-
sion against landlord).
Several American decisions also have characterized certain rights of lodgers or ho-
tel guests as "exclusive," despite the lack of a possessory remedy. See, e.g., Frewen v.
Page, 131 N.E. 475, 476 (Mass. 1921) ("[H]aving duly registered and been put in pos-
session of a room for their exclusive use, [guests] had the right of occupation for all
lawful purposes until vacated ...."); Holly v. Meyers Hotel & Tavern, 83 A.2d 460,
463 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951) ("When a guest is given the key to his room, it
symbolizes the surrender of the quarters to the guest .... [T]he guest is entitled to
possess the free and unmolested use and enjoyment of his room or apartment withoutinterference from anyone."), rev'd on other grounds, 89 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1952); De Wolf v.
Ford, 86 N.E. 527, 530 (N.Y. 1908) ("[T]he guest also has affirmative rights which theinnkeeper is not at liberty to willfully ignore or violate. When a guest is assigned to a
room for his exclusive use, it is his for all proper purposes, and at all times, until he
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consequence for classifying the lodger's payment obligation. As the
House of Lords recognized in its landmark 1985 decision, Street v.
Mountford,142 the lodger's contractual rights of use and occupation
of the land form a basis for characterizing the lodger's obligation as
rent:
An occupier of residential accommodation at a rent for a term is
either a lodger or a tenant. The occupier is a lodger if the land-
lord provides attendance or services which require the landlord
or his servants to exercise unrestricted access to and use of the
premises. 143
This conception also finds support in the propensity of American
judicial decisionmakers to characterize the income paid by lodgers
or hotel guests as "rent." Numerous American courts, in resolving
disputes between owners of hotels' 44 or roominghouses145 and their
gives it up."); Wolk v. Pittsburgh Hotels Co., 131 A. 537, 539 (Pa. 1925) ("[T]he guest
or boarder has an absolute right to the free enjoyment of his room or apartment, with-
out interference from anyone."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 4.2
reporter's note, at 80 ("[A] hotel guest not only has the right to occupy the building
space for a delineated period, but he or she also has the right to exclude others, includ-
ing, in many situations, the hotel management.").
142. 1985 App. Cas. 809. In this case, Street granted Mountford a right to occupy a
furnished room at £37 per week pursuant to an agreement called a "licence." Id. at
814-15. When Street tried to evict Mountford, Mountford asserted that she was a ten-
ant entitled to the protections of the Rent Act (which protects tenants but not licen-
sees). The case attracted great interest because a ruling for Street would have indicated
that landlords could avoid the effects of the Rent Act by characterizing their occupancy
agreements as licenses. The House of Lords ruled that under the agreement, Mountford
was in fact a tenant and was thus entitled to the benefit of the Rent Act. Id. at 827.
143. Id. at 817-18.
144. See, e.g., Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1138, 1139-41 (S.D.
Fla. 1975) (obligation of transient guest characterized as "rent"); Collins v. Viceroy
Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390, 392 & n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (court denominates weekly
obligation of hotel guest as "rental" and "rent"); Green v. Watson, 36 Cal. Rptr. 362,
365 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (characterizing both tenants and lodgers as "renting" rooms);
Sloan v. Court Hotel, 164 P.2d 516, 520-21 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945) (hotel owner's
acceptance of "rent" from plaintiff supported inference of implied contract to accept
plaintiff as roomer); Roberts v. Casey, 93 P.2d 654, 656-60 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1939) (characterizing obligation of apartment hotel occupier as "rent"); Davis v.
Brinkhouse Hotel Co., 219 P. 1074, 1074 (Colo. 1923) (innkeeper's acceptance of one
month's "rent" from guest did not waive lien for balance of unpaid rent); Bourque v.
Morris, 460 A.2d 1251, 1252-54 (Conn. 1983) (guest's contract for occupation of hotel
room was for transient occupancy, despite "fact that the rent was paid weekly"); Davis
v. Francis Scott Key Apartments, 140 A.2d 188, 189 (D.C. 1958) (resident of apartment
hotel characterized as roomer but described as having "rented" room); Ortner v. Linch,
128 So. 2d 152, 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960), cert. denied, 138 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1961)
(invitee status of hotel guest "not dependent upon whether the rent is fixed by the day,
by the month, or by the year"); Zappa v. Higgins, 156 S.E.2d 521, 521 (Ga. Ct. App.
1967) (suit by hotel owner to recover for "rental" of room to temporary guest); Marden
v. Radford, 84 S.W.2d 947, 959 (Mo. Ct. App. 1935) (owner's "billing of the rent" for
hotel room raised inference that plaintiff occupier was lodger, not tenant); Landry v.
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guests, have denominated the sums paid by the guests as "rent"
even though the guests are mere licensees. 146
3. Summary
In its proper historical scope, rent is "the compensation which
the occupier [of land] pays... for that species of occupation which
the contract between them allows."' 147 The bankruptcy courts' for-
Allerton N.Y. Corp., 83 N.Y.S.2d 774, 775 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (in statement of facts, court
denominates guest's obligation as "rent"); Roth v. Hotel Riverside Plaza, Inc., 67
N.Y.S.2d 518, 519 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (same); New S. Hotel Co. v. Kingston, 72 N.E.2d
782, 785 (Ohio Ct. App. 1936) (noting that agreement of long-term guest was "for a
rental of the room for month to month"); Lyons v. Kamhoot, 575 P.2d 1389, 1390-91
(Or. 1978) (in statement of facts, court notes that rooms in residential hotel are
"rented" to temporary guests); McIntosh v. Schops, 180 P. 593, 595 (Or. 1919) (two-
year resident of hotel at "rental" of twelve dollars per month held to be boarder, not
tenant). Even a few hotel bankruptcy cases have acknowledged that hotel room reve-
nues have the characteristics of rent. See In re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. 543, 548
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (though paid by licensees, hotel revenues "are closest in kind to
'rents,' since they are generated by the hotels' provision of room rentals and related
services"); see also In re Kearney Hotel Partners, 92 B.R. 95, 99 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988) (noting that hotel revenues are "referred to in common parlance as 'rent' ").
145. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Solomon, 170 P. 951, 951-52 (Colo. 1918) (repeatedly
characterizing obligation of roominghouse occupant as "rent"); Carroll v. Cooney, 163
A. 599, 600 (Conn. 1933) (lodginghouse owner had lien upon lodger's goods for unpaid
rent); Mathews v. Livingston, 85 A. 529, 531 (Conn. 1912) (same); Thomas v. Lenhart,
444 A.2d 246, 247-49 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982) (characterizing agreement for occupa-
tion of lodginghouse as "rental agreement"); Lindsey v. Watson, 83 A.2d 226, 227
(D.C. 1951) (stating that roominghouse owner received "rent" from plaintiff roomer);
Tamamian v. Gabbard, 55 A.2d 513, 513-16 (D.C. 1947) (repeatedly characterizing
obligation of roomer as "rent"); Donin v. Pierce, 133 So. 178, 178-79 (La. Ct. App.
1931) (same); Trout v. Tipton, 145 N.E.2d 478, 479-80 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (same).
146. Typical of these decisions is Roberts v. Casey, 93 P.2d 654 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1939). The Roberts owned the Riviera Apartment Hotel in San Diego, in
which they offered "for rent" furnished rooms and apartments by the day, week, or
month. Id. at 656. The Roberts retained keys to all rooms, and provided housekeeping
services typical of hotels. The Roberts sued to evict Casey, an occupant who was delin-
quent in payment of his room charges.
In its decision, the court in Roberts stated that an owner and her licensee guest
could stand in a relationship that involved the letting of property without actually being
landlord and tenant. While holding that Casey was a "mere guest or lodger" not enti-
tled to a tenant's possessory remedies, the court suggested that Roberts and Casey were
lessor and lessee, and called Casey's obligation "rent." Id. at 657 ("Ordinarily the land-
lord furnishes the lodger with a furnished room or rooms, whose care the landlord has,
and whose habitation and enjoyment he gives to the lodger, while he himself retains the
occupation. The tenant has the exclusive possession of his rooms, while the lodger has
merely the use without the actual or exclusive possession which remain in the lessor.")
(quoting Mathews v. Livingston, 85 A. 529, 531 (Conn. 1912)); see also id. at 660 (not-
ing that Roberts had elected to oust Casey on January 23, such that Roberts could not
"claim rent for the final eight days of that month").
147. Atlantic Oil Co. v. County of L.A., 446 P.2d 1006, 1015 (Cal. 1968) (quoting
Nelson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 240 F. 285, 293 (8th Cir. 1917)); see also, HAROLD
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malistic definitions of "possession" and "interest in land" narrow
the legal scope of the term "rent" and fail to acknowledge that the
terms "possession" and "interest in land" are relative terms whose
meaning varies with context. As the proposed Restatement recog-
nizes, parties can contract for the limited use and occupation of
land without standing in a relationship of landlord and tenant (ac-
companied by its attendant feudal limitations). Thus, one can prop-
erly characterize the payment obligation of the hotel guest or other
holder of a license to occupy land as "rent," as the Kansas and
North Carolina legislatures have made explicit by recent amend-
ments. 148 Accordingly, the proposed Restatement's position treat-
ing the income paid by occupier-licensees as "rent" is legally sound,
and bankruptcy courts should embrace the proposed Restatement in
administering distressed hotels and similar commercial real estate
developments.
III. COMMERCIAL POLICY AND "RENTS" WITHIN THE
STRUCTURE OF THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCING
TRANSACTION
If the "practical context in which the question of lease or li-
cense is raised must never be overlooked,"' 149 then the question of
how security law should denominate the income paid by occupiers
of a commercial land development must be informed by the context
of the commercial real estate mortgage transaction. Courts cannot
appreciate that the drafters of the proposed Restatement are correct
to treat hotel room revenues as "rents" if those courts fail to con-
sider and understand the structure of the hotel mortgage transac-
tion as compared with other commercial real estate mortgage
transactions. As Part III demonstrates, these financing transactions
are economically similar, and sound policy suggests that security
law should treat the parties to these transactions in a similar
fashion.
F. LUSK & WILLIAM B. FRENCH, LAW OF THE REAL ESTATE BUSINESS 398 (3d ed.
1975) ("Rent is the consideration paid for the use and occupation of property."); Stone,
supra note I 11, at 348 ("rent [is] that which one person renders to another in return for
the use of his land").
148. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2343(a)(4) (Supp. 1992) (" 'Rents' includes the
rents, income, proceeds, profits, royalties and other sums which are (A) derived under
present and future leases, licenses, contracts and other agreements for the use of posses-
sion of real property ...."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20(b)(1) (Supp. 1992) (" 'Rents,
issues, or profits' means ...all amounts payable by or on behalf of any licensee or
permittee or other person occupying or using real property under license or permission
from the owner or person entitled to possession.").
149. RABIN & KWALL, supra note 23, at 27.
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Several bankruptcy courts have justified their decisions to ex-
tinguish liens upon postpetition hotel revenues by arguing that
sound commercial policy requires that hotel room revenues be clas-
sified differently from real property "rents" when used as collateral.
The decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Oregon in In re Nendels-Medford Joint Venture 130 illustrates this
reasoning. In Nendels-Medford, the court rejected the mortgagee's
argument that postpetition room revenues were "rents and profits"
in the nature of land and articulated the policy concerns underlying
this result:
To the extent that [the mortgagee argues] for the proposition that
"rents, issues, and profits" clauses or any other more imaginative
version thereof which appear in real property security instru-
ments, may secure income arising from the operation of a busi-
ness on the premises, this court believes it to be contrary to the
interests of the financial and legal community .... If the lan-
guage used [by the mortgagee's instruments] is broad enough to
cover revenue from all motor inn business, it must also be broad
enough when used by other creditors to cover revenues from any
wholesale or retail business housed on real estate. Yet such in-
come is largely generated from personal property and any secur-
ity interests therein are universally recognized to be governed by
Article 9. What the financial and legal community deserve is a
legal interpretation for clauses which appear in collateral assign-
ment documents that is not overly broad, is relatively precise,
and supports a clear distinction between what is to be collaterally
secured under the provisions of Article 9 and what is to be collat-
erally secured under the state land recording system. 151
There can be little doubt that these policy objectives are desirable.
No one desires uncertainty in the law governing commercial rela-
tionships involving property.' 52 Yet the need for transactional cer-
tainty does not justify wholesale judicial abandonment of economic
substance in favor of legal formalism.153 If the economic assump-
150. 127. B.R. 658 (Bankr. D. Or. 1991).
151. Id. at 667.
152. Except perhaps law professors, who can use uncertainties as teaching tools in
classrooms devoid of transaction costs.
153. As Professor John Dewar has noted, courts relying upon conceptual formalism
often attempt to articulate narrow policy justifications in support of some "concep-
tually-dictated" result, relying upon the premise that such a result will make the law
more certain. Dewar, supra note 58, at 742 ("Above all, conceptual formalism is
characterised by the assumption that conceptual problems need conceptual resolution in
a way that renders the law more 'certain.' "). And as Grant Gilmore noted, in few areas
of law does formalism have as extensive a pedigree as in security law. Grant Gilmore,
Security Law, Formalism and Article 9, 47 NEB. L. REV. 659, 660-61 (1968) (discussing
tendency of courts toward extreme rigidity in interpreting the parameters of approved
security devices).
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tions underlying a court's use of formalism are incorrect, the court's
objective of achieving certainty is certain to be frustrated.
This is apparent in the hotel bankruptcy cases. The manner in
which bankruptcy courts have invoked the policy concern for "cer-
tainty" reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of commercial
mortgage financing. Implicit in the Nendels-Medford court's policy
analysis is the premise that running an apartment complex (which
generates "rent") is so fundamentally different from running
Macy's that the income generated by each must constitute different
forms of collateral. Even if the premise is correct,1 54 it is beside the
point, for it altogether fails to consider the structure of the underly-
ing mortgage financing contract. No sound policy requires that the
legal relationship between a hotel owner and its guest must control
the construction of the hotel's financing documents, which reflect
the legal relationship between the hotel owner and the mortgagee
(and to which the guest is not a party). As discussed below, hotel
financing shares similar development and underwriting assumptions
with apartment, shopping center, and office building financing.
Sound commercial policy accordingly dictates that security law
should treat the hotel financing transaction in the same fashion as
"tenant-based" projects.
A. Acknowledging the Economic Identity of Commercial Real
Estate Mortgage Financing Transactions
In terms of economic reality, mortgage financing transactions
involving hotels and mortgage financing transactions involving
apartment complexes (or some other project in which the occupants
are tenants) are identical. No commercial real estate development
is "typical"; the universe of potential projects is limited only by
market forces and the imagination of creative developers. As long
as there is sufficient demand for a particular commercial end use of
land, some developer will locate a suitable parcel of land and at-
tempt to create a "unique" project to exploit that demand. 15" Nev-
ertheless, one can generalize about a typical commercial real estate
project for two reasons. First, market forces have generated sub-
stantial numbers of projects that fall within identifiable categories
154. Part IV argues that the term "rent" is no longer helpful in describing the sums
generated by an income-producing real estate development, and that those sums should
be classified in a manner that better reflects their true nature.
155. This is probably understated; the experience of the savings and loan crisis sug-
gests that enterprising (or unscrupulous-reach your own value judgmentsl) developers
will undertake commercial real estate exploitation even absent suitable market demand.
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(such as apartments, offices, shopping centers, or hotels). Within
each category, individual projects are architecturally unique and
possess market advantages (or disadvantages) not possessed by
other projects. In an economic sense, though, each project within
each category is similar when viewed from the developer's decision-
making perspective; while the Ritz-Carlton and the Motel 6 look
very different to the business traveller, the financial statements that
depict their respective room revenues look quite similar. Second,
comparing projects from different categories (for example, compar-
ing an apartment complex with a hotel) is not like comparing apples
and oranges; the developmental and underwriting assumptions
upon which any project is developed and financed are essentially the
same.
In determining whether to acquire or develop income-produc-
ing real estate, the developer's financial analysis is essentially identi-
cal from transaction to transaction. While the process of real estate
development involves many different areas of the law, 156 the initial
development decision-whether the project is a "go" or a "no
go"-is a financial decision largely free of other legal constraints.
In determining whether to go forward with a proposed develop-
ment, the developer does not care whether the income will be paid
under commercial leases as opposed to licenses. The evaluation at
this level is purely one of dollars and cents and economic feasibility.
After a careful review of the physical amenities of the proposed pro-
ject, the competitive market environment, local demand, and cost
estimates for development and marketing, the developer projects a
stream of revenues (composed of the consideration to be paid by the
eventual occupiers of the land) over the useful life of the project. 15 7
156. [Real estate development implicates], in addition to the basic law of
contracts and real property, such areas of the law as environmental mat-
ters, construction matters, insurance matters, marketing matters, engi-
neering, architectural, zoning, tax, corporate, ERISA, securities,
bankruptcy and creditors' rights. The list is almost endless.
Charles Zalaznick, Introduction, in REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUC-
TION FINANCING 1989, at 11 (PLI Real Estate Law Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 325, 1989). See generally NORTON L. STEUBEN, REAL ESTATE PLANNING (2d ed.
1980).
157. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. PHYRR & JAMES R. COOPER, REAL ESTATE INVEST-
MENT 632-37 (1982); Thomas F. Morone, Omni Hotels: Facility Acquisition and Devel-
opments, Hotel Feasibility Analysis-The Operations Perspective, in FINANCING,
DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONS OF HOTELS AND CASINOS, at 15 (PLI Real Estate
Law Practice Course Handbook Series No. 332, 1989); Trevor C. Roberts, Checklist for
Purchasing Income Producing Property, in REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT AND CON-
STRUCTION FINANCING 1984, at 9 (PLI Real Estate Law Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 248, 1984); Irwin Glick, Economic Feasibility, in FINANCING AND DEVEL-
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If the projected cash flow exceeds the projected costs of operation
and generates an acceptable return, the developer will attempt to
proceed with the project. The threshold inquiry remains the same
regardless of the type of project-is projected net cash flow from the
project sufficient to provide a suitable return? 158
Similarly, when the developer begins its search for financing,
its prospective lenders are motivated by the same threshold eco-
nomic concerns. The prudent lender's first inquiry is whether pro-
jected net cash flows will service the projected mortgage debt. 159 If
the lender's appraisal and its review of the mortgage application
indicate both that the developer's projections are trustworthy and
that the discounted present value of the projected cash flows ex-
ceeds the desired principal loan balance (based on a prudent loan-
to-value ratio and an appropriate discount rate to reflect market
risk),oo the lender will decide to finance the project. Thus, what
OPMENT OF COMMERCIAL AND RESORT HOTELS, at 13 (PLI Real Estate Law Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 188, 1981); Daniel S. Levy & Michael L. Steinberg, Con-
siderations Involved in the Purchase of an Existing Shopping Center, in EVALUATING
REAL ESTATE AS AN INVESTMENT AND TAX SHELTER, at 255 (PLI Real Estate Law
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 165, 1979).
158. See Glick, supra note 157, at 27 (investor/developer should ask "Is the concept
viable? Is this a good investment? Is it a good tax shelter? What will be the payout or
return on equity?").
159. See id. at 28 (prospective lender asks "At what figure can the project be ap-
praised? What mortgage value is warranted by appraised value? By prospective cash
flow?"); see also MICHAEL T. MADISON & JEFFREY R. DWYER, THE LAW OF REAL
ESTATE FINANCING 1 3.03-3.04, at 3-7 to 3-12 (1981); Gerald M. Levy, Construction
Loan Decision Making: Issues and Documents, Risks and Benefits, in REAL ESTATE
DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION FINANCING 1990, at 125 (PLI Real Estate Law
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 344, 1990).
160. MADISON & DWYER, supra note 159, 1 3.041], at 3-11 to 3-12; Paul M. Brady,
A Methodology for Underwriting Commercial Real Estate, REAL EST. REV., Winter
1990, at 58, 58-60 (accurately projected net operating income is key to determining
proper loan amount); Steven R. Cole, Estimating the Value of Proposed Developments by
Discounting Cash Flow, REAL EST. REV., Summer 1988, at 32, 32-37; Lawrence E.
Fiedler, Calculating Residual Value in DCF Analysis, REAL EST. REV., Summer 1992,
at 16, 17 ("The discounted cash flow (DCF) method ... is also widely accepted for
arriving at bid and ask prices for income-producing properties. Buyers and sellers are
intuitively comfortable with the concepts behind discounting anticipated cash benefits
back to present values."); Lawrence E. Fiedler & B. Hagen Saville, The Misuse of DCF
Analysis, REAL EST. REV., Spring 1992, at 18, 20-22 (noting that discounted cash flow
method is "best available analytical technique for quantifying the elements of future
cash flow," but cautioning that present value cannot be quantified by "mere extrapola-
tion of historical variables"); Peter F. Korpacz & Mark I. Roth, Changing Emphasis in
Appraisal Techniques: The Transition to Discounted Cash Flow, 51 APPRAISAL J. 24
(1983) (noting widespread acceptance of discounted cash flow analysis as the basis for
pricing income-producing property); J. Douglas Timmons & Wayne R. Archer, Dis-
counted Cash Flow Analysis and Unpredictable Cash Flows, REAL EST. REV., Fall 1988,
at 26, 26-30.
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drives the project from proposal to reality is not whether state law
would characterize the occupiers of the completed project as ten-
ants or licensees or Grateful Dead fans; instead, it is projected cash
flow. Unless projected cash flows are sufficient, the proposed devel-
opment will not occur regardless of the legal characterization of the
project's ultimate occupiers.
The significance of projected cash flows to the mortgage financ-
ing decision, and the understandings of both developer and mortga-
gee regarding those cash flows, are reflected clearly in the typical
commercial mortgage loan documentation. Since the lender calcu-
lates its mortgage amount based upon projected cash flows, a lien
upon those cash flows is necessary in order to provide adequate se-
curity for the mortgagee's position. Thus, "[t]o obtain a lien on the
revenue, mortgage lending documents contain broad, sweeping, all-
inclusive provisions covering every conceivable type of income, pro-
ceed, or revenue generated from the property."'' 61 By including the
project cash flows within the collateral identified in the mortgage
loan documents, the developer and the mortgagee demonstrate their
unitary intention and understanding that those cash flows stand
available for the satisfaction of the mortgage debt to the same extent
as the underlying land itself.
The significance of projected cash flows to the transaction be-
comes even more compelling when the parties contemplate a nonre-
course loan transaction. 62 The theory underlying the nonrecourse
transaction is a straightforward one of risk and return:
A developer puts certain assets at risk when he undertakes a pro-
ject. If the project fails, that party will not be legally obligated to
invest more money. If he chooses, he can walk away with impu-
nity. Although he has lost his original investment, he has no
personal liability and his other assets are not at risk. Other par-
ticipants bear the downside risks of the project in exchange for
benefits that make their liability worthwhile.163
When the parties to the commercial real estate mortgage financing
transaction agree that the mortgagee will forgo recourse to the de-
veloper and instead accept recourse solely against the real estate
and its income, they demonstrate an unmistakable intention that
161. Averch, supra note 6, at 484.
162. Most commercial real estate mortgage loans (particularly those made to single-
asset ownership entities) are made on a nonrecourse basis, with the mortgagee agreeing
to take recourse only against the realty (and the income generated thereby) in the event
of default. See Michael L. Molinaro, Single-Asset Real Estate Bankruptcies: Curbing
an Abuse of the Bankruptcy Process, 24 UCC L.J. 161, 164 (1991).
163. Joshua Stein, Nonrecourse Clauses Revisited, REAL EST. REV., Summer 1992,
at 26, 27.
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the mortgagee have recourse to the project cash flows in accordance
with the provisions of their agreement. 164 By accepting the down-
side risks of the project, the mortgagee purchases from the devel-
oper (in an arms-length bargain) first-priority recourse both to the
project and the stream of project revenues. As between the devel-
oper and the mortgagee, the legal characterization of the occupier
of the development-a nonparty to the financing contract-is prop-
erly irrelevant and forms no basis for disturbing the parties' bar-
gained-for contractual expectations. 65
Finally, the mortgagee's lien upon project cash flows is critical
because a commercial real estate development is a capital asset-for
which the mortgagee provided most of the capital-with a limited
economic life. A commercial real estate project will not generate
revenues forever based upon the capital borrowed from the mortga-
gee in order to construct, acquire, or refinance the project. As the
project ages, economic and functional obsolescence diminish its rev-
enue-generating capacity in several respects. While typical use of
164. Only one court, In re Mid-City Hotel Assocs., 114 B.R. 634 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1990), has protected the hotel mortgagee based upon the significance of the nonrecourse
nature of a commercial mortgage transaction:
[T]he underlying debt was a non-recourse obligation by its terms. The
parties structured the note to allow full enforcement of the debt against
the real estate itself and all income generated from it, but barred any
enforcement of a deficiency against (the debtor] or its general partners.
This strongly suggests a bargained-for exchange of remedies, with [the
mortgagee] taking the right to all income from the use of the property, in
exchange for its surrender of the right to enforce the personal liability of
the debtor and the responsible third parties. It is difficult to imagine that
[the mortgagee] would have waived its rights to pursue collateral sources
of satisfaction, had it not gained an unchallengeable right to the fruits of
the use of its tangible security.
Id. at 642 n.9.
165. As Joshua Stein has noted, the refusal of courts to enforce the substance of the
nonrecourse bargain altogether destroys the justification for the nonrecourse
transaction:
Instead of accepting the negotiated remedies and walking away
when the deal goes bad, the defaulting party can and often does throw the
whole transaction into interminable litigation and bankruptcy proceed-
ings, running up costs that are disproportionate to the original transac-
tion and dragging out the process for months or years.
The limited remedies that were supposed to be available to the
lender ... become worthless. Perversely, the party in default often gains
total control of the situation-either occupying the property without pay-
ing rent or debt service, or remaining a partner of the partnership with
the possibility of future upside without performing its obligations ....
Stein, supra note 163, at 27.
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the project begins to cause substantial wear and tear, 166 newer
projects enter the market possessing operating efficiencies and/or
construction improvements that older projects do not possess. 167
Over time, occupiers sensitive to outward appearances tend to pre-
fer modern projects over older ones, reducing the ability of older
projects to generate competitive and increasing revenue levels.1 68
Eventually, a project simply reaches the end of its planned eco-
nomic life. 169 For an aged project to regain its competitive market
position and generate consistent market returns, the developer must
make an additional capital investment to provide the project with a
new economic useful life. 170 By acknowledging the economic life
cycle of the commercial real estate project, a court can recognize
that the revenues paid by occupiers of the project during its eco-
nomic useful life reflect a return upon the economic value of the
project as that value is consumed over time. 17 1 Since the parties
understood from the earliest stages of the transaction that the mort-
gagee's recourse was to that economic value, sound policy suggests
that the mortgagee's recourse to project cash flows should be
respected (absent compelling bankruptcy policy justifications) re-
gardless of the legal characterization of the project's occupants.
166. Gregory T. Bohan & Michael Cahill, Determining the Feasibility of Hotel/Mar-
ket Repositioning, REAL EST. REV., Spring 1992, at 63, 67.
167. See, e.g., Fiedler, supra note 160, at 20.
168. See, e.g., id. ("[D]ifferences in exterior architectural design are important but
not determinative factors in establishing rental differences between old and new proper-
ties."). In discussing hotels, Bohan and Cahill refer to this phenomenon as "functional
obsolescence," or "the loss of a lodging facility's ability to be useful and to function in
accordance with current market tastes and standards." Bohan & Cahill, supra note
166, at 65. As they noted, hotels "are especially vulnerable to functional obsolescence
when new niche products appear within or outside their own market." Id.
169. Bohan and Cahill, supra note 166, at 64 ("Hotel products of the 1950s and
1960s ... are simply reaching the end of their planned economic life.").
170. The period of time in which a project will require new capital reinvestment may
in fact be quite short. For example, "[a]ll hotels require major reinvestment every five
to ten years." Peggy Berg, Exploring Solutions in Hotel Workouts, REAL ET. REV.,
Summer 1992, at 33, 38. In their article, Bohan and Cahill charted their conception of
the economic life cycle of a hotel, ranging from the "young" hotel (one to five years), to
the "mature" stage (three to ten years), to "middle age" (eight to seventeen years) and
finally to "senior citizen" status (fifteen to thirty-five years). Bohan & Cahill, supra
note 166, at 67.
171. See infra notes 220-250 and accompanying text, in which it is argued that the
revenues generated by the letting of property can and should be classified as "proceeds"
of the property.
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B. Acknowledging Common Sense-Of Baseball Card Merchants
and Hotel Occupancy Tax Collectors
The notion that all income paid to occupy commercial real es-
tate should be treated alike when pledged as security also reflects
common-sense reality, as demonstrated by a personal anecdote. On
a Saturday afternoon last year, my wife and I were at a local indoor
mall, which was so crowded with shoppers that walking from store
to store was a contact sport. The mall owners had aggravated the
overcrowding by filling up the interior hallways with nearly one
hundred local merchants, each hawking their wares (baseball cards,
leather goods, T-shirts, art, jewelry, fudge, etc.) for the weekend
only. Unlike the permanent merchants (who typically are tenants),
these temporary merchants were mere licensees, not entitled to ex-
clusive possession of their allotted space. 172 While I do not know
what these local merchants paid the mall owner for their weekend
license, I am reasonably confident that the mall owner did not do-
nate the space. Whatever amount these temporary merchants paid,
I am certain that the mall owner and its mortgagee understood that
such sums constituted collateral security for the mortgage, just like
any other sums paid for the use of space in the mall. 173
At some point my wife-a biochemist, not a lawyer, but for
some reason curious about my research-asked whether these
weekend merchants paid rent just like the permanent tenants. I
started to say "OF COURSE THEY DO," but then lapsed into a
classroom fantasy. Suddenly, I was no longer shopping; instead, I
was attempting to explain to a classroom full of scientists the legal
niceties of commercial finance as viewed in the bankruptcy courts.
I explained how the mall owner borrowed the money to buy the
mall from some bank, pension fund, or life insurance company. I
explained how the mall owner assigned to the mortgagee, as secur-
ity for its loan, all of the monies paid by mall merchants for their
spaces. I tried to explain that these temporary merchants were not
tenants like the permanent merchants, but were just licensees. I
tried to explain that most bankruptcy courts would hold that sums
paid by these temporary merchants are not "rents" because the
merchants are not tenants entitled to exclusive possession of their
spaces. I tried to explain that if the mall owner went bankrupt, a
172. Of course, theoretically nothing prohibits the mall owner from using occu-
pancy agreements for its permanent merchants that create licenses rather than landlord-
tenant relationships. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
173. Certainly, the sweeping language contained in most mortgage documents
would include such income. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy court might say that the mortgagee would have a secur-
ity interest in the monies paid by the tenants for the use of their
spaces, but not in the monies paid by the weekend merchants for
their spaces. Suddenly, I was jolted from my fantasy as my wife,
mystified, looked at me with a sense of disgust that I imagine scien-
tists generally possess for lawyers.
Beneath my wife's mystification lies an obvious common-sense
recognition-there is no functional basis for distinguishing between
the money paid by the permanent mall tenant and the weekend
baseball card merchant. Each is "renting" available space for a lim-
ited period of time, as the term "renting" is commonly understood,
and each pays money in exchange for its limited right to use and
occupy that space. When the mall owner pledges its rights to col-
lect payment from each of those occupiers as collateral, property
security law should treat the owner's rights against each occupier
identically.
This common sense recognition is also reflected in the way that
state legislatures have characterized hotel revenues for state sales,
occupancy, and transient guest taxation purposes. Thirty-two of
fifty-one jurisdictions impose such taxes either upon the "rents" or
"rentals" collected by hotel owners, or upon the income or gross
receipts derived from the "renting" or "leasing" of hotel rooms.1 74
174. See ALA. CODE § 40-26-1 (1985) (imposing 5% excise tax upon privilege of
engaging in business of renting hotel rooms); ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.650(a) (1992) (im-
posing sales tax upon "rents"; construed to include rental of hotel rooms in City of
Homer v. Gangi, 650 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1982)); ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-74-501 (Michie
1992) (authorizing transient occupancy tax up to 2% of gross receipts from renting or
leasing of hotel rooms); id. § 26-52-301(3)(B) (Michie 1992) (assessing excise tax of 3%
of gross receipts from furnishing of hotel rooms to transient guests, defined as those who
"rent" on less than month-to-month basis); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-407, 12-
408 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (sales tax imposed upon renting of hotel rooms; compen-
sation received is rent); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, §§ 6101, 6102 (1985 & Supp. 1992)
(occupancy tax of 8% upon rent due upon occupancy of hotel rooms); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 47-3201, 47-3202 (1990) (consideration for occupancy of hotel room is rent);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 212.03 (West 1989) (occupancy tax of 6% of total rental receipts
for occupancy of hotel rooms); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 237D-1, 237D-2 (1992) (transient
occupancy tax of 5% on gross rental received from occupancy of hotel rooms); IDAHO
CODE § 50-1046 (1988) (authorizing cities to levy occupancy tax on renting of hotel
rooms); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, para. 481b.32, 481b.33 (Smith-Hurd 1991) (occu-
pancy tax imposed upon business of renting hotel rooms; tax equal to 5% of 94% of
gross rental receipts); id. ch. 24, para. 8-3-14 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (authorizing munici-
palities to levy taxes upon business of renting hotel rooms); IND. CODE ANN. § 6-19-18-
3 (Burns 1991) (general innkeeper's tax upon persons engaged in business of renting
rooms); IOWA CODE ANN. § 422A.1 (West 1990) (authorizing occupancy tax up to 7%
of gross receipts from renting of hotel rooms); id. § 422.43(7) (sales tax of 4% upon
gross receipts from renting of hotel rooms); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3603 (1989) (sales
tax of 4.25% of gross receipts from renting of hotel rooms); id. §§ 12-1692, 12-1693
HeinOnline  -- 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1508 1992-1993
1993] COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCE 1509
Furthermore, numerous courts faced with constitutional attacks on
these taxation statutes have identified hotel room revenues as
"rents" or as income derived from the "rental" of rooms. 175
(1991) (authorizing transient guest tax up to 2% of gross rental receipts collected from
hotel rooms); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91A.390 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (occu-
pancy tax equal to 3% of rent charged on hotel rooms); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 2740.18 (West Supp. 1993) (occupancy tax of 1% of rent of hotel rooms); id. § 2711.7
(1988) (same); id. § 2711.9 (1988) (occupancy tax of 2% of rent of hotel rooms in Iberia
parish); id. § 2711.3 (1988) (occupancy tax of 1/2% of rent of hotel rooms in city of
New Orleans); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1811 (West 1990) (sales tax assessed
upon value of rental of hotel room); MD. CODE ANN. art. 24, §§ 9-301 to 9-304 (Supp.
1991) (occupancy tax charged upon rental of hotel rooms); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 64G
§§ 1, 3, 3A (Law. Co-op. 1988) (compensation from occupancy of hotel rooms is rent);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 67.671 (Vernon 1989) (tourism sales tax charged upon rental
charges paid by transient hotel guests); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2702(13)(f), 77-2703
(1990) (sales tax imposed upon rental of hotel rooms); NEV. REV. STAT. § 244.3352
(1991) (authorizing counties to impose occupancy tax upon gross receipts from rental of
transient lodging); id. § 268.096 (1991) (authorizing cities to impose occupancy tax
upon gross receipts from rents of transient lodging); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 78-A: 1,
78-A:3, 78-A:6 (1991) (compensation from occupancy of hotel rooms is rent); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-3(d) (West 1986) (sales tax imposed upon rent received from oc-
cupancy of hotel rooms); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-38-13 to 3-38-15 (Michie 1984 &
Supp. 1991) (compensation received from occupancy of hotel rooms is rent); N.Y. UN-
CONSOL. LAW § 9441 (McKinney Supp. 1993) (authorizing occupancy tax upon rent
collected for occupancy of hotel rooms); N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1202-a to 1202-k (McKin-
ney 1987 & Supp. 1993) (authorizing assessment of occupancy tax upon rental of hotel
rooms in Onandaga, Broome, Jefferson, Oneida, Schenectady, Tompkins, Cortland, Sar-
atoga, Steuben, Westchester, Chemung, Oswego, Schuyler, Ostego, Sullivan, Tioga,
Chautauqua, Montgomery, and Rockland Counties); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4
(1992) (sales tax assessed upon rents collected from rental of hotel rooms); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 40-57.3-01, 40-57.3-01.1 (Supp. 1992) (city lodging tax assessed upon rental or
leasing of hotel rooms); id. § 57-39.2-02.1 (Supp. 1991) (5% sales tax assessed upon
rental or leasing of hotel rooms); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 7209, 7210 (1990) (6%
excise tax upon rent received for occupancy of hotel rooms); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-36-
920 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992) (7% sales tax assessed upon rental of hotel rooms); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-45-7 (1989) (sales tax assessed upon rental of hotel rooms);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-12-301 (1992) (3% transient room tax upon rent received for
occupancy of hotel rooms); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 9202, 9241 (1991) (meals and
room tax assessed upon rent received for occupancy of hotel rooms); see also CAL. REV.
& TAX. CODE § 7281 (West 1987) (authorizing transient occupancy tax upon the rent-
ing of mobile homes for occupancy by transient guests).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County, Md., 761 F.2d 998 (4th Cir.
1985); City of Homer v. Gangl, 650 P.2d 396 (Alaska 1982); People v. Evans, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 276 (Ct. App. 1967); Gowens v. City of Bakersfield, 13 Cal. Rptr. 820 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1961); Alachua County v. Dep't of Revenue, 466 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); Greater Boise Auditorium Dist. v. Royal Inn, 684 P.2d 286 (Idaho 1984); Mar-
cus Corp. v. Village of S. Holland, 458 N.E.2d 112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Springfield
Hotel-Motel Ass'n v. City of Springfield, 457 N.E.2d 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); City of
Lexington v. Motel Developers, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1971); Second Street Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court, 445 S.W.2d 709 (Ky. 1969); William Reilly Constr. Corp. v.
City of New York, 334 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Allegheny County v. Monzo, 500
A.2d 1096 (Pa. 1985); Ambassador Athletic Club v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 496 P.2d
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C. Applying Common Sense in the Bankruptcy Context
Fortunately, a precious few courts have demonstrated the in-
stinct to reject legal form in favor of economic substance in evaluat-
ing the commercial real estate mortgage transaction. One example
is the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota
in its decision in In re Mid-City Hotel Associates. 176 As discussed in
Part I, the debtor in Mid-City Hotel sought to avoid its mortgagee's
asserted lien upon postpetition room revenues on the ground that
hotel revenues were not "rents," "issues," or "profits" of the hotel.
While the Mid-City Hotel court regrettably concluded that hotel
room revenues are not "rents" (because hotel guests are not "ten-
ants"), 177 the court nonetheless held that postpetition room reve-
nues are "profits" of the land and thus subject to the mortgagee's
security interest. 178 In reaching this decision, the court relied heav-
ily upon the economic realities underlying commercial mortgage
financing:
Common sense, and a reasonable divination of the parties'
own intentions, also support this conclusion....
[The mortgage and the assignment of rents, issues and prof-
its] were integrally related, and were executed in conjunction
with one another. This circumstance, and the instruments them-
selves, clearly evidence the parties' intent to subject all of the
economic fruits of [the debtor's] direct physical use of the real-
property interests to a lien in favor of [the mortgagee], to secure
payment of the debt. That physical use, of course, is the provi-
sion of rooms to guests. 179
The Mid-City Hotel court rejected the analysis of the contrary
hotel bankruptcy decisions for failing "to consider the parties' ac-
tual intent ... as to the scope of the creditors' security" and failing
"to recognize the economic realities" of hotel mortgage financing.
Motivated by these realities, the Mid-City Hotel court recognized
that the hotel was worth only the discounted sum of its operating
revenues, which the owner intended to and did pledge as security
883 (Utah 1972); Howe v. Tax Comm'n, 353 P.2d 468 (Utah 1960); Bedford v. Vermont
Dep't of Taxes, 505 A.2d 658 (Vt. 1985).
176. 114 B.R. 634 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990).
177. Id. at 640-41; see also supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
178. The court defined "profit" as "[lthe benefit, advantage, or pecuniary gain ac-
cruing to the owner or occupant of land from its actual use; as in the familiar phrase,
'rents, issues and profits'..... 114 B.R. at 641 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1090 (5th ed. 1979)).
179. Id. at 641-42 (footnotes omitted).
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for the nonrecourse mortgage debt. 180 As the court noted, "[i]t is
difficult to imagine that [the mortgagee] would have waived its
rights to pursue collateral sources of satisfaction, had it not gained
an unchallengeable right to the fruits of the use of its tangible secur-
ity."181 By construing the mortgage documents in a manner consis-
tent with the underlying structure of the transaction, the Mid-City
Hotel court reached a result perfectly consistent with both the law
of real property and the contractual expectations of the parties.
The soundness of the position taken by the Mid-City Hotel
court and several other courts18 2 provides a clear foundation for the
proposed Restatement to treat all sums paid by licensee occupiers of
land as "rent."18 3 Unfortunately, most bankruptcy courts adminis-
tering distressed hotels remain bound to formalism and the weight
of authority, disregarding the structure of the hotel financing trans-
action and refusing to give effect to the developer/mortgagee bar-
gain. Because there is no apparent bankruptcy policy that requires
the disapproval or nonenforcement of this bargain, the bankruptcy
courts' formalistic use of section 552 to extinguish the hotel mortga-
gee's lien upon postpetition revenue is especially suspect. In the
Bankruptcy Code, Congress struck a careful balance between debt-
180. One court has gone even further and suggested that the structure of hotel fi-
nancing requires a conclusion that room revenues are rent:
Hotel room revenues are, or resemble, rents in that they are a pri-
mary component used by appraisers in valuing a hotel. The value of the
income stream, rents, is a major factor in determining the value of the
real property. The income is what the debtor and the secured lender look
to for payment of the loan. To subtract room revenue from the consen-
sual real property security greatly reduces the value of the creditor's col-
lateral package.
In re S.F. Drake Hotel Assocs., 131 B.R. 156, 160 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd, 147
B.R. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see also Berg, supra note 170, at 35 ("Today... hotels are
trading as businesses and are valued on the basis of their revenue streams.").
181. Mid-City Hotel, 114 B.R. at 642 n.9.
182. See, e.g., In re Everett Home Town Ltd. Partnership, 146 B.R. 453, 458
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992) (revenues generated by resort suites treated as "rents"); In re
Miami Ctr. Assocs., 144 B.R. 937, 941 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1992) (hotel room revenues are
"profits" of hotel subject to lender's prepetition lien); In re S.F. Drake Hotel Assocs.,
131 B.R. at 160 (hotel room revenues are rent), aff'd, 147 B.R. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal.
1992); In re Ashford Apartments Ltd. Partnership, 132 B.R. 217, 218 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1991) (revenues generated by parking garage are rent); In re Flower City Nursing
Home, Inc., 38 B.R. 642, 644-45 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1984) (funds attributable to use
and occupation of nursing home were "attributable to real property" and thus consti-
tuted "rents and profits"); Great-West Life Assurance Co. v. Raintree Inn, 837 P.2d
267, 270-71 (Colo. App. 1992) (recorded deed of trust granting security interest in all
"rents, issues and profits, income and revenue" created valid security interest in hotel
room revenues).
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 4.2(a).
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ors desiring to use operating revenues and secured parties claiming
a lien upon such revenues. If hotel operating revenues constitute
the mortgagee's cash collateral, the bankruptcy court can permit
the debtor to use them in order to pay operating and maintenance
expenses; payment of those expenses provides adequate protection
of the mortgagee's secured interest. 184 Furthermore, the debtor
may use postpetition room revenues, even beyond the extent neces-
sary for operating and maintenance expenses, if the debtor can pro-
vide adequate protection of the mortgagee's interest in those
revenues. 85 Finally, section 552(b) authorizes the bankruptcy
court to permit the debtor to use postpetition revenues free of the
creditor's lien altogether if the "equities of the case" suggest that
such unlimited use is warranted. 186
Congress thus has provided statutory mechanisms for bank-
ruptcy courts to provide the bankrupt developer with use of postpe-
tition room revenues. These mechanisms may be narrow ones, but
they are necessarily narrow; they reflect the congressional mandate
that courts must respect the mortgagee's bargained-for rights to se-
curity. By resorting to conceptual formalism to provide the debtor
with broader access to postpetition revenues, bankruptcy courts are
circumventing the debtor-secured party balance struck by Congress
in section 363. Courts instead should respect the mortgagee's lien
upon postpetition revenues, and permit the debtor to use them only
if the debtor can provide the mortgagee with adequate protection or
if the "equities of the case" so warrant.
IV. TOWARD A COHERENT FRAMEWORK FOR SECURING
INCOME FROM THE COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
Lurking beneath the surface of the hotel bankruptcy cases are
larger conceptual questions that have bedeviled the analysis of
bankruptcy courts in administering distressed income-producing
184. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (1988) (debtor-in-possession may use cash collateral
if authorized by court after notice and hearing); id. § 363(e) (court can condition
debtor-in-possession's use of cash-collateral as is necessary to provide adequate protec-
tion of secured creditor's interest therein). Since the mortgagee would have to use oper-
ating revenues to pay operating expenses if the mortgagee were in possession of the
property, the court certainly should permit the debtor-in-possession to use the same
revenues to pay those expenses.
185. Id. § 363(e).
186. Id. § 552(b). As the final floor statements accompanying § 552(b) note: "[Sec-
tion 552(b)] allows the court to consider the equities in each case. In the course of such
consideration the court may evaluate any expenditures by the estate relating to proceeds
and any related improvement in position of the secured party." 124 CONG. REC. 32,400
(1978).
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real estate. What is the true nature of the revenue generated by a
commercial land development? Is it realty or personalty? Should
security law characterize revenue paid for the occupation of land as
fundamentally in the nature of land, with assignments perfected ac-
cording to land security law? Or instead, should security law treat
all such revenue as personalty, with assignments perfected accord-
ing to the UCC?
Instead of examining these questions in depth, courts have re-
lied upon orthodox historical conceptions. Courts have tended to
question whether a particular type of revenue falls within the scope
of "rent," and if so, they have classified that income as realty, sub-
ject to real estate security law. And when pushed in difficult cases
to determine whether a particular type of revenue is "rent," courts
often have relied upon another traditional distinction drawn by land
security law-whether the revenue was generated primarily by "the
use or occupancy of real estate" or "from the sale of goods and
services."' 8 7 In hotel cases, for example, this distinction has led
courts to suggest that because room revenues derive from the
owner's provision of services, not from its bare ownership of land,
room revenues cannot constitute "rent" in the nature of realty.
188
This distinction, referred to here as the "land/services distinc-
tion," has an extensive common law pedigree, but does it have any
continuing utility as a basis for determining the character of the
revenue generated by the modem commercial real estate develop-
ment? The remainder of this Article shifts its focus in an attempt to
provide a new conceptual paradigm for security law to use in char-
acterizing sums paid by occupiers of land. While Parts I through
III asked "Are hotel room revenues 'rent'?," Part IV instead asks
"What is the nature of the sums paid by occupiers of land, and is
there a concept other than 'rent' that is more helpful in characteriz-
ing those sums?"
Part IV first reviews the traditional land/services distinction
and demonstrates that it has diminished meaning and validity when
applied to the occupier of the modem commercial real estate devel-
opment.'8 9 The modem commercial land development involves an
inextricable blend of land and services, each constituting an essen-
tial part of the bargain between developer'and occupier. If payment
obligations are "rent" only when they are incurred solely for the use
of land, then security law uses the term "rent" in an artificial man-
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 4.2 reporter's note, at 78.
188. See infra note 205 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 192-219 and accompanying text.
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ner to describe the sums paid by the modern occupier of commer-
cial real estate. The distinction thus clouds rather than clarifies the
proper characterization of the revenues paid by such occupiers.
Part IV then recommends alternative conceptions that are in-
formed by the nature of commercial land development and the real-
ities of commercial mortgage financing. Part IV suggests that
revenues paid by occupiers of commercial real estate constitute
"proceeds" of the underlying real estate collateral. 19° The devel-
oper of a modem commercial real estate project acquires a produc-
tive capital asset with a limited economic life-an inventory of
space units (of a certain appointed quality) available for temporary
occupation during the project's economic life. The sum of these
units over the development's useful life reflects the development's
productive capacity, which is the true economic value of the real
estate collateral. Viewed in this light, one may designate the reve-
nue paid in exchange for each unit as "proceeds" of the disposition
of that portion of the development's economic value. As such, se-
curity law coherently may treat such revenues as "proceeds" of the
underlying mortgage collateral, with liens upon such revenues pro-
tected in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Code section 552(b).
Part IV concludes that once the land/services distinction is re-
jected, there remains no sensible policy basis upon which to treat
"rent" as an interest in realty beyond the scope of UCC Article 9.
Instead, security law should treat the assignment of a lease or occu-
pancy contract as it treats the assignment of an installment land
contract. Both the lease and the installment land contract involve
the purchase of an interest in land in exchange for the payment of
contractual installments. In analyzing assignments of installment
land contracts, courts have characterized the vendor's rights to the
vendee's contract installments as personal property collateral.
Since the mortgagee's goal in obtaining an assignment of rents is
access to the lessee's contract installments, security law likewise
should characterize the right to collect those installments as per-
sonal property collateral. By bringing assignments of leases and
rents within the scope of the UCC, those charged with revising Ar-
ticle 9 can provide much-needed coherence and transactional cer-
tainty to the financing of commercial real estate development
transactions. 191
190. See infra notes 220-250 and accompanying text.
191. See infra notes 251-267 and accompanying text.
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A. The Land/Services Distinction as Applied to Income from
Real Estate
The land/services distinction is rooted in the common law's
conception of rent as an incorporeal hereditament that issued di-
rectly out of the land. 192 Under this conception, there is a conclu-
sive presumption that the land itself generates the rent, which is a
return purely upon the ownership of the land. Influenced by this
conception, early scholars argued that sums designated as "rent" by
the parties but properly attributable to the landowner's business ef-
forts were not properly "rent" in the nature of land.193 If one car-
ries this analysis to its extreme, the term "rent" necessarily would
exclude any sum received by the owner for providing business serv-
ices to the occupier.194
One of the first modern cases to discuss and apply the land/
services distinction in detail is the decision of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York in Grusmark v.
Echelman.195 In Grusmark, the mortgagee of a summer resort had
requested and obtained the appointment of a receiver pending fore-
closure of the mortgage. The receiver had taken possession of the
resort, which rented vacation bungalows to families and also pro-
vided a child day camp, child-care services, and entertainment ac-
192. See DIGBY, supra note 56, at 231; 1 TIFFANY, supra note 56, § 165, at 1009.
This conception contrasts with the civil law's conception of rent as a "civil profit" that
does not issue from the land itself, but acquires its status as a profit solely by operation
of law. See supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., 1 TIFFANY, supra note 56, § 169, at 1022-23 (sums reserved as com-
pensation for good will, for making of improvements by landlord, or to reimburse land-
lord for repairs, are not "rent" even if so termed by parties to lease).
194. The land/services distinction may reflect the influence of early economists and
their conceptions of economic rent. David Ricardo defined rent as "that portion of the
produce of the earth which is paid to the landlord for the use of the original and inde-
structible powers of the soil." FRANCIS A. WALKER, LAND AND ITS RENT 35 (1883).
This notion of economic land-rent did not include any return attributable to effort ex-
pended upon the land by the landowner:
Ricardo limited his definition of rent to the income from land. That part
of a contract payment made by a tenant to a landlord which represented
improvement in the quality of the land or an investment in leased build-
ings, fences, and other equipment was not classified as rent. In general,
this view.., has been further clarified by excluding from rent, profit and
all earnings of labor, whether that of hired employees or the cultivator
himself.
CARL R. BYE, DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF RENT 2 (1940) (foot-
note omitted). Instead, Ricardo perceived of "rent" as a pure "gift of nature," not
including payment "for any personal productive services rendered by the landowners."
OVERTON H. TAYLOR, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 370 (1960).
195. 162 F. Supp. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
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tivities for its adult guests. 196 The owner sought to have the
receivership order vacated, arguing that (a) no receiver can "be ap-
pointed unless there are actual rents and profits" and (b) the opera-
tion of a summer resort did not generate "rents and profits." 197 The
Grusmark court agreed with the owner and vacated the receivership
order. 198 In doing so, the court addressed the scope of the term
"rents and profits":
Clearly, if the mortgagor is in total possession of the premises as
in the case of a dwelling house, there are no rents and profits and
therefore there is no occasion for the appointment of a receiver to
collect them. The same is true if he is in possession of mortgaged
premises on which he is conducting a business. On the other
hand, an apartment house that is occupied by tenants produces
rents in the form of payments by the tenants which are compen-
sation primarily for the use of the property although they may
cover also incidental services such as heat, gas and electricity.
The concept of rent has been expanded to cover the income from
some businesses operated on real property... [such as] the oper-
ation of a garage by a receiver of rents and profits where the main
business of the garage was leasing space to automobile owners.
On the other hand, a receiver of rents and profits was not permit-
ted to take possession of and operate a restaurant and dance hall
on the ground that there were no rents and profits .... 199
The court decided that the receiver's right to possession of the
resort depended upon the resort's primary function, which the court
found was "to entertain the customers and care for their children as
well as to lease them furnished bungalows. ' 200 In characterizing
the resort's revenues, however, the court concluded that because of
"[t]he extensive scope of the services rendered" by the owner, "a
large part of the income from the business is not earned by the real
estate and is therefore not rent."'201 As a result, the court held that
the receiver was not entitled to possession of the business, and or-
dered the receiver to return possession to the owner pending fore-
closure. 20 2 Nevertheless, the court went on to hold that
"undoubtedly a substantial portion of the income earned was rent
196. Id. at 50. It is not clear from the language of the court's opinion whether the
resort's guests were tenants or licensees.
197. Id. at 51.
198. Id. at 52.
199. Id. at 51 (citations and footnote omitted). The examples used in the quoted
passage are discussed in some detail by Professors Nelson and Whitman in their treatise
on real estate finance. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW § 4.41, at 248-49 (2d ed. 1985).
200. 162 F. Supp. at 51.
201. Id. at 51-52.
202. Id. at 52-53.
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paid for the use of the real estate. ' 20 3 Since receivers are legally
entitled to collect rents, the court ordered the owner to pay the re-
ceiver the reasonable rental value of the premises in accordance
with the terms of the mortgage. 2°4
None of the hotel bankruptcy cases have relied upon Grus-
mark as authority. A number of courts have adopted the land/
services distinction embraced in Grusmark, but have applied it in a
questionable manner. These courts have concluded that a hotel is a
business operation, with guests paying revenues primarily in ex-
change for the owner's personal services, such that room revenues
cannot be characterized as rent.205 This conclusion provides no ba-
sis, however, to distinguish a hotel project from an apartment pro-
ject or any other commercial land development. These courts
implicitly assume that a hotel is a business operation and is thus
different from an apartment complex-which, presumably, must
somehow not be a business operation. Merely stating this assump-
tion illustrates how preposterous it is. Each is a business in which
the developer provides available space of a certain type and quality
for temporary occupation. To the developer, making space avail-
able and providing services to the occupiers are not mutually exclu-
sive activities. 20 6
203. Id. at 52.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., In re The Green Corp., No. 92-10903, 1993 WL 180921, at *5-6
(Bankr. D. Me. May 18, 1993); In re Thunderbird Inn, Inc., 151 B.R. 224, 226-27
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993); Financial Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Days Cal. Riverside Ltd. Part-
nership, No. S-92-119GEB, 1992 WL 471706, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 1992); United
States v. PS Hotel Corp., 404 F. Supp. 1188, 1192 (E.D. Mo. 1975); cf In re Hillside
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 121 B.R. 23, 24 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) (nursing home charges
are for services and are not rents); In re GGVXX, Ltd., 130 B.R. 322, 325-26 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1991) (golf course fees paid in exchange for services are not rents); In re
Woodstock Assocs. I, Inc., 120 B.R. 436, 444 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (nursing home
charges are for services and are not rents).
206. At its core, commercial real estate is essentially a service activity. As one com-
mentator has noted:
Individual real estate executives are really functional experts in specific
areas like sales, finance, construction, or design. The medium through
which they exercise their talents is called real estate.
In the vertical chain of business activity, the functions most real es-
tate firms perform are (1) assisting tenants to distribute goods and serv-
ices (shopping centers and warehouses); (2) assisting tenants to create,
market, or stimulate ideas, and to process information about their prod-
ucts (office buildings); or (3) providing tenants with what the architect Le
Corbusier called machines for living (houses, hotels, and apartments).
Paul Z. Pilzer, The Real Estate Business and Technological Obsolescence, REAL EST.
REv., Fall 1989, at 30, 31. Pilzer suggests that commercial real estate development has
always been a service activity, but that recognition of this fact was obscured "as long as
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In the modem commercial real estate development, the sums
paid by an occupier are compensation both for the occupier's bare
right to occupy the space and for the provision of business services
promised by the owner. One cannot accurately allocate the entire
payment solely to the use of the land or solely to the services pro-
vided-both are a necessary component of the exchange. This con-
clusion can be shown by a comparison of three hypothetical
projects-the Shady Acres Apartments, the Shady Rest Hotel, and
the local Spiffy Lube. Each generates income in the form of cash
payments made by occupiers in exchange for two "benefits." One
benefit is the right to occupy the exploited land without trespassing.
At Spiffy Lube, this right is merely a license lasting approximately
twenty-five minutes; at Shady Acres Apartments, it is likely a non-
freehold estate lasting a year or more.207 In each case, however, the
customer receives some right to occupy the land, and some portion
of each customer's payment is properly allocable to the developer's
ownership of the land.20 8
Each customer also receives a second benefit-the personal
services and business efforts promised by the owner or its agents.
These services relate integrally to the customer's occupation of the
our rapidly developing country continued to have a general shortage of developed real
property." Id.
207. Of course, the owner of Shady Acres could draft its documentation such that
occupiers were in fact licensees rather than tenants. See, e.g., Wenner v. Dayton-Hud-
son Corp., 598 P.2d 1022, 1023-27 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (income received by depart-
ment store owner under agreements that permitted "licensee" to operate department
within store was not income derived from leasing or renting land, since licensee had no
right to exclusive possession of any part of store building); Cook v. University Plaza,
427 N.E.2d 405, 406-08 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (residents of privately-owned student dorm
not "tenants" but "licensees," since residence hall contracts allowed owner to relocate
occupiers at will).
208. In the Shady Acres Apartments case, one easily can see why some portion of
each occupier's payment is allocable to the land. In the Spiffy Lube case, the allocation
is not so clear, but several factors require that one allocate some portion of the cus-
tomer's fee to the developer's mere ownership of land. First, from a pure cost allocation
perspective, some portion of that fee reflects an internalization of the cost of the under-
lying real estate. This explains why the customer of an urban Spiffy Lube (which is
built upon costlier real estate) may have to pay $30.95 for the same service for which
the customer of a rural Spiffy Lube pays $24.95; each owner simply internalizes the
differential costs of the underlying real estate. Second, from a customer preference per-
spective, a Spiffy Lube customer may choose to use a particular Spiffy Lube because the
land upon which it is located is more convenient than the land owned by some alterna-
tive service provider. This convenience is a key factor; one would not see a Spiffy Lube
constructed on inexpensive land far removed from any population center. Since the
customer's decision to use a particular Spiffy Lube may reflect some locational prefer-
ence, some portion of that customer's payment should be allocated to the underlying
land. See infra text accompanying note 212.
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land; usually they occur directly on the land. At Spiffy Lube, these
services include the labor, oil, and lube used to service the cus-
tomer's car, and the coffee she drinks and the magazines she reads
while she waits. At Shady Acres, these services include tenant rec-
reational facilities, resident managers, tenant social activities, com-
mon area maintenance, rubbish disposal, security, and any other
perquisites promised by the owner. Economically, some portion of
each customer's payment is allocable not to the mere use of the
land, but to the provision of these collateral services.
The proper allocation of each customer's payment to land and
services varies from development to development, depending upon
the underlying facts. Much of the tenant's monthly rent payment at
Shady Acres is allocable to her occupation of her space, yet some
portion is allocable to the owner's personal services. In contrast,
most of the $24.95 paid to Spiffy Lube to service a car is properly
allocable to the owner's mechanical services, yet some portion of
that payment (however small) is properly allocable to the tempo-
rary occupation of the underlying land. The Shady Rest Hotel falls
somewhere between these extremes. A significant portion of the
guest's bill is attributable to the guest's bare right to occupy the
room. Another significant portion of the bill is allocable to the pro-
vision of guest services attendant to a hotel stay-the front desk
clerk who takes messages, maid service, fresh towels, the mint on
the pillow, the pool, etc. 2 °9
If security law truly took the land/services distinction seri-
ously, a proper characterization of the revenues from these hypo-
thetical projects would require a sliding-scale allocation of income
both to land and to services, with the allocation weighted more
209. The argument that hotel revenues reflect a payment solely for services rather
than use is fantasy. First, in terms of customer preferences for land versus services, I
have yet to meet a person who chooses to stay in a hotel only because someone makes
the bed and leaves a mint on the pillow. Persons stay in hotels to avoid sleeping in cars,
in airports, on sidewalks, or in other equally uncomfortable and unsafe places when
away from home. Second, from a cost perspective, some portion of the room rate must
be allocable to the underlying land. This is evident from Tom Bodette's radio commer-
cial observation that a room at Motel 6 costs "around 28 bucks, a little more in some
places, a little less in others." All Motel 6 outlets provide essentially the same services;
the price differential reflects that owners of more expensive outlets are internalizing the
costs of their particular locations.
The only way one can argue persuasively that room rates are attributable solely to
"services" is to define "services" to include the provision of desirable space for tempo-
rary occupation. That is a plausible definition of "services." If one defines "services"
that broadly, however, then all rents paid by tenants of any commercial real estate
development are also wholly allocable to "services," and there is no basis for distin-
guishing the hotel from other income-producing real estate projects.
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heavily in favor of services as their relative predominance within the
owner/occupier bargain increases. And if security law applied the
land/services distinction consistently, it would make the appropri-
ate allocations for every commercial development, regardless of the
legal status of the occupiers. That portion of a tenant's contractual
rental payment allocable to the mere occupation of the land would
be treated as "rent" in the nature of realty; that amount allocable to
services would not be "rent" (and thus would be treated as person-
alty). This is precisely what the court attempted in Grusmark v.
Echelman, modifying the receivership order to allow the resort
owner to retain the business and the "nonrent" portion of the reve-
nues, while permitting the receiver to collect the portion of the reve-
nues that was "rent" allocable to the land. 210
Upon reflection, one begins to appreciate the practical obsta-
cles to making these allocations. The first obstacle concerns the
tracking of historical cost data. Even if one assumes that all occupi-
ers equally value the importance of services to their bargains, re-
quiring a land/services allocation would require parties to compile
and analyze historical information concerning the developer's capi-
tal and operational costs in order to allocate revenue properly into
its rent/nonrent components. Complying with this requirement
would involve time and expense, 211 with nothing gained save the
integrity of the common law's conception of rent as issuing directly
from the land. The second and larger obstacle is that all occupiers
of a project are not alike. The extent to which different occupiers
are concerned about "mere occupation of space" as opposed to
"personal services" is a function of each occupier's respective pref-
erences. As an empirical matter, these preferences may be impossi-
ble to measure accurately (and may change over time), thus
rendering the correctness of any particular allocation open to
question. 212
210. Grusmark v. Echelman,, 162 F. Supp. 48, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
211. Cf BYE, supra note 194, at 29 ("The extent to which any land income is earned
[thus being in the nature of economic land-rent] or unearned [not in the nature of eco-
nomic land-rent], cost or surplus, can be accurately determined only by an historical
cost valuation in each particular instance." (quoting H.B. DORAU & ALBERT HINMAN,
URBAN LAND ECONOMICS 493 (1928)). Furthermore, requiring such allocations could
present some documentation problems, as parties to a transaction attempt to project
what amount of future income will be "rent" and what amount will not (with the "land
security law vs. UCC" consequences that follow from that characterization).
212. The drafters of the proposed Restatement have recognized that "[a]ttempts to
segregate [income allocable to land versus services] can be little more than arbitrary
estimates in most cases." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 13, § 4.2 reporter's note,
at 79.
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Most significantly, requiring an allocation would be artificial
given the contractual behavior of owners and occupiers of commer-
cial real estate. In making an occupancy agreement such as a lease,
the owner and the occupier typically do not separate the occupier's
payment obligation into a "use" component and a "services" com-
ponent; rather, the occupier agrees to make one payment in ex-
change for all benefits received. 21 3 In this respect, an apartment
unit, a suite of offices, a small-tenant space in a shopping mall, and
a hotel room do not differ substantively from each other. The de-
veloper is not offering mere space for a price, but a particular type
and quality of space for that price. For example, the mom-and-pop
tenant in a local strip mall may pay $2000 rent each month for
possession of its space, but for that payment the tenant expects
more than just the bare legal right to occupy that space. The tenant
also expects to receive the delivery of services that constitute an
integral part of the "product" it buys: regular common area main-
tenance; the presence of an anchor tenant possessing strong retail-
ing expertise and customer loyalty; a competent property manager
with integrity and marketing skill; promotional and advertising sup-
port; the developer's promises not to make space available to certain
types of tenants or potential competitors, etc. These services are an
integral part of the developer's product; take one or more away, and
the value of that product (reflected in the $2000 market rent) will
decline rapidly compared to competing projects.214 This analysis
also applies to a hotel project. The business traveller who pays $200
per night to stay at the Ritz-Carlton expects not only the right to
occupy that room but also the delivery of the services that make up
the Ritz-Carlton's "product"-the prompt and courteous delivery
of all services promised by the owner and included within that $200
rate. In this sense, "rent" (or whatever term one uses to describe
213. See, e.g., Humbach, supra note 90, at 1261 ("The typical lease of space in a
multi-unit building is not merely an exchange of rent for possession. Rather, it is an
exchange of rent for possession-plus-services.").
Many commercial leases do require the tenant to make a separate payment for
common area maintenance ("CAM"). Most such leases, however, specifically describe
the tenant's CAM obligations as "rent," and courts have tended to treat CAM pay-
ments as part of the tenant's regular contractual rent payment. See, e.g., In re Mount
Pleasant Ltd. Partnership, 144 B.R. 727, 731 n.2 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (noting
that rents at issue in case may have included CAM charges); In re Graham Square, Inc.,
122 B.R. 527, 529-30 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (rent and CAM payments not distin-
guished in order regarding use of cash collateral); In re Fernandes Supermarkets, Inc., 1
B.R. 249, 251 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1979) (tenant's "gross rent" included CAM charges).
214. The developer can receive a higher rent for space in a new, fully-leased, conve-
nient, Wal-Mart-anchored shopping center than for the same amount of space in an
older shopping center without an anchor tenant.
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the payment made by an occupier of land) is not "simply a quid pro
quo for possession" 215 of land separable from the developer's serv-
ices; the two are inextricably intertwined.216
These practical obstacles may explain why most courts have
rejected the land/services distinction altogether in the landlord-ten-
ant context. In evaluating commercial developments in which own-
ers and occupiers stand in a landlord-tenant relationship, courts
have refused to require an allocation of revenue between land and
services. Instead, property law and property security law have cho-
sen to allocate 100% of the tenant's contractual obligation to the
land, treating the entire payment as rent in the nature of land. Se-
curity law thus uses the term "rent" in an artificial manner, treating
as land sums that are allocable as an economic matter to something
other than land.217
Unfortunately, rather than acknowledging that security law
uses the term "rent" artificially, courts have grounded this 100%
allocation to land upon the unrealistic historical assumption of
landlord-tenant law that a tenant pays rent only for the use of the
land itself, with services forming a collateral aspect of the ex-
change.218 The tenant is "deemed" to intend to allocate all of its
contractual obligation to the use of the land, regardless of the ten-
215. Thomas M. Quinn & Earl Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical
Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225,
250-51 (1969).
216. As one judge has noted, rents "do not spring from the ground. Real estate
must be maintained and serviced to produce them, much as a contract must be per-
formed to bring payment under it." In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 84
B.R. 289, 298 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
217. A useful analogy may be drawn here to the contract for the sale of goods
(which is governed by UCC Article 2) and the contract for the sale of services (which is
not governed by Article 2). The UCC makes no provision for dealing with the hybrid
contract that contains both "goods" and "services" components. Accordingly, rather
than allocate the contract between goods and services, courts generally have forced the
hybrid contract into either the "goods" or "services" paradigm, depending upon the
"predominance" of services to the bargain. See 1 RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON
ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-105:36 to 38, at 579-84 (3d ed. 1981 &
Supp. 1992) (collecting cases). As the buyer is contracting for a product that is com-
posed of both goods and services, the courts' all-or-nothing allocation to either goods or
services is artificial. In contrast, a minority of courts have treated such hybrid contracts
as effectively divisible into two contracts-one for the sale of goods (subject to Article 2)
and one for the sale of services (not subject to Article 2). See, e.g., Anthony Pools v.
Sheehan, 455 A.2d 434, 437-41 (Md. 1983).
218. Scholars have criticized this assumption as unwarranted and unfair in the con-
text of the residential landlord-tenant relationship. For example, Professors Thomas
Quinn and Earl Phillips argued that the common law's treatment of rent as the quid pro
quo for possession bifurcated the landlord-tenant contract into two levels, a possession
level and a services level:
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ant's actual preferences regarding the importance of services to her
bargain. In turn, the hotel bankruptcy cases have turned this as-
sumption on its head, conclusively presuming that the services pro-
vided to a hotel guest are so predominant to the guest's bargain that
they cannot constitute a collateral part of the bargain. As a result,
the courts choose to allocate the guest's entire payment to services,
and none of the payment is treated as "rent" in the nature of realty.
The guest is "deemed" to intend to allocate 100% of his contractual
obligation to the receipt of services, regardless of his actual
preferences.
This distinction between the tenant and the hotel guest is per-
verse. The expectations of each are essentially the same; each ex-
pects both undisturbed occupancy and the delivery of the
developer's promised services that give that right of occupancy its
value.219 Property security law certainly may choose to refuse to
allocate an occupier's payment into its "land" and "services" com-
ponents, but the reason for that refusal should have some connec-
tion with reality and should be consistently applied to similar
transactions. It may be legitimate for security law to refuse to allo-
cate the occupier's payment obligation between land and services
because it is too difficult to make those allocations or to measure
each occupier's preferences. That approach demonstrates reasoning
informed by reality. In contrast, it is pure fiction for security law to
Significantly, the two levels were separate and distinct. A failure to
perform on one level generated a remedy on that level, but in no way
affected the other level. In technical terms, the covenants on one level
were not reciprocal with the covenants on the other. What it actually
meant was that the tenant had to pay the full rent so long as he had
possession of the premises (level one), even though the landlord failed
miserably in the delivery of services (level two).
Quinn & Phillips, supra note 215, at 234 (footnote omitted). Quinn and Phillips as-
serted that the subordination of services to possession was the source of great social
injustice in landlord-tenant law. Shortly after their article, their thesis was embraced by
Judge Skelly Wright in his groundbreaking Javins opinion, which implied a warranty of
habitability into residential leases. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
This assumption also has been rejected implicitly in modem rent control legisla-
tion, which typically permits landlords to pass through to tenants periodic increases in
operating costs. See generally Kenneth K. Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control
Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 747 (1983); Stephen Dobkin,
Confiscating Reality: The Illusion of Controls in the Big Apple, 54 BROOK. L. REV.
1249, 1263-64 (1989); John N. Drobak, Constitutional Limits on Price and Rent Con-
trol: The Lessons of Utility Regulation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 107, 144-45 (1986); Phillip
Weitzman, Economics and Rent Regulation: A Call for a New Perspective, 13 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 975, 985 (1985); Scott J. Sheldon, Note, Rethinking Rent
Control: An Analysis of "Fair Return," 12 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 626-40 (1981).
219. See supra notes 213-216 and accompanying text.
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presume conclusively that certain occupiers (tenants) are concerned
only with the bare right of use while others (licensees) are con-
cerned only with receipt of services. That approach demonstrates
reasoning completely detached from reality. If security law is to
abandon the land/services distinction, it should do so in a consis-
tent manner, treating the income from similar projects similarly
rather than drawing arbitrary distinctions based upon the imputed
intentions of the occupier.
B. Toward a New Paradigm-Treating Income from a
Commercial Real Estate Project as "Proceeds" of the Project
The problems associated with the land/services distinction
raise a legitimate question whether "rent"-given its historical bag-
gage-remains a meaningful concept to describe the revenues gener-
ated by the occupancy of commercial real estate. The courts'
rejection of the land/services distinction in the landlord-tenant con-
text leaves the term "rent" with a meaning detached from the com-
mon law conception that "rent" springs directly from the land.
Although this artificiality does not preclude security law from using
"rent" as a category for classifying the revenue generated by com-
mercial real estate, it does provide an opportunity to inquire
whether a more coherent conceptual paradigm is available.
As suggested above, the developer who acquires a commercial
real estate project acquires a productive capital asset with a limited
useful economic life. The project will generate revenues paid by oc-
cupiers in exchange for their rights, but the project will not generate
those revenues forever. The developer's stream of future revenues
represents the true economic value of the development and the
mortgagee's real collateral for repayment of the mortgage loan.
Over time, the occupation of the project during its useful life con-
sumes the project's economic value. The payments received from
the occupiers on account of their rights over the useful life of the
project properly can be characterized as a return upon the project's
economic value as it is consumed. So understood, payments re-
ceived from those occupiers fit squarely within the scope of the term
"proceeds" as it is used in Bankruptcy Code section 552(b).
1. The Leasing of Personal Property-Are Rentals "Proceeds"?
To demonstrate this thesis, one first may turn to the UCC and
analyze how Article 9 treats the leasing of personal property collat-
eral. The UCC defines "proceeds" to include "whatever is received
upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral
1524 [Vol. 40:1461
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or proceeds. ' 220 The concepts of "sale" and "exchange" are rela-
tively straightforward, but unfortunately the UCC does not define
"other disposition" of collateral. Intuitively, it seems plausible to
characterize the temporary letting of property subject to a lien as a
means of "disposition," such that sums paid for temporary use
would be characterized as "proceeds." '22 ' Certainly, the owner of
the property grants to the user certain rights of use for a term, dur-
ing which the owner contractually agrees not to disturb the user in
the exercise of those rights. Such a transfer of rights respecting
property seems to fit squarely within any meaningful conception of
"disposition." 222
Surprisingly, however, what limited case authority exists on
this point has concluded that sums payable in exchange for the tem-
porary use of property subject to a lien are not proceeds of that
property under section 9-306(1). The seminal case addressing this
issue is In re Cleary Brothers Construction Co. 223 The case involved
General Electric Credit Corp. ("GECC"), which held a perfected
first-priority security interest in a crane owned by the debtor Cleary
Brothers. After its bankruptcy filing, Cleary Brothers leased the
crane (without the permission or knowledge of GECC) to a third
party for ten days at an agreed rent of $10,668.224 Upon learning of
the lease, GECC argued that the rent constituted "proceeds" of the
crane and should be applied in satisfaction of GECC's claim.
225
The court disagreed, holding that "the term 'proceeds' does not in-
220. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1987).
221. This characterization can find both support and criticism in § 9-504(1), which
permits a secured party to "sell, lease or otherwise dispose of" collateral after default.
U.C.C. § 9-504(1) (1972). One might argue that § 9-504(1) demonstrates that the terms
"sell" and "lease" are subsumed within the concept of "disposition" by use of the word
"other," such that the leasing of property constitutes a disposition under § 9-306(1).
Alternatively, one might argue that the presence of the term "lease" in § 9-504(1) dem-
onstrates that its omission in § 9-306(1) was intentional. This alternative argument
seems to have been embraced by the court in In re Cleary Brothers Construction Co., 9
B.R. 40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980), the seminal case regarding this issue. See infra text
accompanying notes 223-227.
Neither of these arguments is compelling. Instead, § 9-306(1) should be inter-
preted in the context of the drafters' evolving sensitivity to economic substance over
legal form. As discussed in the following text, this context suggests that the leasing of
property should constitute a "disposition" within the meaning of § 9-306(1).
222. Cf Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1978)
("[Though 'other disposition' cannot technically be characterized as a sale or exchange,
at the minimum it must meet the threshold test of these two transactions by effecting a
transfer of property.").
223. 9 B.R. 40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
224. Id
225. Id. at 41.
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elude rents" paid for the use of the crane, since "[tihe words 'other-
wise disposed of' related to a permanent or final conversion, not to
a temporary use."' 226 The court accordingly held that GECC had
no security interest at all in the $10,668 paid to the debtor. The
court suggested that if GECC had wanted a lien upon such rentals,
it should have taken an assignment of any leases of the crane:
Had the [drafters of the UCC] intended to extend the lenders
[sic] lien to include rent from the temporary use of collateral
which has been given as security, they would have included the
term "leased."
This failure to do so could not have been inadvertent. The
way to create a security interest in rent under the U.C.C. is to
assign the lease or to give a security interest in the lease. The
rent would then be the proceeds of the collateral .... 227
Few decisions since Cleary Brothers have revisited this issue, and
most of those decisions have agreed with Cleary Brothers without
substantial analysis.228
The narrow conception of the words "other disposition"
adopted by Cleary Brothers is hopelessly inconsistent with the eco-
nomic realities of property leasing. The biggest concern of the se-
cured party is the value of its collateral. A debtor-owner of
encumbered property disposes of that property by disposing of its
economic value. That disposition may occur by outright sale; alter-
natively, the debtor-owner may transfer its economic value in a
piecemeal fashion by contracting away the collateral for temporary
use for its useful life. For example, assume that Secured Party
holds a lien upon Debtor's new computer. Unbeknownst to Se-
cured Party, Debtor leases the computer to Lessee for $300/month,
the same amount Debtor is obligated to pay to Secured Party under
its security agreement. After three months of nonpayment by
Debtor, Secured Party attempts to repossess the computer and dis-
covers that it has been leased to Lessee. When Secured Party repos-
sesses the computer from Lessee, the computer has generated three
226. Id.; see also Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Gaucher, 386 N.E.2d 1052, 1055 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1979) ("other disposition" as used in UCC § 9-306(1) implies a "permanent
transfer of possession"). The court in Cleary Brothers was interpreting the 1962 version
of section 9-306(1), which read slightly differently in pertinent part from the 1972 ver-
sion quoted in the text. See infra note 234.
227. Cleary Brothers, 9 B.R. at 41.
228. In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, 133 B.R. 850, 856 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1991); In re Investment Hotel Properties, 109 B.R. 990, 995-96 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990);
In re S & J Holding Corp., 42 B.R. 249, 250 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re A.E.I. Corp.,
11 B.R. 97, 100-02 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). But see In re Southern Equip. Sales Co., 24
B.R. 788, 794 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982) (characterizing sums paid upon leases of inventory
collateral as proceeds received upon disposition of such collateral).
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months' worth of contractual payments from Lessee to Debtor; to
that extent, the computer's economic value to the Secured Party has
been reduced. That three months' worth of economic value has
been transferred to and consumed by Lessee, just as certainly as if
title to collateral worth an equivalent amount had been sold by
Debtor to Lessee outright. In exchange, the $900 that Lessee paid
to Debtor pursuant to the lease reflects an amount received upon
the Debtor's disposition of that portion of the collateral's economic
value.
A court adhering to the Cleary Brothers analysis would say "If
Secured Party had wanted a lien upon that $900, it should have
taken an assignment of the lease. Had it done so, the lease would be
its collateral, and the rentals would be proceeds of the lease."
229
But this merely begs the question. Why is not the lease already
Secured Party's collateral, as "proceeds" of the computer? The
debtor has disposed of a portion of the useful economic life of the
computer in exchange for rights established and set forth in a con-
tract with Lessee. The Debtor's rights as embodied in that contract
are what the Debtor receives from the Lessee for transferring to the
Lessee the right to use the computer. Accordingly, the Debtor's
rights as embodied in that contract fit squarely within section 9-
306(l)'s definition of proceeds. 230 In turn, the $900 paid by Lessee
on account of its contractual obligation is "proceeds of proceeds,"
squarely within section 9-306(1). It should be unnecessary to take
an assignment of the lease solely to obtain a security interest in the
rents due under that lease. 231
Furthermore, the conclusion in Cleary Brothers that section 9-
306(1) requires "a permanent or final conversion, not a temporary
229. See, e.g., In re Investment Hotel Properties, 109 B.R. at 995-96.
230. The UCC acknowledges this in § 9-308(b), which determines priority as be-
tween a purchaser of chattel paper (which can be a lease of goods under U.C.C. § 9-
105(l)(b)) and an inventory financer. Under § 9-308(b), a purchaser of chattel paper for
value in the ordinary course of business takes priority over an inventory lender who
claims a security interest in the chattel paper "merely as proceeds of inventory subject
to a security interest." U.C.C. § 9-308(b) (1972). For an inventory lender to have a
security interest in the lease of an item of inventory collateral "merely as proceeds" of
that inventory, then the lease of the item must constitute a "disposition" within the
meaning of § 9-306(1). Otherwise, there would be no basis for according the inventory
lender with any security interest in the chattel paper.
231. A prudent secured creditor would take an explicit assignment of the lease and
would also take possession of the lease, in order to protect against the risk that a subse-
quent purchaser for value might take priority under § 9-308. See U.C.C. § 9-308
(1972). But that assignment would be precautionary, and is not necessary solely to
create a security interest in the lease in the first instance, since the lease is "proceeds" of
collateral.
15271993]
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use"232 is equally unpersuasive. This approach effectively requires a
transfer of absolute title to collateral in order for the consideration
received in exchange for that transfer to constitute proceeds under
section 9-306(1). Such a requirement is contrary to Article 9's gen-
eral philosophy that the location of title to collateral is less signifi-
cant in determining rights than the economic substance of the
transaction. 233 The drafters have expressed this philosophy repeat-
edly as the UCC has evolved through amendments intended to
stress economic substance over legal form. In particular, two
amendments to the UCC strongly suggest that Cleary Brothers was
decided incorrectly and that the term "disposition" in section 9-
306(1) includes the leasing transaction.
The first such amendment is the 1972 revision to section 9-
306(1) governing insurance payments received by a debtor follow-
ing loss or destruction of the collateral. Following a casualty loss,
the owner of the destroyed item still possesses nominal "title" to the
item. That title is worthless, however, since the casualty has irre-
trievably destroyed the collateral's economic value. Following a
casualty, a secured party with a lien upon the destroyed collateral
understandably might look toward insurance payments received by
the debtor as a substitute for the now valueless collateral. Under
the 1962 version of section 9-306(1),234 however, most courts con-
cluded that the destruction of collateral via casualty was not a "dis-
position" of the collateral, so insurance monies payable for that
casualty were not "proceeds" of the collateral subject to the secured
party's lien.235 In 1972, the drafters amended section 9-306(1) to
232. In re Cleary Brothers Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 40, 41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980); see
also In re S & J Holding Corp., 42 B.R. 249, 250 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (cash gener-
ated through collateral "is not received from the sale of collateral, but rather, through
the use of it.... The fact that the money was earned through the use of the collateral
does not make it 'proceeds.' "); Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Gaucher, 386 N.E.2d 1052,
1055 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) ("other disposition" as used in UCC § 9-306(1) implies a
"permanent transfer of possession").
233. Cf U.C.C. § 9-202 cmt. (1972) ("The rights and duties of the parties to a se-
curity transaction and of third parties are stated in this Article without reference to the
location of 'title' to the collateral.").
234. The 1962 version of § 9-306(1) provided:
"Proceeds" includes whatever is received when collateral or proceeds is
sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of. The term also in-
cludes the account arising when the right to payment is earned under a
contract right. Money, checks and the like are "cash proceeds". All
other proceeds are "noncash proceeds".
U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1962).
235. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 696 F.2d 213, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1982); Peo-
ples State Bank v. Marlette Coach Co., 336 F.2d 3, 5 (10th Cir. 1964); In re Whitacre,
21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1169, 1174-75 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1976); In re Parks,
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overrule these decisions, providing that "[i]nsurance payable by rea-
son of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds" of the collat-
eral. 236 This amendment demonstrates the drafters' apparent
concern that the characterization of a particular sum as "proceeds"
under section 9-306(1) should focus on whether that sum was re-
ceived as compensation for some event which extracted the eco-
nomic value of the collateral. If so, that sum fits squarely within the
scope of the term "proceeds" as used in section 9-306(l).237
A second and more recent amendment also suggests that the
leasing transaction constitutes a "disposition" of property. In 1987,
the drafters amended section 1-201(37)'s definition of "security in-
terest" in order to clarify the rules for classifying leases as either
"true leases" (outside the scope of Article 9's coverage) or disguised
secured sales (subject to the provisions of Article 9).238 Prior to
1987, section 1-201(37) provided little concrete guidance to courts,
merely stating that the classification was to be made on a factual,
case-by-case basis.239 To clarify the resulting morass of conflicting
19 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 334, 334-35 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1976); In re Walt-
man, 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 576, 579 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1975); In re Hix, 9
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 925, 927-28 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1969); In re Levine, 6
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 238, 241 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1969); White v. Household
Fin. Corp., 302 N.E.2d 828, 836 n.9 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973); Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d
94, 95-96 (Me. 1968); Third Nat'l Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 446 N.E.2d 380, 382
(Mass. 1983); In re Boyd, 658 P.2d 470, 471-74 (Okla. 1983); see also Bank of N.Y. v.
Margiotta, 416 N.Y.S.2d 493, 495 (Dist. Ct. 1979) (claim for damages against tortfeasor
who destroyed collateral not "proceeds" of collateral); Hoffman v. Snack, 37 Pa. D. &
C.2d 145, 146-47 (1964) (same).
236. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1987). The drafters noted that this sentence was "intended
to overrule various cases to the effect that proceeds of insurance on collateral are not
proceeds of the collateral." PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT, Section 9-306 Reasons 
for Change 97-98 (1971).
237. The Cleary Brothers decision was governed by the 1962 version of § 9-306(1).
See In re Cleary Brothers Constr. Co., 9 B.R. 40, 41 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980). Subse-
quent decisions have followed Cleary Brothers without analyzing whether that court
would have reached the same conclusion under the 1972 version. See, e.g., In re Corpus
Christi Hotel Partners, 133 B.R. 850, 856 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991); In re Investment
Hotel Properties, 109 B.R. 990, 995-96 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re S & J Holding
Corp., 42 B.R. 249, 250 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re A.E.I. Corp., 11 B.R. 97, 100-02
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
238. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) cmt. (1987) ("The focus of the changes [to the defini-
tion of security interest] was to draw a sharper line between leases and security interests
disguised as leases to create greater certainty in commercial transactions.").
239. The pre-1987 version of § 1-201(37) provided in pertinent part:
Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of
each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of
itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that
upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or
has the option to become the owner of the property for no additional
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decisions, the drafters amended section 1-201(37) to provide a more
detailed definition that emphasizes the economic substance of the
leasing transaction: 240
Whether a transaction creates a lease or security interest is
determined by the facts of each case; however, a transaction cre-
ates a security interest if the consideration the lessee is to pay the
lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is an obli-
gation for the term of the lease not subject to termination by the
lessee, and
(a) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than
the remaining economic life of the goods,
(b) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining
economic life of the goods or is bound to become the
owner of the goods,
(c) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the re-
maining economic life of the goods for no additional
consideration or nominal additional consideration upon
compliance with the lease agreement, or
(d) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the
goods for no additional consideration or nominal addi-
tional consideration upon compliance with the lease
agreement. 241
This amendment dramatically shows the drafters' concern that eco-
nomic reality rather than legal form determine the rights of parties
to secured transactions. 242 By leasing property, the owner transfers
a portion of the property's economic value to the lessee. If the
terms of the lease effectively transfer the entire economic value of
the property to the lessee, then section 1-201(37) treats the transac-
tion as a sale, and the lessor must comply with Article 9 in order to
perfect an interest in the property against third parties.
In recognizing that the leasing transaction involves a transfer
of the property's economic value, section 1-201(37) effectively re-
quires courts to characterize the leasing transaction as a "disposi-
tion" under section 9-306(1). A simple example illustrates this
thesis. Assume that Secured Party sells two new computers to
Debtor. Secured Party retains a purchase money security interest
in the computers, but does not take an assignment of leases. Each
computer is worth $10,000 new, and has an expected value of
consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one in-
tended for security.
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1972).
240. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) cmt. (1987).
241. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1987).
242. The drafters advised that this definition was intended to "focus on economics."
Id. cmt.
1530 [Vol. 40:1461
HeinOnline  -- 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1530 1992-1993
1993] COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE FINANCE
$2,000 after 36 months of use. Debtor then leases both com-
puters--the first to Lessee #1 for $320 per month for 36 months,
with no option to purchase; the second to Lessee #2 for $320 per
month for 36 months, with an option to purchase for $250 at the
end of the lease term. In each case, the Debtor has disposed of its
right to use the computers for a three-year period, during which
time $8,000 of each computer's economic value is expected to be
consumed.
Under the Cleary Brothers analysis, Secured Party has no se-
curity interest in the $320 per month that Debtor receives under
Lease # 1, since that is a true lease and Secured Party took no as-
signment of the lease. Lease #2 is not a true lease, however, but a
secured transaction, since Lessee #2 can acquire the computer for
a nominal consideration at the end of the lease term.243 Since Lease
#2 is in fact a sale, and since the word "sale" clearly appears in
section 9-306(1), the plain meaning of that section requires the con-
clusion that each $320 payment Debtor receives from Lessee #2 is
"proceeds" of the computer. Thus, under Cleary Brothers, Secured
Party has a lien upon the $320 per month paid by Lessee #2, but
not upon the $320 per month paid by Lessee # 1.
As the Permanent Editorial Board of the UCC has now recog-
nized, 244 this result is absurd, because both leases-one "true," the
other not-have exactly the same effect upon Secured Party's collat-
eral during their respective terms. Each lease takes a portion of the
economic value of the property and transfers that value to the
lessee. The payments by the respective lessees represent compensa-
tion received by Debtor upon the exhaustion of that economic
value. Between Debtor and Secured Party, the character of each
lease as "true lease" or "disguised sale" does not change the sub-
stance of the lessee's payments. Those payments fit within the
243. Since it is reasonably certain that Lessee #2 will capture the full economic
value of the collateral, § 1-201(37) treats Lease #2 as a sale ab initio. See supra notes
241-242 and accompanying text.
244. The recently approved PEB Commentary No. 9 provides that "[w]here a debtor
has granted to a secured party a security interest in goods that the debtor later leases as
lessor, the lease rentals would constitute proceeds of the secured party's collateral for
the reason that the debtor's conveyance of a leasehold interest in the goods constitutes a
disposition of the goods for purposes of § 9-306(1)." PEB COMMENTARY No. 9 (1992).
Furthermore, the Article 9 Study Committee of the Permanent Editorial Board has
recommended that the definition of "proceeds" in § 9-306(1) be revised in order to
"make clear that when collateral consisting of goods is leased the debtor's (lessor's)
leasehold interest, including the lease rentals, constitutes proceeds of that collateral."
REPORT OF PEB STUDY GROUP, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 (Dec. 1,
1992), at 106 [hereinafter REPORT OF PEB].
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scope of the term "proceeds," just as if outright title to collateral
worth that amount had passed to the respective lessees.
2. Letting Space in the Commercial Real Estate Development:
Treating the Revenues as "Proceeds"
The foregoing analysis is equally compelling when applied to
the commercial real estate mortgage transaction. As discussed in
Part III, the mortgagee with a lien upon a commercial development
expects a secure lien upon future property cash flows, since the dis-
counted present value of those cash flows constitutes the economic
value of the development. This concern is understandable, since the
discounted present value of the future cash flows determined the
amount of the mortgage loan the developer used to acquire the
project.
What did a developer actually obtain when it acquired a pro-
ject? The developer acquired legal title to the project, but more im-
portantly, the developer obtained the project's productive capacity,
or the exclusive right to exploit the development for commercial
purposes during its useful economic life. In tangible terms, the de-
veloper obtained a finite inventory of units of space-the right to
make available for occupancy X number of hotel rooms or apart-
ments, at $Y per term, for the project's remaining economic life of
Z years. If the Shady Rest Hotel has 100 rooms and a remaining
useful economic life of five years, 245 the developer acquires an in-
ventory of 182,500 units, or room-nights, of space that it can sell.
Likewise, if Shady Acres Apartments has 100 units and a remaining
useful economic life of ten years, the developer obtains 12,000 po-
tential unit-months of space. This inventory of space units is both
the development's productive capacity and the developer's actual
"product." Over time, the developer mixes its occupier services
with the space and makes the units available for use under occu-
pancy agreements (such as leases or licenses) that require the oc-
cupiers to pay compensation for their rights. When a unit of that
space is consumed, that proportion of the project's productive ca-
245. The remaining useful life of any development will be much shorter than the
actual physical life of the structure. Use and occupation effects wear and tear upon the
property, which will require rehabilitation (which in turn requires additional capital) in
order to maintain its marketability. Further, the economic utility of a project can be
impaired by functional obsolescence, or the loss of a project's "ability to be useful and to
function in accordance with current market tastes and standards." Bohan & Cahill,
supra note 166, at 65. As Bohan & Cahill have noted, hotels "are especially vulnerable
to functional obsolescence when new niche products appear within or outside their own
market." Id.; see also supra notes 166-171 and accompanying text.
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pacity, its economic value, has been consumed. Once the entire in-
ventory of space units is exhausted, the development's entire
productive capacity has been consumed. At that point, nothing re-
mains of the project in an economic sense--one can no longer ex-
pect the project to generate additional income for the repayment of
the mortgage debt.246
Since the developer's operations will exhaust the project's eco-
nomic value over time, the prudent mortgagee insists upon a first-
priority assignment of the developer's right to collect project cash
flows. In order to obtain the project and its productive capacity, the
developer must assign to the mortgagee its rights to the project cash
flows generated by the developer's sales of space over the project's
useful life. Parties to these transactions may have denominated
these assignments as assignments of rents and leases, as assignments
of room revenues, or as assignments of accounts receivable or gen-
eral intangibles, but the labels should not obscure the real nature of
what is being assigned. The occupier's payment obligations in real-
ity constitute the proceeds of the exhaustion of the development's
productive capacity over time. The assignment simply reflects the
parties' understanding that the mortgagee has a property interest in
those revenues that constitute a return upon the economic deprecia-
tion of the project.
An agreement to occupy a commercial real estate project fits
squarely within the concept of "proceeds" of the project within the
meaning of section 552(b), 247 as do the actual payments made by
246. The physical structure remains in existence, of course, but its ability to generate
revenue based upon the initial capital investment (reflected by the mortgage debt) is
exhausted. In order to acquire additional economic value, the project must be rehabili-
tated, which will require additional capital. That capital will not be invested unless that
investment is justified by future cash flows, under the same analysis explained in Part
III. Thus, any future cash flows that the project might generate after rehabilitation
cannot be assumed to be a source for repayment of the original mortgage obligation.
247. Definitionally, such sums cannot constitute "proceeds" under UCC § 9-306(1);
Article 9 defines "collateral" as "property subject to a security interest," U.C.C. § 9-
105(1)(c) (1987), and one cannot create a "security interest" in land. Id. §§ 1-201(37),
9-102(1), 9-104(j). This definitional trap would require bankruptcy courts to define the
term "proceeds" in Bankruptcy Code § 552(b) more broadly than the term is used in
UCC § 9-306(1). There is legislative history in support of this view. See H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 377 ("The term 'proceeds' [as used in § 552(b)] is not limited
to the technical definition of that term in the U.C.C., but covers any property into
which property subject to the security interest is converted."); id. at 368 ("Proceeds
here [in § 541(a)'s definition of property of the estate] is not used in a confining sense, as
defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, but is intended to be a broad term to encom-
pass all proceeds of property of the estate."); S. R P. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83
(same). In addition, bankruptcy courts have used this legislative history to give the
term "proceeds" a broader definition than the UCC definition. See, e.g., Bradt v.
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occupiers pursuant to those agreements. Contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom of the hotel bankruptcy cases, Congress did not in-
tend to include sums such as postpetition hotel room revenues
within the scope of section 552(a). Congress's purpose in adopting
section 552(a) was to defeat the postpetition application of an after-
acquired property clause in a prepetition security agreement,
thereby cutting off a secured party's floating lien as of the date of
bankruptcy.24 Postpetition rents or hotel revenues, however, are
not the classic type of after-acquired property that Congress in-
tended section 552(a) to reach. The classic floating lien involves a
pool of collateral of a certain type, such as inventory, in which a
secured party has a lien. As the debtor sells old inventory in the
course of its business operations, new items of inventory are ac-
quired to which the secured party's floating lien immediately at-
taches. The mortgagee's lien upon rents or hotel revenues is
different in kind from a floating lien. When a developer acquires a
project, it acquires the project and its future productive capacity. As
that capacity is consumed over time by occupiers, the developer
adds no new capacity over which the mortgagee's lien can "float."
Woodlawn Auto Workers, F.C.U., 757 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1985) (insurance pay-
ment for repair of debtor's car constituted proceeds of debtor's car); In re Judkins, 41
B.R. 369, 372 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (payment-in-kind contracts under federal crop
diversion program are proceeds of farmer's crop, even if crop was never planted); In re
Cupp, 38 B.R. 953, 955 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (same); In re Sunberg, 35 B.R. 777,
783-84 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1983) (same), aff'd, 729 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1984).
Other courts have rejected the language in the legislative history, concluding that
"proceeds" as used in § 552(b) has the same meaning and scope as in § 9-306(1). See,
e.g., In re Bumper Sales, Inc., 907 F.2d 1430, 1437 (4th Cir. 1990) (§ 552(b)'s reference
to "applicable nonbankruptcy law" means that extent of creditor's security interest in
proceeds governed by UCC § 9-306); In re Hugo, 58 B.R. 903, 907 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1986) (same); In re Transportation Design & Technology, Inc., 48 B.R. 635, 641
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985). None of these cases, however, have involved real property
collateral. Absent some indication that Congress intended to limit the application of
the term "proceeds" solely to personal property, it seems sensible to conclude that sums
received upon the disposition of real property collateral would constitute "proceeds"
under § 552(b).
248. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 376 ("As a general rule, if a
security agreement is entered into before the case, then property that the estate acquires
is not subject to the security interest created by the security agreement."); S. REP. No.
2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at 91 (same).
In explaining § 552(a) to students, I analogize § 552(a) to the chalk line that the
police draw around the body of a crime victim. Bankruptcy renders the debtor "dead,"
and § 552(a) draws a chalk line around the property belonging to the debtor on that
date. If a secured party has a validly perfected prepetition security interest in "furni-
ture," every item of furniture within that chalk line is subject to the secured party's lien.
But if the debtor-in-possession acquires new furniture the following week, that new fur-
niture is not placed within the chalk line; instead, the debtor-in-possession takes that
new furniture free of the secured party's lien. But see infra note 249.
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Instead, postpetition rents or hotel revenues fall squarely
within the parameters of section 552(b). Congress intended section
552(b) to secure to the mortgagee its prepetition collateral and the
collateral's future productive capacity.249 Thanks to section 552(b),
a debtor cannot use, consume, or dispose of prepetition collateral or
its productive capacity to the detriment of the secured party's lien.
When the developer provides space to temporary occupiers, the de-
veloper in fact uses the mortgaged collateral in a fashion that con-
sumes its productive capacity and its economic value over time.
The sums received by the developer in exchange for that consump-
tion-regardless of whether state law characterizes them as com-
mon law "rent"-plainly constitute the fruits of the developer's use
and the proceeds of the consumption of the secured party's collat-
eral. Accordingly, one properly can characterize the income gener-
ated by the letting of space as "proceeds" of the underlying
mortgage collateral within the scope of section 552(b), and thus give
weight and effect to the realities underlying commercial real estate
financing transactions. 250
249. This should be apparent from § 552(b)'s language, which protects the secured
party's rights in the "proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits" of prepetition col-
lateral. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1987). The clear thrust of this provision is to protect the
secured party against the risk that its prepetition collateral is disposed of or used in a
manner that consumes its value to the detriment of the secured party's interest. For
example, suppose that a debtor-in-possession disposes of prepetition collateral and uses
the proceeds to acquire new collateral of the same type? The new collateral is after-
acquired property, but it is also "proceeds" under UCC § 9-306(1), and the secured
party maintains its lien against the new collateral under § 552(b). See, e.g., In re
Bumper Sales, Inc., 907 F.2d 1430, 1436-39 (4th Cir. 1990) (§ 552(b) protects secured
party's lien against second generation proceeds of prepetition collateral notwithstanding
§ 552(a)).
250. Several hotel bankruptcy decisions have held that postpetition hotel room reve-
nue is generated by the debtor's provision of postpetition services and thus cannot con-
stitute "rents" or "proceeds" under § 552(b). See Averch, supra note 6, at 496-501
(discussing cases). The fact that the developer's services occur postpetition is irrelevant.
First, those services are an inextricable part of the developer's product-available space
for temporary occupancy. See supra notes 213-216 and uccompanying text. Second,
prepetition collateral of any kind, whether real or personal, does not simply liquidate
itself upon the commencement of a bankruptcy. The debtor must always undertake
additional labor services to liquidate prepetition collateral, yet that fact does not trans-
form the sums generated by that liquidation into something other than proceeds of the
collateral. Future rents, hotel room revenues, or any other sums paid by occupiers of
land "require the contribution of additional acts or services [by the developer] in order
to come into being." In re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. 543, 548 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991);
see also In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 84 B.R. 289, 298 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1988) ("Rents ... do not spring from the ground. Real estate must be main-
tained and serviced to produce them, much as a contract must be performed to bring
payment under it.").
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C. Article 9 as a Superior Conceptual Framework for the
Assignment of a Security Interest in Rents
As discussed above, the developer's right to payments under its
contracts with occupiers constitutes proceeds of the development as
the occupiers consume its economic value over time. Since it is the
developer's right to this stream of contract payments that is the pri-
mary focus of the developer/mortgagee bargain, the developer's as-
signment of that right can be characterized as an assignment of an
interest in personal property rather than an assignment of an inter-
est in real estate. This characterization would allow property secur-
ity law to use Article 9 as a framework for the creation, perfection,
and enforcement of any security interest in the revenue generated
by occupation of commercial real estate.
The appropriateness of Article 9 for this task is apparent when
one considers how security law currently treats assignments of in-
stallment land contracts. Assume that 0, owner of Blackacre in fee
simple absolute, sells Blackacre to P via an installment land con-
tract. Subsequently 0 needs cash and borrows money from M, as-
signing to M its rights in Blackacre to secure the loan. If M is
prudent, M will take both an assignment of O's record title and an
assignment of O's rights under the land contract-particularly, O's
right to payment of each installment when due. Clearly, M may
record the assignment of O's record title upon the real property
records, but what about the assignment of the installment contract
rights? Theoretically, we could treat this as an assignment of an
interest in land (such that M must record the assignment on the
realty records) or an assignment of an interest in personalty (such
that M must provide notice to third parties by filing a UCC financ-
ing statement). The overwhelming trend in the courts, however, is
to treat the assignment of the vendor's interest under an installment
land contract as an assignment of an interest in personal property
subject to the provisions of Article 9.251 As the Ninth Circuit re-
251. See, e.g., In re Heide, 915 F.2d 531, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Washing-
ton law); In re Equitable Dev. Corp., 617 F.2d 1152, 1155-57 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying
Florida law); In re I.A. Durbin, Inc., 46 B.R. 595, 599 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); In re
Northern Acres, Inc., 52 B.R. 641, 644-47 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); In re D.J. Mal-
tese, Inc., 42 B.R. 589, 591-92 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); In re Southern, 32 B.R. 761,
764-65 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc., 32 B.R. 279, 284-86
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983); In re Gemini at Dadeland Ltd., 24 B.R. 57, 58 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1982); In re Southworth, 22 B.R. 376, 378-79 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); Citicorp
Person-to-Person Fin. Ctr., Inc. v. Fremont Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 29, 31-32 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1987); Security Bank v. Chiapuzio, 747 P.2d 335, 336-43 (Or. 1987); Crichton v.
Himlie Properties, Inc., 713 P.2d 108, 110 (Wash. 1986); In re Freeborn, 617 P.2d 424,
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cently noted, "[t]he vendor's right to receive payments under the
contract is a personal property right; therefore, Article 9 governs
the assignment of a vendor's right to receive those payments. '252
In evaluating the interests transferred by assignment of an in-
stallment land contract, security law thus has separated the ven-
dor's interest in the land itself from the vendor's contractual right
to receive installment payments. To this extent, the installment
land contract can be analogized to and contrasted with the lease.
The vendee's promise to perform an installment land contract gives
the vendee an interest in land; similarly, the lessee's promise to per-
form the terms of its lease gives the lessee an interest in land. While
the vendor's contract rights bear a close relationship to the land, the
trend of authority in property security law treats the vendor's con-
tract rights as separable from the land, designating them as personal
property collateral in the nature of general intangibles. 253 This clas-
sification is not arbitrary; it reflects commercial reality by recogniz-
ing that the assignee's primary concern in taking the assignment is
to obtain security in the vendee's installment payments.
Accordingly, the decision to include the assignment of an in-
stallment land contract vendor's rights within Article 9 stands in
stark contrast to Article 9's exclusion of assignments of leases and
rents. The final version of section 9-104(j), approved in 1958, ex-
cluded assignments of leases and rents from Article 9's otherwise
sweeping coverage, apparently to avoid objections from the real es-
tate bar and thereby facilitate the UCC's passage. Removed from
its political genesis, 254 however, the UCC's exclusion of leases and
427-29 (Wash. 1980). Contra In re Shuster, 784 F.2d 883, 884-85 (8th Cir. 1986) (ap-
plying Minnesota law); In re Hoeppner, 49 B.R. 124, 127-29 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985).
252. In re Heide, 915 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Washington law).
253. Section 9-106 defines "general intangibles" as "any personal property (includ-
ing things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments,
and money." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1972).
The Permanent Editorial Board Article 9 Study Group has now recommended that
Article 9 be revised to codify this position. REPORT OF PEB, supra note 244, at 66
("Article 9 should be revised to make clear that perfection of a security interest in a
vendor's rights under an installment land contract is governed by Article 9, that perfec-
tion should be accomplished in the same manner as with any other right to payment,
and that no additional perfection is required with respect to the vendor's interest in the
subject real property.").
254. Even Grant Gilmore described § 9-104's exclusions as a "curiously compiled
list [that] defies rational analysis." 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY, § 10.7, at 312 (1965). As Gilmore noted, many of the § 9-104 exclu-
sions reflect "what might be described as politically inspired concessions by the Code
sponsors to interests which, for good or bad or no reasons, did not want transactions in
which they were involved covered by a newfangled statute." Id.
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rents is more puzzling. Analytically, the assignment of a lease can
easily be separated into real and personal property components, as
security law has done with the installment land contract. Security
law could characterize the assignment of a lease as transferring both
an interest in realty (the lessor's reversionary interest in the land)
and an interest in the lessor's contractual rights under the lease (in-
cluding the lessor's right to collect the lessee's contractual pay-
ments). But for the sheer historical weight of the common law
conception that rent "issues from the land," the lessor's contractual
rights under the lease could be characterized as an interest in the
nature of personalty.
The time has arrived for security law to discard this historical
baggage. This Article previously demonstrated that security law
uses the term "rent" in an artificial manner removed from its pure
common law conception as an obligation that springs from the
land.255 Thus, the manner in which security law characterizes the
revenue generated by a development ought to be informed not by
outmoded common law conceptions, but by the behavior of the par-
ties to the financing transaction. At the planning stage, the devel-
oper and mortgagee evaluate the development transaction in terms
of projected future cash flows generated by occupancy contracts,
without regard to the legal characterization of those cash flows. 256
This fact is critical to a meaningful understanding of the term
"rents and profits" as parties use that term in the commercial real
estate financing transaction. As Tiffany recognized in his treatise
on landlord and tenant, the term "rent" has at least four distinct
uses. First, "rent" abstractly may describe any and every sum pay-
able by any person having an interest in land ("Rents are high be-
cause the market is tight"). Second, "rent" may describe a
particular obligation to be made by an occupier of particular land
("X's rent is overdue"). Third, "rent" can describe the right of a
particular person to a payment or succession of payments by the
occupant of a particular parcel of land ("Y has a rent of $500 per
month on Blackacre, which she leased to X"). Fourth, "rent" may
designate the proceeds of the occupier's legal obligation ("I just de-
posited $10,000 of rent paid by Y,,).257 When the mortgagee takes
an assignment of "rents and profits," the mortgagee's primary ob-
jective is to secure the "rent" in this fourth sense, as the cash flow
255. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 155-171 and accompanying text.
257. 1 TIFFANY, supra note 56, § 165, at 1009-10.
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or the proceeds of the occupier's obligation.258 In the commercial
land financing transaction, the practical significance of a collateral
assignment of rents and profits is to express clearly that the mortga-
gee receives a security interest in project cash flows from the closing
of the financing transaction through the completion of a foreclosure
and the extinguishment of the owner's equity of redemption in the
development.259 Since the length of time necessary to extinguish
the owner's equity of redemption may be significant (and since it
may be extended indefinitely by the owner's bankruptcy), a collat-
eral assignment of rents and profits protects the security of the
mortgagee both in (a) cash flows that have accrued prior to default
and (b) cash flows that will accrue between default and completion
of a foreclosure. 26"
With respect to rents already accrued, there is ample common
law authority for the proposition that they constitute personal prop-
erty.261 With respect to unaccrued rents, the common law histori-
258. See id. at 1010 ("The word [rent] is frequently used in this sense in the phrase
'rents and profits.' ").
259. By obtaining and enforcing this interest, the mortgagee can prevent the mortga-
gor from "milking" the property, or engaging in
a combination of aggressive rent collection efforts, minimal maintenance,
tax delinquency, low purchase down payments, and delinquency in pay-
ing off.., mortgages [which] can permit an owner to make a handsome
profit for a limited time, even as he writes off a larger portion of the rent
roll and depreciates the asset value of the property to zero by walking
away from his building when its economic potential is exhausted.
PETER D. SALINS, THE ECOLOGY OF HOUSING DESTRUCTION 14 (1980); see also NEL-
SON & WHITMAN, supra note 199, § 4.42, at 250-51 ("milking" is siphoning off project
cash flows for benefit of developer without maintaining property and paying mortgage
debt).
260. This is not to suggest that an assignment of rents and leases serves no other
purpose, or that a mortgagee does not care about the security of its right to collect
revenues after foreclosure is completed. Still, unless the developer previously has as-
signed away the right to collect unaccrued rents and profits, that right passes to the
mortgagee along with title upon the completion of the foreclosure. See NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 199, §§ 4.20-4.23, at 192-200. If the developer previously as-
signed away its right to collect unaccrued revenues, no prudent mortgagee will make a
first-priority mortgage loan against the development. Accordingly, the primary signifi-
cance of the assignment of rents, as a contractual matter, is to protect the mortgagee's
security in the project cash flows prior to extinguishment of the developer's equity of
redemption.
261. See, e.g., 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant, §§ 515, 530, at 495, 512 &
n. 16 (1970 & Supp. 1992) (collecting cases holding that accrued rents represent a chose
in action, are personal property, and do not pass to a transferee of reversion absent
contrary agreement); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.41, at 455 (A. James Casner
ed., 1952) (same); see also Marine Nat'l Bank v. Northwest Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 454
A.2d 67, 70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) ("The right to accrued rents is a personal property
right.").
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cally has treated them as an interest in land.262 But why should
security law characterize the tenant's payment obligation for its in-
terest in land as realty, yet classify the installment contract vendee's
obligation for its interest in land as personalty?263 Since the mort-
gagee intends the term "rents and profits" to describe the proceeds
of the occupier's contractual obligation, it seems ridiculous to char-
acterize those revenues as realty based solely upon the outmoded
construct that rent issues directly from land.
By focusing upon the economic realities of the modem com-
mercial real estate financing transaction, security law can provide a
coherent conceptual basis for treating the income generated by a
commercial development as personalty when pledged to secure the
underlying mortgage indebtedness. 264 Incorporating income paid
for the use of land into Article 9's framework for creating and
perfecting security interests can provide much-needed transactional
uniformity to commercial land finance. 265 Furthermore, including
262. See, e.g., 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord and Tenant, §§ 515, at 495 (1970) (collect-
ing cases holding that unaccrued rents are realty that pass with a transfer of reversion);
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 261, § 9.41, at 455 (same); see also
Marine Nat'l Bank, 454 A.2d at 70 ("The right to unaccrued rents is, however, an
'incorporeal hereditament' and part of the reversionary real property.").
263. See supra notes 251-253 and accompanying text.
264. At least one other commentator has expressly analogized rents to accounts re-
ceivable. See Sally A. Conti, Assignments of Rent in Bankruptcy: There Is Hope for
Secured Creditors, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, May 1991, at 7, 9-10. Unfortu-
nately, the UCC provides a definitional obstacle. An account is "any right to payment
for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instru-
ment or chattel paper." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1987). A hotel room does not fit within the
UCC definition of "goods," which is limited to movables and fixtures. Id. § 9-
105(l)(h). Furthermore, unless 100% of the occupier's payment is allocated to services
received (or unless "services" is interpreted to include the provision of land for tempo-
rary occupancy), the occupier's entire payment would not fall within the definition of
account. Accordingly, the occupier's payment is best characterized as a "general intan-
gible" under § 9-106, consistent with the UCC's current classification of a vendor's
right to installment land contract payments. See supra notes 251-253 and accompany-
ing text.
265. Previous efforts to achieve uniformity in state real estate finance laws have
failed miserably. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
have proposed a number of uniform acts-the Uniform Real Estate Mortgage Act
(1927), the Model Power of Sale Foreclosure Act (1940), the Uniform Land Transac-
tions Act (1977), and the Uniform Land Security Interest Act (1985)-yet none has
been enacted by any state. See Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential
Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Mar-
kets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1278-79 (1991).
Further, incorporating payments made by occupiers of land into Article 9 would
provide much needed uniformity in the bankruptcy context. For example, there has
been a tremendous amount of confusion in the bankruptcy courts as to when a mortga-
gee's security interest in rents is "perfected." This confusion has triggered a senseless
debate, with some courts concluding that a mortgagee perfects by duly recording its
1540
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such income within the scope of Article 9 is consistent with the
UCC drafters' expressed objective to adhere to substance over form
in the governance of secured transactions. As the drafters noted,
the objective of Article 9 was "to make distinctions, where distinc-
tions are necessary, along functional rather than formal lines."
'266
Viewed in hindsight, the drafters' decision to exclude rents gives
significance to form rather than function, contrary to this objective.
Those charged with revising Article 9 should remove section 9-
104(j)'s exclusion of rents pledged as security, and should instead
treat the developer's right to payments made by occupiers of land as
a general intangible subject to the provisions of Article 9.267
assignment of rents on the realty records, while others conclude that a mortgagee must
actually take possession of the realty after default in order to perfect its lien. Compare
In re Village Properties, Ltd., 723 F.2d 441, 443-47 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
974 (1984) (security interest in rents unperfected where mortgagee had not obtained
possession of property, impounded rents, or secured appointment of receiver) and In re
Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 84 B.R. 289, 293-97 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988)
(same) with In re Vienna Park Properties, 976 F.2d 106, 112-14 (2d Cir. 1992) (security
interest in rents perfected upon recording of assignment of rents) and In re Raleigh/
Spring Forest Apartments Assocs., 118 B.R. 42, 44-45 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990) (same);
see also Averch, supra note 6, at 485 n.3 (collecting dozens of cases on either side of this
debate). Requiring the mortgagee to take possession of the realty in order to perfect its
lien misapprehends the distinction between the creation and perfection of a lien and the
enforcement of that lien against the collateral-a distinction that is clearly expressed
and understood in the UCC. Had § 9-104(j) not excluded assignments of leases and
rents from Article 9, none of this senseless debate-the primary effect of which has been
to reallocate wealth from owners, mortgagees, and unsecured creditors to bankruptcy
lawyers-would have been necessary.
266. The drafters intended Article 9 "to provide a simple and unified structure
within which the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go
forward with less cost and with greater certainty." U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1972). One
purpose for this unitary approach was to simplify the complex hodgepodge of state
security laws governing each type of lien, which imposed "increasing costs to both par-
ties and increasing uncertainty as to their rights and the rights of third parties dealing
with them." Id.
267. Regrettably, a majority of the Permanent Editorial Board's Advisory Group on
Real Estate-Related Collateral has recommended that Article 9 not be amended to in-
corporate security interests in real estate rents. The report suggested the following rea-
sons for this recommendation:
(1) such an amendment would frustrate otherwise feasible real estate
reorganizations;
(2) it would be unfair to allow a party to collect rents if they have no
responsibility to maintain the property;
(3) there are potential problems coordinating the lender's remedies as a
secured party with the lender's remedies as a mortgagee;
(4) there is a reluctance to inject Article 9 into an area historically domi-
nated by real property law;
(5) such an amendment would meet strong political opposition from in-
terest groups that would delay the enactment of needed amendments
to Article 9.
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CONCLUSION
The conceptual formalism displayed by the bankruptcy courts
in the hotel bankruptcy cases is unsatisfactory both as a matter of
REPORT OF PEB, supra note 244, app. at 154-55, 196. A minority of the Advisory
Group recommended that Article 9 should be revised to include "rents" within its
scope. Id.
These justifications do not withstand careful scrutiny. The first objection (frustra-
tion of feasible reorganizations) is directed to the wrong forum. Inclusion of rents
within Article 9 would not by itself doom otherwise feasible real estate reorganizations.
As discussed previously, real estate reorganizations must rise or fall on their own merits
under the standards set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. See supra notes 184-186 and
accompanying text. If proper characterization of rents as Article 9 collateral would
make single asset real estate bankruptcy cases more difficult to sustain, that is a bank-
ruptcy matter-not a UCC concern-and a matter more appropriately addressed to
Congress.
The second objection (mortgagees could collect rents without maintaining the
land) makes an assumption that is plainly wrong. Where is it written that a lender with
a security interest in rents can take the gross rents from a project without regard for
maintaining the property? Lenders write mortgage loans on the assumption that net
cash flow after operating expenses will be available to secure repayment of the mort-
gage. See supra notes 155-171 and accompanying text. If the mutual understanding of
developer and mortgagee is that gross rentals are to be dedicated to maintaining the
property, security law certainly can condition the mortgagee's enforcement of its secur-
ity interest upon maintenance of the property. Furthermore, bankruptcy courts gener-
ally will allow the debtor-in-possession to use rents to pay operating expenses on the
ground that payment of these expenses preserves the going-concern value of the prop-
erty and thus provides adequate protection of the mortgagee's interest in the property.
See supra note 184 and accompanying text. Finally, the suggestion that a commercial
mortgagee would consciously fail to maintain the property and allow it to deteriorate,
thereby destroying the value of its own collateral, seems spurious.
The third objection (coordination of the mortgagee's Article 9 and real estate reme-
dies) seems trivial. While there may be potential problems in coordinating a lender's
remedies as an Article 9 secured party with its remedies as a mortgagee, the UCC has
drafted around such problems in the past. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-504(l) (1982) (where
security agreement covers both land and personal property, secured party may choose
to sell personal property collateral under Article 9 or in foreclosure sale under real
estate law). Likewise, the fourth objection (rents have always been real estate collateral)
is uninspired. Yes, rent historically has been within the purview of real estate law, but
that fact hardly justifies continuing adherence to an outmoded concept that now ob-
scures and complicates the proper analysis of commercial transactions. Cf U.C.C. § 9-
101 cmt. (1972) (discussing why Article 9 abandoned traditional distinctions among
pre-UCC security devices such as chattel mortgages and trust receipts and replaced
them with broader and more functional term "security interest").
The fifth objection (the proposed amendment would meet strong opposition from
various interest groups, risking delay in the enactment of the Article 9 reforms) is en-
tirely understandable yet completely unsatisfactory. First, the risk of disagreement
seems an inappropriate basis upon which to cease debate. Second, if political opposition
to this proposal would threaten the passage of other necessary amendments, the Perma-
nent Editorial Board should sever this issue from the remaining unobjectionable amend-
ments and discuss this proposal in greater detail. Finally, if the Permanent Editorial
Board is concerned about the political clout of developers and the Chapter I 1 bar, anec-
dotal evidence of state legislative activity suggests that this concern may be misplaced.
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law and logic. As the American Law Institute has suggested in the
proposed Restatement (Third) of Property-Security (Mortgages),
there is no legal or functional basis for bankruptcy courts to treat
hotel room revenues (and other sums paid in exchange for the right
to occupy land) differently from rents paid by tenants holding lease-
hold estates in land.268 In administering distressed hotel projects,
bankruptcy courts should reject the "tenant vs. licensee" distinction
previously embraced by the hotel bankruptcy cases and should in-
stead treat the hotel mortgagee identically with mortgagees of ten-
ant-based commercial land developments.
While the proposed Restatement's definition of "rents" is a vast
improvement over the conceptual formalism of the bankruptcy
courts, it does not resolve the larger question whether the term
"rent" has continuing usefulness as a basis for categorizing the in-
come generated by commercial real estate. The historical common
law distinction that sums paid for the bare use of land are rent,
while sums paid for services are not rent, no longer provides a prin-
cipled basis for characterizing the sums paid by occupiers of com-
mercial real estate projects. These projects involve an inextricable
blend of land and services, both of which are essential parts of the
developer/occupier bargain.2 69 Instead, sums paid by occupiers of
a project during its useful economic life reflect a return upon the
diminution of the project's productive capacity as that capacity is
exhausted over time. Accordingly, those sums constitute proceeds
of the underlying real estate collateral and should be protected
under Bankruptcy Code section 552(b) to the same extent as the
mortgagee's lien against the real estate collateral. 270 Furthermore,
there remains no sensible basis upon which to categorize "rent" as
an interest fundamentally in the nature of realty. All income gener-
ated pursuant to contracts for the occupancy of land should be
characterized as personal property when that income is pledged as
Ten states already have enacted statutes establishing that a creditor's lien upon rents is
"perfected" when the creditor records its assignment of rents on the real estate records,
thereby incorporating the UCC concept of "perfection" into the law of rents and mak-
ing single asset Chapter 11 cases more difficult to sustain. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 2938, 2938.1 (West 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN § 697.07 (West Supp. 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN § 58-2343 (Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 (West 1991); MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-204 (Sup. 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20(c) (Supp.
1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 93.806 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-116 (Supp. 1992);
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-220.1 (Michie Supp. 1992); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7-28-
230(3) (West 1992).
268. See supra Parts II-II1.
269. See supra notes 192-219 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 220-250 and accompanying text.
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security, and liens upon that income should be subject to the provi-
sions of UCC Article 9.271
271. See supra notes 251-267 and accompanying text.
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